Indian Kanoon - Search engine for Indian Law

93. The Division Bench further held, in Suyambukani (supra), that from an analysis of all the Exceptions, it would be found that in all the Exceptions, either premeditation or ill-will is absent and, therefore, when both are present, it will be impossible to consider the matter as an exception and, ultimately, came to the conclusion that there is a cardinal difference between provocation, as defined under Exception 1, and sustained provocation and the only word, which is common to both ― 'provocation' and 'sustained provocation' -- is provocation and what Exception 1 contemplates is 'grave and sudden' provocation; whereas the ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts, more or less grave, spread over a certain period of time, the last of which act being the last straw breaking the camel's back, which may even be a very trifling one. The Division Bench, in Suyambukani (supra), further held that far from 'grave and sudden' provocation, contemplated under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC, sustained provocation is, undoubtedly, an addition by Courts as anticipated by the architects of the Indian Penal Code.

94. We may, however, point out, at this juncture, that even though we agree with the proposition of law, laid down in Suyambukani (supra), that "sustained provocation is a series of acts, more or less grave, spread over a certain period of time, the last of which act being the last straw breaking the camel's back may even be a very trifling one", yet, we are, respectfully, unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the concluding observations, in Suyambukani (supra), that sustained provocation is an addition to First Exception to Section 300 IPC by Courts as anticipated by the architects of the Indian Penal Code. Such an interpretation, in our considered view, amounts to making legislating or enacting a law, which is beyond the scope of judicial functions.

96. Thus, if facts exist to show that circumstances, in bits and pieces, played a pivotal role in building up the edifice of 'grave and sudden' provocation, the Courts can extend the benefit of First Exception to Section 300 IPC. Sustained provocation, we believe, is only an expression, which conveys the idea behind the principles nos. 3 and 4 of Nanavati's case (supra) and not an addition to the various existing Exceptions to Section 300 IPC.

97. In our considered opinion, while it is permissible to deduce more than one reasonable meaning from the plain words used in a statute, it would be impermissible to add to the statute a meaning, which the legislature did not intend to convey. Thus, interpretation of statute would require that a word, in a given statute, is interpreted in a manner, which is permissible to interpret. Bearing in mind the purpose of legislation, one may attribute more than one interpretation to a given word in a statute. If a new meaning is sought to be given to a word used in a statute, which legislature never intended to convey, such an act would amount to legislation, which is impermissible in law.

109. What we have concluded, on the strength of the discussions, made above, is that if circumstances, potential enough to provoke a person to commit suicide, has been recognised, it should be equally recognised, going by the victim's level of trauma, that the same set of circumstances are potential enough to turn her into an aggressor so much so that she kills her husband or kills any of her provocateur.

110. Thus, in the circumstances, envisaged in Section 304 B, if the victim, under the influence of sustained provocation, 'grave and sudden' enough to deprive her of her power of self-control, becomes an aggressor, such circumstances would definitely fall within the First Exception to Section 300 IPC. While we arrive at such a conclusion, we are not oblivious of the fact that the circumstances, with respect to sustained provocation, have been conceived of bearing in mind the reactions of a woman, which is natural and in keeping with her social environment. In this regard, it may be worth quoting the observations, made by the Supreme Court, in State Of West Bengal vs Orilal Jaiswal (AIR 1994 SC 1418), which run as follows: