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76. In other words, under the Explanation to First Exception to Section 300 IPC, the question of fact would remain whether the provocation was 'grave and sudden'. Naturally, when provocation is not 'grave and sudden', the question of applying the First Exception does not arise. What has, however, not been categorically mentioned, in Section 300 IPC, is the process of 'grave and sudden' provocation potential enough to deprive a person of his or her power of self control.

77. An examination of the following part of the sentence may make the question clearer: "whilst deprived of the power of self-control by 'grave and sudden' provocation,"

85. The case of Boya Munigadu (supra) illustrates that the state of mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct of the deceased, may be taken into consideration in determining whether the subsequent act of the deceased would be sufficient provocation to bring the case within the First Exception to Section 300 IPC.

86. The decisions, in Duffy (supra) and Boya Munigadu (supra), were considered in K.M Nanavati vs State of Maharashtra (AIR1962 SC

96. Thus, if facts exist to show that circumstances, in bits and pieces, played a pivotal role in building up the edifice of 'grave and sudden' provocation, the Courts can extend the benefit of First Exception to Section 300 IPC. Sustained provocation, we believe, is only an expression, which conveys the idea behind the principles nos. 3 and 4 of Nanavati's case (supra) and not an addition to the various existing Exceptions to Section 300 IPC.

97. In our considered opinion, while it is permissible to deduce more than one reasonable meaning from the plain words used in a statute, it would be impermissible to add to the statute a meaning, which the legislature did not intend to convey. Thus, interpretation of statute would require that a word, in a given statute, is interpreted in a manner, which is permissible to interpret. Bearing in mind the purpose of legislation, one may attribute more than one interpretation to a given word in a statute. If a new meaning is sought to be given to a word used in a statute, which legislature never intended to convey, such an act would amount to legislation, which is impermissible in law.

117. The catalogue of events, when considered realistically and dispassionately, squarely brings the case of the accused-appellant within the First Exception to Section 300 IPC and the accused-appellant, instead of being held guilty of murder, ought to have been held guilty of the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The evidence on record reveals that the accused-appellant did not want to cause death of her husband, but she was merely concerned with stopping of the violence, which her husband had been perpetrating on her, and give him a lesson without really intending to put an end to his life. The facts of the case, thus, bring the case within the First Exception to Section 300 and accused-appellant ought to have been found guilty not of murder, but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.