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(iii) The phrase "person" occurring in Section 364-A IPC and defined by Section 11 IPC excludes an individual and is meant for a juristic person, company or association, or body of persons only. It was strenuously argued that the very object of amending Section 364-A IPC was to tackle international terrorism, hence the phrase "person" must be given a purposive construction harmonious with the Object of the amended provision. Reference is made to Article 13 of the International Convention which reads as follows:-

(9) Countering these contentions, Dr. Sidhu, learned Assistant SG and learned counsel for the States of Punjab & Haryana have questioned the very maintainability of this writ petition.

(10) The dismissal of this writ petition in limine could be well justified simply on the ground that the petitioners along with their co-accused Sonia have been concurrently held guilty of the substantive offence under Section 302 IPC and awarded death sentence for the said offence, independent of their conviction and sentence under Section 364-A IPC. The counsel for the Union and States rightly contended that this circuitous route of challenging vires of Section 364-A IPC is merely a cloak to delay the execution of death warrants for even if the challenge to 'death sentence' under Section 364-A succeeds, the same sentence awarded for the offence under Section 302 IPC still sustains and is final. (11) Similarly, the plea whether Section 364-A IPC is attracted or a convict thereunder could be sentenced to death without following the test of 'rarest of rare cases' preceded by 'special reasons', was very much available and unsuccessfully raised by the petitioners or that they are now estopped from re-agitating the same issue, also carries weightage. We say so for the reason that while deciding the petitioners' appeal vide judgement dated January 25, 2010 (Annexure P2), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 26 referred to the aim and object of inserting Section 364-A by virtue of Amendment Act No.42 of 1993 and thereafter held as follows:-

(14) Be that as it may, owing to the intense and importance of the legal issues raised by the petitioners, we deem it appropriate to express our views on merits as well.

(15) The offence of 'kidnapping or abducting in order to murder' as defined in Section 364 IPC was found inadequate to curb the growing menace of such kidnapping or abducting for ransom, hence Section 364-A IPC was inserted by Act No.42 of 1993 w.e.f. 22nd May, 1993. The nature of offence has been further widened by Act No.24 of 1995 w.e.f. 26th May, 1995 whereby the existing phrase "the government or any other person", has been substituted with an expanded expression "the government or any foreign state or international inter-governmental organization or any other person". (16) The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment Act No.42 of 1993 clearly expounds that the amendment was brought as "kidnappings by terrorists for ransom, for creating panic amongst the people and for securing release of arrested associates and cadres have assumed serious dimensions for which the existing provisions of law were proved to be inadequate". On the other hand, the object of further amendment of Section 364-A IPC vide Amending Act No.24 of 1995 was to bring the domestic law consistent with the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17th December, 1979 and to which India acceded to w.e.f. 7th September, 1994 only. Resultantly, w.e.f. 26.05.1995, the offence of 'kidnapping for ransom' not only covered private individuals but also the ones who indulged in compelling the Government or a foreign State or International Inter-governmental Organization to do or abstain from doing any act or to pay ransom also. The petitioner's claim that the amended provision intended to punish those only with death penalty who commit the offence against Government, any foreign State or International Inter-governmental Organization, is thus totally farce and contrary to the legislative history of Section 364-A IPC.

(25) The fifth contention has no factual basis behind suggesting that death penalty is the 'rule' or life imprisonment is an 'exception' for the offence under Section 364-A IPC. In the absence of any definite information or material such like vague and wild discord merits outright rejection. We may, however, hasten to add that the reported decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, a few of which are cited in this order, unambiguously bear out that the vigorous tests applied for awarding death sentence for an offence under Section 302 IPC mutatis mutandis are applied while considering the quantum of sentence in a case under Section 364-A IPC too. No instance of awarding death sentence even if the victim of kidnapping for ransom was rescued has been referred to or brought to our notice. Occasion to consider whether the case falls within the known exceptions and is fit for award of death sentence, arises only when the victim has been met with cold-blooded gruesome murder for greed. The decision in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate (supra) is inapplicable in the instant case as that was a case under TADA read with Section 302, 307 and some other offences under IPC and it explains the duties of the Designated Court under the TADA. (26) The last submission too has no legs to stand and must fall flat. The decision of a Co-ordinate Bench in Vinod Kumar's case renders no help to the petitioners for more than one reason. Firstly, the petitioners have been convicted and sentenced to death upto the highest court for the substantive offence under Section 302 IPC also. The quantum of sentence under Section 364-A IPC thus, in no way, changes their fate. Secondly, in Vinod Kumar's case, the kidnapped child was recovered unharmed. The award of lesser sentence, on facts, was justified. Thirdly, in Vinod Kumar's case as well as in the previous Division Bench decision of this Court in Balwant Singh's case, the phrase "or any other person" went unnoticed by the Bench. Fourthly, the plea on quantum of sentence taken by the petitioners has been expressly rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dismissing their criminal appeal(s) with a finding that soon after kidnapping the victim was reduced to a corpse with the help of chemicals and was done to death in an inhuman, diabolic and dastard manner.