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1. The dispute between the petitioner and the respondent was referred to arbitration. The award was not made on the date prescribed, but extensions were asked for from time to time. The award was actually written on 26th August, 1936; but the order of Court allowing the last extension of time was not passed until 27th August, 1936, although the application had been filed in Court some days before the award' was made. The principal question argued in this Court and in the Court below was whether the Court became functus officio-in this matter on the day the award was made and was income petent to pass the order on 27th August, 1936, extending the time.

3. Section 521 of the old Code did in fact say:

No award shall be valid unless made within the period allowed by Court.

4. There is no such clause in the present Act and,< as has already been remarked, in the case before their Lordships the award was not made even within the extended time. In Annamalai Chettiar v. Annamalai Chettiar (1933) 65 M.L.J. 376, Curgenven, J., doubted whether Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudrain Bhagwant Kuar (1891) 18 I.A. 55 : I.L.R. 13 All. 300 (P.C.) was any longer good law. In Gopalji Kallianji v. Chhaganlal Vithalji (1920) I.L.R. 45 Bom. 1071, where an application was put in by consent for extending the time for making the award, it was held that the date of the application must be referred back to the date when it was filed in the office of the Prothonotary and not to the date when it was signed by him. That case is not similar to the present one; but it lays down the principle that an application dates back to the day of its presentation which has, I think, a wide application. Moreover, if the contention of the earned Counsel for the petitioner is correct, then the arbitrators were functus officio on the date on which they should have made the award expired, and they had no power to continue the arbitration proceedings while the application was pending. If that were so, then there was no valid award made at all. It would also follow from this proposition that applications for extension would become largely fruitless because the applicants could do nothing before the applications were granted and so proceedings would drag on indefinitely. Needless to say, there is no authority, either for the "original contention of Mr. Sampath Aiyangar or for any of the principles that have been deducted from it. It seems to me that the arbitrators had jurisdiction to continue the arbitration subject to the result of their application to extend the time.

6. Jetha Lal Laxmi Chand Shah v. Amrita Lal Ojha I.L.R. (1938) 2 Cal. 482 is a very important decision on the present paragraph 8 of Schedule XI; for it holds that the section is so widely worded that an application for extension of time put in even after the award is made can be granted; and that if it is granted the award can be filed. The wording of paragraph 8 is certainly wide enough to carry this meaning and with due respect I agree. I find no reason in the present provisions relating to arbitration for supposing that once an award is made the Court ceases to have jurisdiction to extend the time. The old Code did contain such a provision; but that is absent in the present Act.