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(5) There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the above authorities cited by the counsel for the appellant. But there the Courts were not concerned whether the document was forged or signatures were obtained on blank papers. In all those cases Courts were concerned with the interpretation of the document. In the case of Jadu Gopal Chakravarty (supra) the construction of the basic document was deed of trust. In that case the deed creating a religious trust came up for interpretation because that deed was capable of two possible constructions, namely, whether it created only a partial dedication and not an absolute debutter, the properties being charged for seva puja or other religious purposes to the extent specified therein, and secondly whether it created an absolute debuttar in favour of the deity. Therefore, the construction of the document. Since the deed of trust was capable of two interpretations, the Court opined that such an interpretation touches very important question of law hence appeal was maintainable. In the case of Smt.Vidya Wati (supua) the question of interpretation was the contract by virtue of which possession of the business or the shop was given. The question came up for consideration was whether it was a lease or not. I am afraid that is not the case in hand. In the present case respondents were punished. They underwent that punishment. Their case through out had been that under threat their signatures on blank papers were obtained which were ultimately used as Form of Discharge. Whether signatures were obtained on blank papers or on a filled form touches the merits of the case. It does not require any interpretation of the document. Even otherwise as per appellant the "Form of Discharge" was purported to have been signed by the respondents on 19th February,1991. The perusal of the Form of Discharge shows that no opportunity was afforded to the respondents to withdraw as alleged by the appellant. The speed with which the discharge was recommended and accepted smacks the submissions of the appellant. On 19th February,1991 the form was purported to have been signed by the respondents, it was recommended to the higher authority on the same day who in turn further recommended to his superiors for acceptance. The appropriate authority accepted the recommendation on 19th February,1991 itself. This contradicts the assertion of the appellant that opponunity was given to the respondents to withdraw the request of discharge. In fact on 19th February,1991 itself everything was completed. Respondents submitted the Form of Discharge and they stood discharged from the service on the same day. Had they sought for the discharge as put up by the appellant there was no question of them making representation immediately on being discharged from service. They alleged that they had been played upon them. In fact the assertion of the appellant that is signatures of respondents were not taken on blank papers could not be proved on record. On the contrary assertion of the respondents that their signatures were obtained on blank papers which were used as Form of Discharge remained unrebutted on record. The appellant Union of India was proceeded ex parte. It never led any evidence to rebut the assertion of the respondents. In the absence of there being any rebuttal there was no question of drawing presumption against the present respondents or drawing any presumption under Section 140 and 142 of the Army Act. The appellant did not adduce any evidence nor the evidence of the commanding officer before whom it is alleged that the respondent filed the Form of Pre-mature Discharge from service nor evidence of those persons adduced who asked the respondents to re-consider their request of discharge and that the respondents persistently requested that they be discharged. In the absence of any such evidence having been adduced by the appellant, the First Appellate Court rightly concluded that discharge of the respondents from the service w.e.f. 23rd February,1991 was not legal. This was a question of fact based on the documentary evidence placed on record that the Court concluded that the said discharge was not voluntary. In view of the fact that the First Appellate Court dealt with the fact at length, I see no reason to interfere with the same in this second appeal. To my mind, no question of law has been raised in this appeal. In the facts of this case it cannot be said that the learned First' Appellate Court arrived at a perverse finding or the Form of Discharge was capable of two interpretations. In this appeal the appellant has alleged that findings of the First Appellate Court are contrary to the facts on record. In fact no evidence was adduced by the appellant before the Courts below, therefore, there was no question of First Appellate Court not relying on the same nor his finding can be called perversed. The findings of the First Appellate Court which are based on documentary evidence cannot be interfered with.