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23. From the said provisions of the Constitution and the Regulations, it becomes clear that the BPSC is an independent institution, which has been brought into existence with the avowed object of maintaining the integrity, sanctity and efficiency of the civil services of the State of Bihar. The Chairman and members to be appointed to the BPSC become constitutional functionaries. The provisions clearly indicate as to what are the functions to be discharged by the Chairman and members of the Commission as a body and as to what are the administrative functions to be discharged by the Chairman of the Commission. At the same time, the provisions indicate as to what are the service conditions of members which are protected. Thus, the provisions in the Constitution and the Regulations together constitute an exhaustive Code for the BPSC within the frame work or parameters of which its functionaries can function.

32. The contention of Shri R.K. Garg, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Thakur, was to put it in his own words. "Chairman was after all, the first among the members, in that, Article 316 of the Constitution of India relating to appointment and term of the Office of the Chairman and other members and Article 317 relating to removal and suspension of Chairman and members, make no distinction between the Chairman and other members of the BPSC. If that be so, there was no reason why a member should be denied the facilities which were available to the Chairman". The other contention urged by him was that Article 318 of the Constitution which enables the making of regulations in respect of service conditions of members of the Commission, when by its proviso, declares that the conditions of service of the member of the Public Service Commission shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, the facilities provided to the member (Dr. Thakur) after his appointment should not have been withdrawn by the Chairman of the BPSC. Both the contentions of Shri Garg, in our view, lack merit. It is true that the provision in Article 316 of the Constitution relating to appointment and term of Office of a Member of the Public Service Commission and that the provision in Article 317 relating to removal and suspension of a Member of the Public Service Commission treat the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and the member of the Public Service Commission, on a common footing, as regards matters provided for therein. It may also be true that in the matter of performance of functions and in the matter of discharge of duties of the Public Service Commission, required to be performed or discharged under Article 320 or Article 321 of the Constitution, the Public Service Commission's Chairman and every member are equal participants. But, that does not mean that there is no difference between the office held by the Chairman and the office held by member of the Public Service Commission as regards functions to be performed by each of them in respect of his respective office. When Article 316(1A) of the Constitution, expressly recognises "the office of the Chairman" and specifically refers to the duties to be performed by him as the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission and the member of the Public Service Commission cannot be treated on a common footing as urged. The Chairman cannot be treated on par with a member, becomes clear not only from Regulation 4 of the Regulations which provides for higher salary to the Chairman and lower salary for the member, but also from Regulation 8 thereof which provides for payment of a special allowance to a senior member who holds current charge of administrative duties of the Chairman. Further, the Chairman and the member of the Public Service Commission cannot be treated as persons standing on the same footing in respect to every matter, when the Constitution in several of its Articles treats the Chairman and the members alike for certain purposes and in several other Articles treats them differently for certain other purposes by use of the words 'the Chairman and the member', and 'other than the Chairman'. Therefore, under the scheme of the provisions in the Constitution and the scheme of the Regulations to which we have already adverted. Chairman of a public Service Commission has an exclusive role to play in discharge of administrative duties of his office as a chairman while a member cannot have any role to play in that regard unless otherwise required. As the Chief Justice of a High Court is made the repository of duties to be performed in respect of administration of a High Court under the Constitution, the Chairman of a Public Service Commission is made the repository of duties to be performed in respect of administration of the Public Service Commission under the Constitution. Chairman of a Public Service Commission is entrusted with the discharge of administrative duties of the Public Service Commission obviously for the reason that as high constitutional functionary he could be depended upon to discharge such functions justly and fairly. When Regulations under Article 318 of the Constitution are made with respect to the conditions of service of Members of the Public Service Commission, it is true, such regulations cannot vary the conditions of service of the Member of the Public Commission to its disadvantage after this appointment. Therefore, what becomes obvious is that so far as the Member of the Public Service Commission is concerned, as may be the case with the Chairman, he can undoubtedly make a grievance thereof when any condition of his service is varied to his disadvantage after his appointment, by regulations made in that regard and obtain relief from courts. But, when certain facilities for amenities are provided by the Chairman to a member of the Public Service Commission after his appointment, while carrying out the administration of the Commission nothing could come in the way of such Chairman of the Public Service Commission, to withdraw any of such facilities or amenities given to a member in carrying out the administration of the same Commission if the administrative exigencies so demand. Withdrawal of such facilities or amenities cannot amount, at any rate to variation of service conditions of a member of the Public Service Commission envisaged under the proviso to Article 318. Hence, the contentions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner based on equal status of member with the Chairman and on proviso to Article 318 of the Constitution. Lacks merits. From this it follows that the petitioner member of the Public Service Commission is entitled to get similar type of facilities and amenities which the Chairman of the BPSC has, cannot be countenanced and is liable to be rejected.

38. It is the said interim orders which are the impugned in the Special Leave Petitions. We are really unable to see how the Writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could have been availed of to make the said interim orders which interfered with the normal functioning of the BPSC by the constitutional functionaries, even if the High Court desired to have the views of the BPSC as regards the writ petition filed by Dr. Thakur against the BPSC and the functioning of its Chairman. We are indeed unable to understand now such interim orders could be regarded as those which have been made in aid of the final relief, if any, required to be granted in the Writ Petition or required to maintain status quo pending final disposal of the writ petition. When the nature of the interim order is seen, it becomes obvious that the High Court has sought to take over responsibility of carrying on the functions of the BPSC by appointing its own chairman for conducting a meeting of the BPSC. It is no doubt open to the Court to reject the affidavit filed on behalf of the BPSC by the Chairman on its view that it cannot be regarded as the opinion of the BPSC. But, in a case, even where such decision of the Commission as a body had been called for, the High Court was not enabled, in the purported exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to make such interim orders which would have made the functioning of the BPSC, a constitutional institution, a mockery in the eyes of the general public and exposed its constitutional functionaries to ridicule. It is true that Article 226 of the Constitution, empowers the High court to exercise it discretionary jurisdiction to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, quo warranto and mandamus or any of them for the enforcement of the rights conferred under the Constitution or for an other purpose, but such discretion to issue directions or writs on orders conferred on the High Court under Article 226 being a judicial discretion to be exercised on the basis of well-established judicial norms, could not have been used by the High Court to make the said interim orders which could not have any way helped or aided the Court in granting the main relief sought in the writ petition. The said interim orders, therefore, not being those made to maintain the status quo or undo an order, the review of which is sought, so that the ultimate relief to be granted to the party approaching it, may not become futile, they become wholly unsustainable. Such interim orders are made by the High Court, to say the least, without realisation that they had the effect of putting the Chairman and its Members to ridicule in the eyes of the general public and making a constitutional institution of the BPSC a mockery. For the said reasons, the interim orders impugned in the S.L.P.s cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside.