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17. In Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, the petitioner was selected for appointment as an Extra Assistant Commissioner and was so appointed in accordance with Rule 22 of the relevant rules. This rule enabled the Government to extend the period of probation. It was common ground that the period of probation was not extended. The question that arose for consideration was as to what was the position of the petitioner after the expiry of his initial probationary period as fixed by the Rules. It was contended that inasmuch as the period of probation was not extended despite there being power to do so, the expiry of the period of probation envisaged by the Rules, resulted in automatic confirmation. It was held that a probationer cannot automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. There is no rule or term in the contract of service in the present cases giving power to extend the period of probation, but in our view the result would still be the same as in the case of Sukhbans Singh. In that case there was power which was not exercised. In the present cases there is no power to extend the period of probation. In either case the result would be that when the period of probation fixed initially expires the Government servant continues to be on probation till he. is confirmed by an Order to that effect. The observations in the Management of Express Newspapers (P.) Ltd.'s case relied upon have already been discussed by us above. It does not follow from this decision that there is automatic confirmation on the expiry of the period of probation. Indeed, it was held to the contrary in the above case.

18. In G. S. Ramaswamy v. InspectorGeneral of Police, Mysore, also the contention was about automatic confirmation on expiry of the period of probation of two years. The contention was negatived. It is urged that the ratio of this decision would not be attracted as in terms Rule 486 of the relevant rules in that case provided that "promoted officers will be, confirmed at the end of their probationary period if they have given satisfaction." It was held that till satisfaction is recorded there could be no confirmation and so, the mere expiry of two years did not result in confirmation. The contention here is that there is no such rule applicable in the case of the petitioner Dhingra and so, on the expiry of three months he stood automatically confirmed. The fallacy in the contention is on account of a misconception about the concept of probation on which we have already dilated above. Probation implies putting a person on trial which means confirmation on satisfaction. The existence or the non-existence of a rule providing for the pre-condition of satisfaction regarding performance of an employee is immaterial. In the case of Ramaswamy also there was no specific power given for extending the period of probation but it was held that there could be no automatic employee continued to be on probation till orders of confirmation were passed.

19. The referring bench has noticed three unreported decisions of the Supreme Court which may now be considered. The first one is Narain Singh Ahluwalia v. The State of Punjab-Civil Appeal No. 492 of 1963, decided on 29-1-1964 (SC). The bench noticed that from the judgment it is not clear whether there was any rule which provided for the order of confirmation being passed or there being a bar to the period of probation being extended but the contention of automatic confirmation on the expiry of the probationary period of one year was dispelled. Next, in D. A. Lyall v. The Chief Conservator of Forests, U. P., Civil Appeal No. 259 of 1963, decided on February 24, 1965 (SC) the Supreme Court in the context of Rule 16 of the U. P. Forest Service Rules which bars the confirmation of a probationer amongst other things, till he has passed all the tests prescribed by the Rules and the Governor is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation in other respects, held that the rule barred automatic confirmation. In the case of Accountant General, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior v. Beni Prasad Bhatnagar, Civil Appeal No. 548 of 1962, decided on January 23, 1964 (SC), also, the argument about automatic confirmation was dispelled despite there being no specific power for ordering extension of probationary period. All these cases, in our view, proceed on the same principle, namely, that whether there is a rule or not the very concept of probation implies satisfactory completion of the probationary period and despite absence of rule probation would continue, unless specifically barred, till confirmation.

24. Reliance was placed on a decision of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Shankar Lal Mehra v. Chief Engineer, N. F. Rly., 1970 Serv Lr 536 = (AIR 1970) Assam 16 = 1970 Lab Ic 176).The petitioner in this case was appointed as Senior Draftsman in a temporary post on a probationary period of one year whereas he continued to work for five years without being confirmed. A plea of automatic confirmation was raised in this case. In the decision of the, F. B. (D. B.?) the learned Chief Justice observed that the relevant rule provided that all appointments will be made on probation for one year and that it did not specifically lay down that the period of probation can or cannot be extended. It was thus held that there is no rule for extending the said period and that in the absence of a rule giving power to extend the period of probation the period specified by the relevant rule, namely of one year, cannot be extended and the employee became confirmed automatically on the expiry of the period of one year. No reasoning for this conclusion has been given nor has any precedent been relied upon. K. C. Sen, J. also endorsed the opinion of the learned Chief Justice and observed that the rule specifying the period of probation for one year does not say that the authorities have any power either to extend the period of probation or not to do so, and in that view of the matter there would be automatic confirmation. In our respectful opinion the decision cannot be regarded as laying down the correct law. Indeed, it is contrary to the rule enunciated by a catena of authorities starting from Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case .