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There cannot be any controversy that if the provisions of section 35 (10) are to be construed as a temporary measure, then in the absence of special provision to the contrary, when it was omitted in 1959, no action can be taken after the temporary statute has ceased to be in force.

In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume XXXVI, at page 421, paragraph 641, the learned author, dealing with permanent and temporary statutes, says :

"The duration of a statute is prima facie perpetual, it endures until it is repeated either expressly or by implication, by a subsequent statute, or in the exercise of a power conferred by statute and does not lapse through non-user. A statute, or a particular provision thereof, may, however, be merely temporary, that is to say, may be expressed to continue in force for a limited period only, in which case it will expire automatically at the end of that period unless earlier repealed."

In Craies on Statute Law, 5th edition, at page 374, it is stated :

"Every statute for which no time is limited is called a perpetual Act, and continues in force until it is repealed."

Again, dealing with temporary Acts, at page 377, the learned author says :

"As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired no proceedings can be taken upon it, and it ceases to have any further effect."

In S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, Mr. Justice Patanjali Sastri states the rule regarding temporary statutes thus :

"The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires."

Again, the Supreme Court had to consider the applicability of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, where a repeal of a statute is followed by a fresh legislation on the same subject. Mr. Justice Mukherjea, speaking for the court, in the decision in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh observes :

"Of course, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature automatically expires by efflux of time. The Ordinance in the present case was undoubtedly a temporary statute but it is admitted that the period during which it was to continue had not expired when the repealing Act was passed. The repeal, therefore, was an effective one which would normally attract the operation of section 6 of the General Clauses Act."