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2. As both the aforesaid complaints were filed by the respondent against the petitioner for dishonouring of various cheques described in the private complaints. It is said that the notice of dishonouring the cheque given by complainant was received and on filing the complaint after recording the statement cognizance were taken in both the complaints by the trial court. On service of the notice, petitioners have filed a preliminary objection on 6.7.2012 inter alia contending that in private complaint No.233/08, a notice for dishonouring was issued on 20.12.2007, which remained unclaimed by the noting of the postal department dated 1.1.2008 and the complaint was filed on 14.1.2008 prior to expiry of the period of 15 days; while in complaint case No.234/08, the notice was given on 20.12.2007 to which the intimation was given to the accused on 24.12.2007 and return by the postal department on 3.1.2008, however, filing of the complaints on 14.1.2008 is prior to expiry of the period of 15 days. Counsel for applicant referring the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1988 (in short "N.I. Act") contends that for dishonouring of the cheque giving the notice by the payee to the drawer within 30 days from the receipt of intimation of dishonouring from the bank is a sine qua non as per Section 138 (b) of the N.I. Act, however the offence is deemed to have committed but if the amount has not been paid within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the offender can be prosecuted for the said offence. In the present case, the date of intimation of unclaimed notice is 1.1.2008 and 3.1.2008, however, on filing the complaint on 14.1.2008 prior to expiry of the period of 15 days, the complaint is not prosecutable and it is liable to be dismissed. It is also contended that in case where the intimation was given by postal department in reference to the provisions as contained under Section 138 (b) which returned unclaimed then it would not be treated as the notice received by the drawer, therefore, the complaint cannot be prosecuted. The trial Court considering the date of issuance of giving the notice as relevant for reckoning the period of 15 days to prosecute private complaint rejected the said application and which is confirmed by the revisional Court without due consideration of the provision of law, however, both these orders may be set aside and complaint may also be dismissed treating it as premature. In the last, it is urged that if procedure as prescribed under Section 138(b) & (c) has not been followed for commission of any offence, the private complaint is not prosecutable.

138. However, commission of the offence and its prosecutability are two distinct issues which is to be observed for the purpose of punishment as contemplated under the N.I. Act.

8. In the above context, undisputed facts of the present case are required to be seen. A loose cheque was given by the drawer to the payee which was dishonoured. Within a period of 30 days from the date of dishonouring, the notice was issued on 20.12.2007 to the drawer by post. The Post Office of the drawer's address gave first intimation on 24.12.2007 and when it remained unclaimed for seven days as per the noting dated 1.1.2008 pleaded in private complaint No.233/08 and on 3.1.2008 pleaded in private complaint No.234/08, it was returned to the payee. It is not in dispute that both the complaints were filed on 14.1.2008, however, from the date it was shown to be unclaimed by the postal department i.e. 1.1.2008 and 3.1.2008 and the complaints have been filed prior to expiry of the 15 days of the said notice. However, in the said context, prosecutability of the private complaint has been objected by filing a preliminary objection by the trial Court which is rejected by the orders impugned, which were confirmed in revision.

10. Reverting to the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant that the notice was issued on 20.12.2007 which was received to the Post Office and intimation was given by the Post Office to the drawer on 24.12.2007, however, the first date of intimation ought to be counted as a date of notice unclaimed by the petitioner. In this context, much emphasis has been laid on the paragraphs of the judgment of Apex Court in the case of K. Bhaskaran (supra). On perusal of the judgment of K. Bhaskaran (supra), it is apparent that the notice in the said case was given on 2.2.1993 and it was returned to the complainant on 15.2.1993, thereafter, the complaint was filed on 4.3.1993 after elapse of the period of 15 days. While in the present case, the notice sent by the payee to the drawer remained unclaimed as per the notice of the Postal Department dated 1.1.2008 and 3.1.2008 and the complaint has been filed on 14.1.2008 therefore, in the said fact the observations of the Court in the case of K. Bhaskaran that if the notice is returned as unclaimed, such date would be the date of commencement or reckoning the period of 15 days. In the facts of the present case, as discussed hereinabove and the facts of the K. Bhaskaran's case (supra) are quite distinguishable, therefore, the arguments as advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant relying upon paragraph-24 of the said judgment cannot be countenanced and is hereby repelled. Now one of the aspect is further required to be dealt with which is contended relying upon the case of Agrawal Medical Agencies (supra) wherein issue of service of notice was considered in the context of the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act and in the said case issue of presumption of service has been dealt with in the facts and situation of the case. If the provisions of Section 27 of General Clauses Act has been read in the context of provisions of Section 138 then there is some distinction which is to be drawn and kept in mind always by the Courts. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act indicates expression "served", "give" or "sent" while section 138 (c) of the N.I. Act indicates the giving of notice and accrual of a cause of action, if the amount is not paid within 15 days after receipt of the notice, therefore, for the purpose of Section 138, the Court ought to construe the word "give" as "receive". It should not be construed as specified under the General Clauses Act "served", "give" or "sent". Therefore, the judgment of the Agrawal Medical Agencies (supra) as relied upon is of no help to the respondent.