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58. Sezhivan Committee itself had recommended and it would be obvious that pursuant thereto Table 58 also was introduced into the market to benefit those lives in rural areas or in the unorganised sectors. Confining the policy under Table 58 to already covered salaried sections would, therefore, be unreasonable and arbitrary and would deprive large segments in the rural areas or unorganised or self- employed would be unjust and irrational and unfair.

An unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is also unjust amenable to judicial review. In common law a party was relieved from such contract. In Gillespie Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd., 1973 (1) Q.B. 400, Lord Denning for the first time construing the indemnity clause in a contract stated that the court to permit party to enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or applied so unreasoably, would be unconscionable, it was stated :

In his "The Bargain Principle And Its Limits" published in (1982) 95 Har. L.R. page 441, Prof. M.A. Eisenberg quotes Prof. Arthur Leff from the latter's article "Unconscionability of the Code" published in 1967) 115 U.Pen. Law Review 485 at 494 stating that:

"The purpose of contract law is not simply to create conditions of liability, but also to respond to the social process of promising."

He stated that since the law does not enforce a promise as such, a legal analysis of bargain of promise must start with a question whether such promise is enforceable at all. He further quoted Aurthor Leff analysing the distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability. Procedural unconscionability is fault on unfairness in the bargaining process and substantive unconscionability is fault or unfairness in the bargaining outcome-that is, unfairness of terms. Quoting S.208 of the Restatement (second) of Contracts, he stated at page 752 that :

"Whether the clause involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of making of the contract - The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise - and not of distrubance of allocation of the risks because of superior bargaining power."

He further stated at page 799 that :

"Over the past thirty years a new paradigmatic principle -

unconscionability - has emerged. This principle expalins and justifies the limits that should be placed upon the bargain principle on the basis of the equality of a bargain."

At page 800, he stated that :

"The paradigma (unconscionability) must be articulated and extended through the development of more specific norms to guide the resolution of specific cases, provide affirmative relief to exploited parties, and channel the discretion of administrators and legislators. In accomplishing this task, it now appears that the distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability, which may have served a useful purpose at an earlier stage, does not provide much help once the relatively obvious norms of unconscionability, such as unfair surprise, have been articulated. Development of more specific norms must, instead, proceed by the identification of classes of cases in which neither fairness nor efficiency supports the application of the bargain principle - an effort that can be guided in part by the reconstruction and extension of existing contract doctrines."