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Showing contexts for: sudden provocation in Smti Manju Lakra vs The State Of Assam on 5 August, 2013Matching Fragments
76. In other words, under the Explanation to First Exception to Section 300 IPC, the question of fact would remain whether the provocation was 'grave and sudden'. Naturally, when provocation is not 'grave and sudden', the question of applying the First Exception does not arise. What has, however, not been categorically mentioned, in Section 300 IPC, is the process of 'grave and sudden' provocation potential enough to deprive a person of his or her power of self control.
77. An examination of the following part of the sentence may make the question clearer: "whilst deprived of the power of self-control by 'grave and sudden' provocation,"
88. The principle No. 3, as reproduced above, enables the Court to take into account all those acts, which started building potential rage in the mind of an accused, culminating into the last provocative act immediately preceding the causing of death, though the provocative act, immediately preceding the causing of death, may not, by itself, be 'grave and sudden' within the meaning of the expression 'grave and sudden' occurring in First Exception to Section 300 IPC. In such cases, the sentence, 'whilst deprived of the power of self-control by 'grave and sudden' provocation' may have to be read as 'whilst deprived of the power of self-control by series of acts constituting 'grave and sudden' provocation'.
91. Thus, what the principle No. 4 lays down is an extension of the principle No. 3. In other words, it would be necessary for the Courts to ascertain the proximity between the first act, in the entire series of acts, along with the immediate act, which preceded the act of causing of death. If the Court is able to connect even an innocuous provocative act preceding the causing of death with a series of acts, which, when taken together, constitute, in its entirety, 'grave and sudden' provocation', the Court would be justified in extending the benefit of First Exception to Section 300 IPC. The series of acts, which together constitute 'grave and sudden' provocation, must be such acts of provocation, which never really allowed the accused to calm down and the act, immediately preceding the killing, was the culmination of the previous provocative acts as mentioned hereinbefore.
93. The Division Bench further held, in Suyambukani (supra), that from an analysis of all the Exceptions, it would be found that in all the Exceptions, either premeditation or ill-will is absent and, therefore, when both are present, it will be impossible to consider the matter as an exception and, ultimately, came to the conclusion that there is a cardinal difference between provocation, as defined under Exception 1, and sustained provocation and the only word, which is common to both ― 'provocation' and 'sustained provocation' -- is provocation and what Exception 1 contemplates is 'grave and sudden' provocation; whereas the ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts, more or less grave, spread over a certain period of time, the last of which act being the last straw breaking the camel's back, which may even be a very trifling one. The Division Bench, in Suyambukani (supra), further held that far from 'grave and sudden' provocation, contemplated under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, sustained provocation is, undoubtedly, an addition by Courts as anticipated by the architects of the Indian Penal Code.