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The relevant Part of the compromise is also reproduced below:

1& ;g fd vihykaV us jsLiskMsUV ls dqy tsj fMxzh 750@& vnkyr olwyh es vnk dj fn;s gS 'ks"k jde fnukad 3&3&72 dks vnk dj nh tkosxh A 2& D;ksfd vc vihykaV gj ekg fdjk;k jsLiskMsUV dks vnk djrk jgsxk ml lwjr es jsLiskMsUVku vihykUV ds f[kykQ bUnzjkt dks dk;Zokgh ogka dj ldsxk A vihykaV dk ,d ekg dk gh fglkc dj nsus dh lwjr es jsLiskMsUVku dk;Zokgh bUnzjkt djk ldsxk A According to the decree-holders, the judgment-debtor paid the entire amount of costs and rent upto March 31, 1972 An application for execution of the ejectment part of the decree was filed on May 17, 3972 stating that the judgment debtor has failed to make payment of rent for the month of April, 1972. The case of the decree-holders was that amount of rent of the aforesaid month was neither tendered for paid and thus the judgment debtor committed a default and failed to comply with the terms of the decree passed on compromise and, therefore, they are entitled to get possession of the suit premises from the judgment-debtor. On July 8, 1972, the judgment-debtor submitted an objection petition stating that he has been paying rent according to the decree of the appellate court and on refusal by the landlords to accept the rent and to issue receipt, rent has been regularly tendered through money-order. He, there fore, prayed that the proceedings for eviction be stated and it be declared that the decree is in executable. The decree-holders submitted the reply on August 12, 1972, inter alia contending therein that the decree for arrears of rent and ejectment was maintained in appeal and the parties had only entered into compromise with regard to the mode of satisfaction of the decree. According to the decree-holders, as the judgment-debtor has failed to comply with the mode of satisfaction mentioned in the decree and has failed to make payment of rent to them, they were within their rights to get the decree executed On 7-10-1972 an application was moved on behalf of the decree-holders stating the details of the defaults committed by the judgment-debtor. In this connection, it may be stated here that according to the decree-holders, six month' rent amounting to Rs. 120.10 had become due upto 30-9.72 whereas the judgment-debtor had paid only in respect of two months namely, April and May, 1972. The learned Munsif, after recording the evidence of the parties and hearing arguments by his order dated 4-10.1978, dismissed the objection of the judgment-debtor and held that the decree holder are entitled to excuse the decree The learned Munsif was of the opinion that the terms of the decree passed by the appellate court en the basis of the compromise merely suggests that the judgment debtor was allowed concession and there is no penal clause in the compromise decree in respect of which any relief against forfeiture may be allowed to him Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Munsif, the judgment-debtor filed appeal. The learned District Judge accepted the appeal and sec aside the order of the learned Munsif and ordered that the decree-holders are not entitled to proceed with the execution of the decree for ejectment unless the judgment debtor fails to deposit the arrears of rent upto March 15, 1974. Against the appellate judgment dated March 6, 1974, the decree-holders have preferred this revision.

3. I have heard Mr. R.P. Dave for the petitioners and Mr. R.R. Nagori for the non-petitioner and have also perused the record of the case.

4. This revision was presented on July 1, 1974. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, and came into force from February 1, 1977. Reference hereinafter co the various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 1903 will be to the provisions as they stood prior to its amendment by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Section 2(2) defines "decree". The determination of any question within Section 47 is expressly included in the definition of the "decree". Though such determination is neither made in a suit nor n drawn up in the form of a decree, Section 47 C.P.C. provides for questions to be determined by the court executing the decree. Sub-section (1) of Section 47, C.P.C. says that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of she decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The question whether a decree is capable or incapable of execution is prominently one coming under this Section and a decision on such a question is a decree. The judgment debtor preferred objections praying therein that it be declared that the decree is in executable. The objection was dismissed and, therefore, the decision on the question that the decree is executable was a decree as that order decided the rights of the parties with regard to the matter in controversy in the proceedings under Section 47, C.P.C. At the objection covered by Section 47 was dismissed, the judgment-debtor rightly preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge on October 23, 1973 under Section 47/96, C.P.C. That appeal was allowed by the learned District Judge by the order under revision. In these circumstances, the decree holders should hive preferred second appeal against the appellate judgment under Section 100, C.P.C. as the order passed by the executing court holding that the decree was not in executable amounted to a decree under Section 2(2) read with Section 47, C.P.C. and that order was set aside by the appellate court holding that the decree-holder are not entitled to proceed with the execution of the decree for ejectment unless the judgment debtor fails to deposit the arrears of rent uoto March 15, 1974. The decree-holders, instead of preferring an Execution Second Appeal, filed a revision. No revision lies under Section 115, C.P.C., against the order against which an appeal lies as Section 115 C.P.C. provides that the High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto. In these circumstances, the revision preferred by the decree-holders under Section 115, C.P.C. is not maintainable.

13. For the reasons aforesaid, the learned District Judge as not right in setting aside the order of the learned Munsif and ordering that the decree-holders are not entittled to proceed with the execution of the decree for ejectment unless the judgment-debtor fails to deposit the arrears of rent upto March 15, 1974.

14. In view of the conclusion to which I have arrived at, I do not consider it necessary to examine the other contentions of the learned Counsel for the judgment-debtor and to encumber this judgment by discussing in detail all the authorities cited by him.