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Referring to the case of Goodwin v. Phillips, [1908] 7 CLR 16 the Court observed that the doctrine of implied repeal was well recognised, and that repeal by implication was a convenient form of legislation and that by using this device, the legislature must be presumed to intend to achieve a consistent body of law. The Court then went on to say that it is undoubtedly true that the legislature can exercise the powers of repeal by implication, but it is an equally well-settled principle of law that there is a pre- sumption against an implied repeal. Upon the assumption that the legislature enacts laws with a complete knowledge of all existing laws pertaining to the same subject, the failure to acid a repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal existing legislation. This presumption is rebutted if the provisions of the new Act are so inconsistent with the old ones that the two cannot stand together. Then the Court referred to the following observations from page 631, para 311 of Crawford on Statutory Construction:
"There must be what is often called 'such a positive repug- nancy between the two provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together'. In other words they must be absolutely repugnant or irreconcilable. Otherwise, there can be no implied repeal ..... for the intent of the legislature to repeal the old enactment is utterly lacking."

The Court then referred to the observations made in Crosby v. Patch, 18 Calif. 438 quoted by Crawford "Statutory Con- struction" p. 633 to point out the reasons of the rule that an implied repeal will take place in the event of clear inconsistency or repugnancy. The said observations are as follows:

1. Whether there is direct conflict between the two provi- sions;
2. Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaus-

tive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier law;

3. Whether the two laws occupy the same field. The Court then referred to Sutherland on Statutory Construc- tion (Vol. 13rd Edn. p. 486) on the question of "repeal of special and local statutes by general statutes". The para- graph reads as follows:

"The enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and application to cover the field of operation of a special or local statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law, or to a particular locality within the jurisdictional scope of the general statute. An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted to statutes of the same general nature since the legislature is presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject-matter by the general enactment. Therefore, where the later general statute does not propose an irreconcilable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a quali- fication of or exception to the general law."

It was further held that though there is no express repeal, even then the State law will be void under the proviso if it conflicts with later law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by the Parliament. The principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, that if the subject matter of later legislation is identical with that of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, will be equally applicable to a question under Art. 254(2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. Accordingly, it was held that Sec. 2 of the Bombay Act, No. 36 of 1947 cannot prevail as against Sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act as amended by Act 52 of 1950.