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It would have been open to us to reject these contentions without an elaborate discussion on the ground that they are Inconsistent with the decisions of this Court and are indeed inconsistent with the decisions of all the Indian High Courts. But we feel that the questions raised are of some importance and we are anxious that there should not linger in the mind of any lawyer or lawyers any doubt as to the fundamental requirements of professional ethics in such matters. That is why we propose to deal with the arguments urged before us by Mr. Gauba at some length. Before dealing with these points, however, it would be necessary to consider two preliminary objections raised by Mr. Gauba before us.

It is necessary to emphasise that the primary and the fundamental notions of professional ethics must always remain unimpaired. The standard of professional honesty and integrity and of rules of professional conduct that are relevant in that behalf must never be relaxed or scaled down. In the observance of these primary rules lies the strength and the importance of the status of the Bar.

Amongst the rules which are treated as of fundamental importance in professional ethics, a place of pride has always been given to the rule which prohibits a lawyer from entering into an agreement With his client that he will accept as his fees a specified share in the subject-matter of the litigation upon the successful issue of such litigation, In our opinion, therefore, the respondent has violated this important rule of professional ethics. He has entered into an agreement which is opposed to public policy and his conduct must, therefore, be held to amount to professional misconduct. It now remains to refer briefly to the decisions to which our attention has been invited.

The conduct of Mr. Gauba, in our opinion, is highly objectionable. It is totally inconsistent with the requirements of professional ethics and it has been condemned by no less a person than Sir Lawrence Jenkins as being "highly reprehensible." Even so, it may be relevant to take into account the fact that since the time when Sir Lawrence Jenkins addressed his warning to the members of the Bar, there has been no reported lapse from professional ethics in that behalf. That is a matter which gives us profound satisfaction and would undoubtedly give the Bar a feeling of just pride.

The point is that, what Mr. Gauba characterises as the "hardness" of a case is not determinative of the fairness and justice of a principle. It scarcely requires a statement that the principle of charging fees on percentage basis, i.e. the principle of virtually claiming a share in the litigant's property, sullies the stream of justice and strikes at the root of professional ethics. It is a grossly improper and reprehensible principle.

For a member of a Bar to insist by way of his fees upon a share in his client's property is to be grossly indifferent to his obligations to the client and to his loyalty to the legal profession. By insisting upon his fees on a percentage basis, an advocate secures to himself an advantage out of all proportion to the professional skill and industry which he may bring to bear upon the case. Take an example. If the advocate insists on charging as his fees 50 per cent. of the successful claim of his client and if the successful claim is to the extent of Rs. 10,000, the advocate would insist of being paid Rs. 5,000 as his fees though in fairness and justice, having regard to his professional skill and measure of industry bestowed by him upon a particular case, he might be entitled to even less than Rs. 1,000.