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(18) In Pratap Udai Nath v. Sara Lal Air 1949 Patna 39(17) a special bench of Agarwala Cj, Meredith and Narayan Jj held that equity acts in personam and an injunction is a personal matter. The ordinary rule is that it can only be disobeyed in contempt by persons named in the writ. Persons who were not defendants in the suit in which the injunction was granted nor were named in the decree cannot be proceeded against in contempt for disobeying the injunction, even if such persons claim through the person against whom the injunction was granted. The special bench held that the decision of the Privy Council in the case of S. N. Banerjee v. Kuchwar Lime & Stone Co. Ltd.. was conclusive upon the point before them. Jn that case the Patna High Court had held that the Secretary of State for India and -the Director , the Manager of the Kalyanpur Lime Works were guilty of contempt for interfering with a former lessee under the Government, the Kuchwar Lime and Stone Company Ltd. in breach of an injunction against the Secretary of State. "The Privy Council held that there had been no contempt by the Secretary of State. But they were pressed with the argument that Ghosh and Banerjee of the Kalyanpur Company were nevertheless guilty of contempt for aiding and abetting. The Privy Council said : 'THErespondents, however, contended that even if the Secretary of State was nut himself guilty of direct disobedience to the injunction which had been granted, yet the other two appellants were guilty of contempt upon the principles set out in Avery v. Andrews. 51 L. J. Ch. 414 (46 L. T. 279) and Seaward v. Paterson (1897) 1 Ch. 545 : (66 L. J. Ch. 267). In terms, however, those cases limit the offence of contempt by a person not a party to the injunction to cases where they aid and abet the party enjoined in its breach. Where, as here, that party has not broken the injunction it is impossible to hold that anyone has aided or abetted them in breaking it. The respondents sought to avoid this difliculty by maintaining that the doing by anyone of an act which was forbidden by the injunction was itself an offence. Their lordships can find no authority for so wide a proposition. It is certainly not enunciated or indeed hinted at the cases referred to nor do they think it is sound in principle."

(30) This then is the distinction between 'civil contempt' and 'criminal contempt'. This distinction is made in the Ac. The disobedience of injunction is a civil contempt Strictly speaking it does not fall within section 2(b) of the Act. It is specifically dealt with in Order 39 of the Code. But it is not a criminal contempt. The argument that the act of aiding and abetting a breach of injunction amounts to a criminal contempt is based on the leading English case of Seaward v. Paterson (1897) I Ch. 545. ft concerned a promoter who had arranged boxing matches on residential premises in London and thereby knowingly assisted the lessee to disobey an order enjoining him from committing a. nuisance. In the course of his judgment in the Court of Appeal upholding the promoter's committal for contempt. Lindley L.J. distinguished between "a motion to commit a man for breach of an injunction, which is technically wrong, unless he is bound by the injunction" and a "motion to commit a man for contempt of court, not because he is bound by the injunction by being a party to the cause, but because he is conducting himself so as to obstruct the course of justice.' The inference to be drawn from this distinction made by Lindley Lj is that the liability of the promoter was considered to be as for a criminal contempt of court. In Scott v. Scott (1913) A.C. 417 (458-459) (22), however, Lord Atkinson denied that this was so, and himself suggested that it would be absurd if a criminal contempt were to be committed by one who was not personally prohibited from doing the act in question, while no more than a civil contempt was committed by one who was. A third party which is said to be guilty of aiding and abetting the contempt incurs the liability of a principal offender. The powerful speech of Lord Atkinson Scott v. Scott (supra), shows that an aider and abetter will also be guilty of a civil contempt because the principal is guilty of civil contempt. (See Miller Contempt of Court pp. 249-250). Salmon Lj has said : "Astranger who helps the defendant to breach the injunction is sent to prison, no doubt as a punishment for contempt but the effect of sending him to prison is also an indirect en- forcement of the order which benefits the plaintiff."

(44) Founding himself on Seaward v. Paterson counsel argued that the husband incited the wife in continuing the construction in defiance of the order of the court. It was argued that the husband's support and endorsement of the action of the defendant in setting the court at defiance is a criminal contempt. With this contention I do not agree. In that case the principal Paterson, his agents and servants were restrained by injunction from, amongst other things having, or permitting to be held, exhibitions of boxing on his premises. He held, or permitted to be held there, such an exhibition in breach of this injunction. One Murray, who was neither his agent nor servant, was present at the exhibition, aiding and abetting Paterson in holding it. The plaintiff moved that both principal and the abettor should be committed for breach of the injunction. The whole controversy before North J. was whether Murray could be committed, as he was not a party to the suit and was no" named in the injunction. The learned judge held that he could be committed, not indeed for breach of the injunction but for contempt of court in aiding and abetting Paterson in doing an act which the latter was by the injunction prohibited from doing, and committed both Paterson and Murray to prison. Murray alone appealed from this order to the court of appeal. In the appeal the order of North J. was upheld.

(46) There is no agreement amongst the judges on its true ratio decidendi. In a trenchant criticism of the view that this case is an authority on criminal contempt Lord Atkinson said "I cannot agree that disobedience per se of an order of the court irrespective of the nature of the thing ordered to be done, is a criminal offence." (Scott vs. Scott). Scott v. Scott and Jennison v. Baker (supra) take the view that in Seaward v. Paterson the action amounted to a civil contempt. Cross J. in Phonographic Performance assumed that the act amounted to a criminal contempt. Oswald and Fox in their treatises on contempt classify adding and abetting breach of injunction as a criminal contempt. Miller in his book on Contempt of Court takes the view that a person rendering assistance commits a cririnnal contempt. (page 248). Borrie and Lowe in their book on The Law of Contempt sum up the controversy in these words : "ANOTHERtype of contempt which is difficult to classify is aiding and abetting a breach of injunction. It can be argued that such an act amounts to a criminal contempt since the offence is not committed by a party to the action and the act clearly impedes the due course of justice. On the other hand it can equally well be argued that the act amounts to a civil contempt, the punishment of the offender being an indirect means of enforcing the court order for the benefit of the plaintiff. Authority can be found to support both of these views."