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2. This decision has led to some controversy as to the obligation of the Muslim husband to pay maintenance to the divorced wife. Opportunity has, therefore, been taken to specify the rights which a Muslim divorced woman is entitled to at the time of divorce and to protect her interests."

11. A reading of the Statement makes it clear that the Legislature took the opportunity arising out of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, , to specify the rights a Muslim divorced woman would be entitled to at the time of divorce and to protect her interests.

39. In Tyabji's Muslim Law (4th Edition, Para 304, Pages 268-269, the relevant statement made reads as under :

"On the expiration of the iddat aftert talaq, the wife's right to maintenance ceases, whether based on the Muslim Law, or on an order under the Criminal Procedure Code."

40. In Muslim Law in Modern India, 1982 Edition, Page 130, it is stated :

"When a marriage is dissolved by divorce the wife is entitled to maintenance during the period of iddat. On the expiration of the period of iddat, the wife is not entitled to any maintenance under any circumstances. Muslim law does not recognise any obligation on the part of a man to maintain a wife whom he had divorced."

41. Relying upon the statement of law on the point in the Text Books, it was contended before the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan (1985 Cri LJ 875) that the liability of the husband to maintain a divorced wife is limited to the period of Iddat. The Supreme Court, dealing with the contention, observed (at p. 881 of Cri LJ) :

"14. These statements in the text books are inadequate to establish the proposition that the Muslim husband is not under an obligation to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife, who is unable to maintain herself. One must have regard to the entire conspectus of the Muslim Personal Law in order to determine the extent, both in quantum and in duration, of the husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of an indigent wife who has been divorced by him. Under that law, the husband is bound to pay Mahr to the wife as a mark of respect to her. True, that he may settle any amount he likes by way of dower upon his wife, which cannot be less than 10 Dirhams, which is equivalent to three or four rupees (Mulla's Mahomedan Law, 18th Edition, para 286, page 308). But, one must have regard to the realities of life. Mahr is a mark of respect to the wife. The sum settled by way of Mahr is generally expected to take care of the ordinary requirements of the wife, during the marriage and after. But these provisions of the Muslim Personal Law do not countenance cases in which the wife is unable to maintain herself after the divorce. We consider it not only incorrect but unjust, to extend the scope of the statements extracted above to cases in which a divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. We are of the opinion that the application of those statements of law must be restricted to that class of cases, in which there is no possibility of vagrancy or destitution arising out of the indigence of the divorced wife. We are not concerned here with the broad and general question whether a husband is liable to maintain his wife, which includes a divorced wife, in all circumstances and at all events. That is not the subject matter of Section 125. That section deals with cases in which, a person who is possessed of sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain, amongst others, his wife who is unable to maintain herself. Since the Muslim Personal Law, which limits the husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of the divorced wife to the period of iddat, does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125, it would be wrong to hold that the Muslim husband, according to his personal law, is not under an obligation to provide maintenance, beyond the period of iddat, to his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. The argument of the appellant that, according to the Muslim Personal Law, his liability to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife is limited to the period of iddat, despite the fact that she is unable to maintain herself, has therefore to be rejected. The true position is that, if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband's liability to provide maintenance for her ceases with the expiration of the period of iddat. If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to take recourse to Section 125 of the Code. The outcome of this discussion is that there is no conflict between the provisions of Section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim husband's obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself."

44. Thus, the question raised before the Supreme Court was, whether, under the Muslim Personal Law, any sum is payable to the wife on divorce. It was urged that Mahr is the amount payable by the husband to the wife on divorce. The Supreme Court felt that it was impossible to accept the argument. Quoting with approval the decisions of the Privy Council in Hamira Bibi v. Zubaide Bibi 43 Ind App 294 : AIR 1916 PC 46 at p. 48 and in Syed Sabir Husain v. Farzand Hasan 65 Ind App 119 at p. 127 : AIR 1938 PC 80 at P. 83 and examining the contention with reference to the statements made in the Mulla's Principles of Mahomedan Law and Muslim Law and Muslim Law in Modern India by Dr. Paras Diwan, the Supreme Court ruled that Mahr is not a sum under the Muslim Personal Law as payable on divorce.