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In a case such as the one before us, in which there were two factions in a village, one of the oppressors and the other of the oppressed, (1) AIR 1956 S.C. 654. (2) AIR 1956 S.C. 731. (3) 20 Sut. W.R. (Cr.) 5 (A).

smarting under the pain of injuries inflicted by their oppressors, the intention of a member of an assembly could be initially quite lawful. His object may not go beyond joining a procession for purposes of protest. We are convinced, on the evidence on record, that the participation of the appellant before us went beyond,exhibiting a mere intention to protest. It not only embraced knowledge of likelihood of hurt of some kind to members of the party attacked, but it included an attack by the appellant on Baliram, PW 1. The nature of that attack was, however, relatively mild. At most, from the, concerted action of so many men a member of the unlawful assembly, on the facts and circumstances of the case before us, could be reasonably held to be aware that grievous hurt would result. After examining all the evidence relating to the participation of the appellant and others in the riot we are left in grave doubt whether the assembly had a common object of killing any one at all,' even if such was really the object of any particular member or members of the unlawful assembly. It may be that those who cut the limbs of men who lost their lives due to bleeding could reasonably be held liable for murder. But, it seems to be unlikely that each member, considering the nature of the riot and the different acts of different members of the riotous assembly, had such an object. This was exactly the view adopted by this Court in Chikkarange Gowda's case (supra).