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3.7. Aggrieved by the 03.03.2018 order recalling the earlier sanction of refund, the Appellants first attempted to challenge it before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) by way of an appeal under Section 53 of the Act. The CCRA dismissed the appeal on 16.04.2019, prompting the Appellants to file Writ Petition No. 8276 of 2019 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. In its judgment dated 04.10.2022, the High Court set aside the orders dated 03.03.2018 and 16.04.2019, noting that the Appellants had not been accorded proper opportunity of hearing. The matter was remanded to the CCRA for fresh consideration, particularly on the question of whether the original (unamended) or the amended provision under Section 48(1) of the Act would apply to the cancellation. Pursuant to that remand, the CCRA  passed a fresh order on 16.12.2022, again rejecting the refund claim on the ground that the amended six-month limitation governed the Appellants’ case.

3.8. Aggrieved by the CCRA’s stance, the Appellants filed Writ Petition (C) No. 2018 of 2024 before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, urging, inter alia, that (i) the right to seek refund accrued on the date of execution (17.03.2015), thus invoking the unamended two-year window, and (ii) the CCRA had no statutory power of review to recall its initial order granting refund.

3.9. By the impugned judgment dated 18.04.2024, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding, in essence, that the date of registration (28.04.2015) triggered the Appellants’ claim, which fell under the amended provision stipulating a six-month limitation. The High Court further opined that, in the specific facts, the CCRA’s recall could not be struck down solely on the ground of no express power of review.

12. We also find merit in the Appellants’ submission that the CCRA, having once granted a refund by its order dated 08.01.2018, lacked any express statutory power to review or recall that decision. A quasi- judicial authority can only exercise such powers as the statute confers. There is no provision in the Act enabling the CCRA to sit in review of its own orders. In the absence of any enabling clause, the subsequent orders dated 03.03.2018, 16.04.2019, and ultimately 16.12.2022, reversing the earlier sanction of the refund, cannot be sustained solely because the Appellants participated in the proceedings.

17. The subsequent orders of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) recalling the earlier sanction of refund, including the Order dated 16.12.2022, are accordingly quashed. The Order dated 08.01.2018, which allowed the Appellants’ refund, shall stand restored.

18. The appellant had applied for refund of the stamp duty on 6th August, 2016. The same had been allowed by the CCRA vide order dated 08.01.2018. Instead of refunding the amount, the CCRA, by a subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 illegally recalled its earlier decision of 08.01.2018 and rejected the request for refund. We have already held above that the subsequent order dated 03.03.2018 was vitiated in law and secondly that the appellant was entitled to refund. In such circumstances, we find that the amount of Rs.27,34,500/- had been wrongly retained by the State from 08.01.2018 for almost seven years. As such, we are of the view that the appellant would be entitled to simple interest @ 6 per cent per annum on the above amount from the date of the first order of CCRA dated 08.01.2018 till the date it is paid.