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Secondly.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
Thirdly.-That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation.-Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact."

69. In order to ascertain whether the proven facts of the present case give rise to an offence of murder or an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, it would be necessary to undertake an exercise of appreciation of evidence from the perspective as to whether there was provocation from the end of the deceased and if so, whether the 'provocation' was 'grave and sudden' enough so as to deprive the accused-appellant of her power of self control.

76. In other words, under the Explanation to First Exception to Section 300 IPC, the question of fact would remain whether the provocation was 'grave and sudden'. Naturally, when provocation is not 'grave and sudden', the question of applying the First Exception does not arise. What has, however, not been categorically mentioned, in Section 300 IPC, is the process of 'grave and sudden' provocation potential enough to deprive a person of his or her power of self control.

77. An examination of the following part of the sentence may make the question clearer: "whilst deprived of the power of self-control by 'grave and sudden' provocation,"

83. The learned Judges, in the circumstances indicated above, held, in Boya Munigadu (supra), that the accused had sufficient provocation to bring the case within the First Exception to Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.

84. The relevant observations, appearing in Boya Munigadu (supra), read:

"............If having witnessed the act of adultery, he connected this subsequent conduct as he could not fail to connect it, with that act, it would be conduct of a character highly exasperating to him, implying as it must, that all concealment of their criminal relations and all regard for his feelings were abandoned and that they purposely continued their course of misconduct in his house. This, we think, amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden enough to deprive him of his self- control and reduce the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder."

109. What we have concluded, on the strength of the discussions, made above, is that if circumstances, potential enough to provoke a person to commit suicide, has been recognised, it should be equally recognised, going by the victim's level of trauma, that the same set of circumstances are potential enough to turn her into an aggressor so much so that she kills her husband or kills any of her provocateur.

110. Thus, in the circumstances, envisaged in Section 304 B, if the victim, under the influence of sustained provocation, 'grave and sudden' enough to deprive her of her power of self-control, becomes an aggressor, such circumstances would definitely fall within the First Exception to Section 300 IPC. While we arrive at such a conclusion, we are not oblivious of the fact that the circumstances, with respect to sustained provocation, have been conceived of bearing in mind the reactions of a woman, which is natural and in keeping with her social environment. In this regard, it may be worth quoting the observations, made by the Supreme Court, in State Of West Bengal vs Orilal Jaiswal (AIR 1994 SC 1418), which run as follows: