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16. Reference is made to the verification clause of defendant 1's written statement. In this written statement there is a denial of the plaint averment about Ex.J having been executed on 30-11-1967. The verification in regard to this denial is on information and not to personal knowledge. It would not be proper to draw an inference that this manner of verification is an admission of Ex.J, having been executed on 30-11-1967. Another inferential conclusion is sought to be based on Ex. K's recital that FSI 2 was not available despite "best efforts". The best efforts are said to have been made under Ex. L-1 dated 16-10-1967. Therefore, Ex.K and Ex.J must have been drawn after 31-3-1967. The expression "best efforts' could apply to efforts made till 31-3-1967, and also, those made thereafter. And efforts would include trips and oral pleas to BMC both pre and post 31-3-1967. Defendants 1 and 2's reliance on the apparent date of Ex. 139--the indemnity deed - is sought to be countered by Johari's admission that the waiver of height restriction clause by Munchershaw Mistry recited in Ex. A-112. dated 23-7-1966 had been rendered valueless by the passing of Ex. A-139 but after, 30-11-1967. But this answer would be equally effective irrespective of whether Ex. A-139 was executed on or after 31-3-1967. Defendants 1 and 2 submit that Ex. A-139's being executed on 31-3-1967 is itself a guarantee of Ex.J being drawn up on the same day. Both are unstamped and unregistered documents. And if one could be antedated, so could be the other. The party interested in antedating Ex.J would take the precaution to antedate documents so important as Exs. A-139 and K.

17. The dates on which Ratanchand and Lalchand signed and submitted their returns of income-tax for year 1967-68 i.e. 8-12-1967 and 18-12-1967 only probabilise, not prove, the execution of Ex.J, after 31-3-1967. The other factor going against the defence version is the non-examination of Lalchand. Were there no material in support of the plaintiff's version, the defence would have been under no obligation to examine Lalchand. But there is good material to bear out the plaintiff's accusation. There was both motive and opportunity to tinker with the date. The reference to a plan drawn up on 30-11-1967 in deed dated 31-3-1967 required an explanation. No credible explanation has been offered by Phadke and Johari. Ex.K is an antedated document as is clear from it reciting a payment mentioned in a writing dated 5-7-1967 at Ex. AA 120. The date of the said payment being 5-7-1967 was confirmed by Johari himself in his affidavit Ex. A-177 filed in the 1970 suit. As said earlier, the laboured explanation of Johari in his deposition is an afterthought and not worth any credence. The last factor pressed into service is the marked aversion of defendants 1 and 2 to filing written statements. Defendant 2 Lalchand flourished some such statement quite, some time after the trial's commencement. Defendant 1 went battling right upto the Supreme Court to get the plaint rejected on the preliminary ground of its not disclosing a cause of action. To that aspect of the case I shall turn to later. As to the purpose of antedating of Ex.J, men do not unnecessarily tinker with dates on solemn deeds. Phadke and Johari both speak of Lalchand's great anxiety to hurry up the execution of the conveyance on account of a tax problem. Tax problems beset every person who has an income subject to payment of taxes, inclusive of income tax. Avoidance of taxes, wholly or in part, is a perfectly legitimate desire. An activity to arrange one's affairs in such a manner as to lessen the burden on oneself is nothing to be ashamed about. So admitting in a trial open to the public should not embarrass the righteous folk. Not allowing one to be subjected to a scandal-ridden but unsubstantiated accusation, is also understandable. However, there cannot be any excusable persistence in staying away from the witness-box, when a prima-facie case requiring an explanation is made out. Here, such a case requiring an explanation has been made out. If Lalchand has not entered the witness-box, the sure inference is that he certainly did not want an exposure. The explanation that age had dulled his memory and intellect, cannot be accepted in the absence of credible material to that effect. The inference flowing is that Lalchand wanted to evade paying the tax rightfully due on the capital gain accruing from the sale effected in fact on 30-11-1967. To effectuate this desire Ex.J. was antedated to give the impression of it being executed on 31-3-1967.

Again, these observations appear in a claim made by one party to an agreement against the other party to the said agreement. Plaintiff relies on a statement in the same authority at page 86 which speaks of the stigma of voidness attaching to contracts of a fraudulent nature to defeat the rights of third parties. But it is not as if the entire transaction recorded in Ex.J is a fraud upon the rights of Maneckabad owners vis-a-vis Ratan Villa. Even on plaintiff's own showing. Ratanchand and consequently his estate, had a saleable interest in Ratan Villa subject to the convenants in favour of the vendee of Ex.B. A deception of the nature attempted under Ex.J would not invalidate the whole transaction or merit the accusation of being wholly fraudulent and thus void. Plaintiff falls back on the oft-expressed view that fraud vitiates all transactions. Pranballav v. Tulsibala, A.I.R. 1958 Calcutta 712, Lazarrs v. Beaslev, 1956(1) D.B. 702, S.B. Naronha v. Prem Kumari, . A fraud on the Revenue and the casting of a cloud on plaintiff's title stand proved. But the consequences cannot be so disproportionate as to unsettle the sale and restore the status quo ante. This is all the more-so, when neither party to Ex.J wants to get out of the bargain. The Revenue's rights or options are not diminished by the existence of Ex.J. The law's majesty is not destroyed by an officer of the Court practising a fraud on the Revenue. The law can be effectively vindicated by other means. Plaintiff claims the protection of the law as an innocent non-participant likely to be injured by Ex.J. That protection will be available to him; but not in the terms solicited by him. It is argued that Lalchand received additional consideration of Rs. 3,14,000/- by antedating Ex.J, that this was done with the active assent of defendant 1 and therefore the consideration of the agreement is illegal. Ex. G-1 shows with clarity the pecuniary advantage gained by the vendor in antedating the conveyance. But the probabilities militate against defendant 1 knowing anything more than the antedating being motivated by a desire to effect a saving in taxes by Lalchand. As said earlier a desire to save taxes is not the equivalent of an intent to do so by unlawful means. Antedating of a document though permitted by defendant 1 being without the accompanying mens rea would not render defendant 1 a participant in the tax evasion. The fifth issue has thus to be answered as "only so far as defendant 2 is concerned".

(i) On which date the compulsion to sue accrued, or, to put it differently, when did time begin to run?

(ii) What period of time is excludible under section 15(2) of the Limitation Act?

(iii) Is plaintiff entitled to exclude the time spent in prosecuting the suit in the City Court under section 14 of the Limitation Act?

33. Defendant 1 contends that Article 56 is applicable, and that also, the date on which Ex. J was issued. The word issued implies the date on which Ex. J was executed or at least that date on which it was admitted for registration. The forgery i.e. the alleged antedating in Ex. J is said to have taken place on 30-11-1967. If so, the suit is definitely barred by limitation even if it be assumed that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of section 14 Limitation Act. Plaintiff contends, and rightly so, that the word 'issued' occurring in Article 56 can have no application to a document pertaining to transfer of immovable property. Act XV of 1877 had an article being Article 92 therein which was in pari materia to Article 56 of the Limitation Act of 1963. The said article was sought to be used in relation to a written authority given to adopt unto the alleged executant. Exception was taken of the genuineness of the deed. The question was whether a deed such as the above could be said to have been issued. The Judicial Committee in Hurri Rhusan v. Upendra Lal, 23 I.A. 97, speaking through Lord Morris held that the word 'issued' was intended to refer to the kind of documents to which people commonly applied that term in business and that it had no application to an instrument such as a power to adopt. The word 'issued' even otherwise is not used in relation to non-commercial documents. Its use in relation to a deed of conveyance would be incongruous. A conveyance of immovable property such as Ex. J is compulsorily registerable. Ali Mirza Beg v. Hasan Raza Khan, A.I.R. 1917 Oudh 188, is authority enough for the proposition that limitation for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument compulsorily registerable has to be within three years of its registration and not from three years of its execution. But to go further with Article 56, even registration by itself does not trigger the march of time. The article speaks of registration becoming known to the plaintiff. Ex. J after registration was used for the first time against plaintiff on 12-2-1971. It may be argued that the fact of registration by itself amounts to notice. But Article 56 excludes the concept of deemed notice or deemed knowledge. This is made clear by the use of the words "registration becomes known to the plaintiff". These words imply a direct perception without recourse to fictional props like knowledge flowing from deemed notice. Thus viewed, time would begin to run from 12-2-1971 and the lodging of the plaint in this Court on 21-9-1973, would bring the suit well within the period prescribed by Article 56. But it is doubtful if Article 56 is the appropriate provision for reckoning limitation for this suit. The suit in substance is one for a declaration. Plaintiff's penchant for the jugular has brought in the prayer for cancellation. This is an embellishment which can be safely ignored for assessing the true nature of the suit. Ex. J's existence vis-a-vis plaintiff in his private capacity, amounts to little more than a sneaky, surreptitious and covert attempt to outflank those claiming under Ex. B. A judicious venture for plaintiff had made known his determination to harry and run them to the ground. On the face of it Ex. J did not appear antedated. Documents which could have given a clue on the antedating were in the possession of the parties to the transaction. They, as later events have shown, fought a dogged battle to prevent even the copies from being received in evidence. This was after spirting away the originals and studiously keeping out the wrongdoers from the witness-box. Knowledge of Ex. J's registration was not enough to found an action. The appropriate provision for computing limitation would be Article 58 which governs suits for obtaining any declaration other than those covered by Articles 56 and 57. For such suits, time begins to run when the right to sue first accrues. Once again, the date would be 12-2-1971 for that was the first ties defendant 1 used Ex. J to ward off a claim advanced by plaintiff. That would bring the suit instituted even as on 21-9-1973, within limitation. By let us assume that cancellation is the principal relief claimed in the suit and that Article 59 is the provision for computing limitation. This article prescribes a period of three years for cancelling an instrument. Time begins to run "when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled first became known to him". Now a mere look at Ex. J could not have sufficed for plaintiff to institute a suit. He had to track down different documents mentioned in the many preambles to Ex. J. These were unregistered and plaintiff had to move heaven and earth to get copies thereof. Those documents secured, plaintiff had to contact a tax expert to find out a possible reason for the antedating. If due allowance is given for ascertainment of the complete set of facts, plaintiff's suit instituted even on 21-9-1973 would be within time. That would be so even if the starting point is taken at 12-2-1971. The last article that could be used for computation of limitation would be Article 113. This is a residuary article and under it time begins to run when the right to sue secures. Once again the starting point would be 12-2-1971, when Ex. J was first sought to be used against plaintiff and the issue of limitation would be in plaintiff favour.