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11. In reply, Mr. Venugopal relying on this Court's decision in S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore & Ors.

[(2007) 11 SCC 75] submitted that the respondents before this Court are entitled to support the impugned judgment of the High Court by challenging any finding that might have been rendered by the High Court against the respondents in the impugned judgment. He submitted that the respondents are therefore entitled to challenge the finding of the High Court in the impugned judgment that the  appellant had been professing Hinduism at least from the date of admission in the law college in 1978. He vehemently argued that the appellant has not pleaded in his written statements filed before the High Court that he was a Christian during his childhood and he converted himself to Hinduism on attaining majority and his plea in the written statements was that his parents were Hindu and that he was a Hindu even during his childhood and therefore he cannot be allowed to contend that his parents were Christian and during his childhood he was a Christian and on attaining majority he re-converted himself into Hinduism by abjuring a Christian religion. He submitted that in Perumal Nadar (dead) by LRs. v. Ponnuswami [1970 (1) SCC 605] this Court has held that a mere theoretical allegiance to the Hindu faith by a person born in another faith does not convert him into a Hindu, nor is a bare declaration that he is a Hindu sufficient to convert him to Hinduism but a bona fide intention to be converted to the Hindu faith, accompanied by conduct unequivocally expressing that intention may be sufficient evidence of conversion and no formal ceremony of purification or expiation is necessary to  effectuate conversion. He submitted that in Kailash Sonkar v. Smt. Maya Devi (supra) this Court has held that the main test to determine whether there has been reconversion is that there should be a genuine intention of the reconvert to abjure his new religion and completely dissociate himself from it and reconversion should not be only a ruse or a pretext or a cover to gain mundane worldly benefits. He argued that in the facts of the present case, no evidence has been adduced to show that the appellant abjured Christian religion and reconverted himself into Hindu and the evidence only shows that the appellant went through a formal reconversion to Hindu religion only with a view to avail the benefits of reservation. Mr. Giri and Mr. Rajendran adopted these contentions of Mr. Venugopal.

15. In reply, Mr. Venugopal submitted that the fact that the appellant was elected from a reserved constituency in the earlier elections cannot prevent the disqualification from being established in a subsequent election as each election results in a fresh cause of action. He cited the decisions of this Court in C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and others [(1976) 1 SCC 863] and Satrucharla Vijaya Rama Raju v.

Nimmaka Jaya Raju and others [(2006) 1 SCC 212] in which it has been held that every election furnishes a fresh cause of action for a challenge to that election and adjudication on a prior election petition cannot be conclusive in a subsequent proceeding. According to him, therefore, the fact that the appellant on five earlier elections had been elected from a constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste is not a bar to the challenge to his election in 2009 from a  constituency reserved for Scheduled Caste on the ground that he was not a member of the Scheduled Castes. He submitted that in C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal and others (supra) this Court considered whether in fact S. Rajgopal was accepted as a member of Adi Dravida caste after his reconversion to Hinduism and after considering the various circumstances detailed in para 18 of the judgment as reported in the SCC came to the conclusion that after his reconversion to Hinduism, S. Rajgopal was recognized and accepted as a member of Adi Dravida caste by the other members of that community. He vehemently argued that in the facts of the present case there is no circumstance to show that the appellant, if at all has been reconverted to Hinduism, was accepted by the Cheramar caste.

16. Mr. Giri, learned counsel for respondent in Civil Appeal No.6391 of 2010, adopted the arguments of Mr. Venugopal and further submitted that in the Constitution (Scheduled Castes Order, 1950, Part VIII) relating to State of Kerala, in Entry 54, Pulayan and Cheramar castes have been shown as two separate castes. He submitted that Pulayan and Cheramar castes are thus two separate and  distinct castes and onus is on the appellant to show that after his reconversion he was accepted by either the Pulayan caste or the Cheramar caste. He argued that the pleadings of the appellant and the evidence produced by him would show that the appellant was not clear as to which of the two castes he was accepted. He cited the decision in S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors. [1969 (1) SCR 254] in which the law relating to acceptance of a person by members of caste to which the appellant originally belonged after his reconversion to Hinduism has been laid down.

18. We have perused the decisions of this Court cited by the learned counsel for the parties on the acceptance of the reconvert by the members of the original caste of the reconvert. In S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam & Ors. (supra) this Court agreed with the High Court that Rajagopal, on conversion to Christianity, ceased to belong to Adi Dravida caste but held that if the members of the caste accept the reconversion of a person as a member of their caste, it should be held that he does become the member of that case, even though he may have lost membership of that caste on conversion to another religion. In the aforesaid decision, this Court, however, held that Rajgopal though married to a member of the Adi Dravida caste, his marriage was not performed according to the rites observed by members of that caste and the marriage not being according to the system prevalent in the caste itself, that marriage cannot therefore be proof of admission of Rajgopal in the caste by members of the caste in general. This Court further found in the aforesaid case that no other evidence was given to show that at any subsequent stage any step was taken by the members of the caste indicating that  Rajgopal was being accepted as a member of that caste. In C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal & Ors. (supra), this Court noted that in its earlier decision in S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and others (supra) Rajgopal had not produced evidence to show that after his reconversion to Hinduism, any step had been taken by the members of Adi Dravida caste indicating that he was being accepted as a member of that caste. This Court, however, found in this later case of C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal & Ors. (supra) that there were several circumstances to show that Rajgopal was accepted as Adi Dravida Hindu and these circumstances were: he had been invited to lay the foundation stone for the construction of a new wall of the temple at Jambakullam, which was essentially a temple of Adi Dravida Hindus; he was requested to participate in Margazhi Thiruppavai celebration at the Kannabhiran temple, which was also a temple essentially managed by the Adi Dravida Hindus; he was invited to preside at the Adi Krittikai festival at Mariamman temple where the devotees are Adi Dravidas or to start the procession of the deity at such festival; the children of Rajgopal were registered in the school as Adi  Dravida Hindus and even he himself issued a certificate stating that his son was a Scheduled Caste Adi Dravida Hindu; he participated in the All India Scheduled Castes Conference attended largely by Adi Dravida Hindus.