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According to the learned counsel, since the acts of cruelties complained by Manju had taken place in Spain, the offences had occurred outside India. Thus, according to the aforesaid proviso, the offences cannot be inquired into without the sanction of the Central Government. Since there was no sanction granted by the Central Government, therefore, there is a legal bar for inquiring and for trying the case by a court in Jaipur.

Relying on the case of Samarudeen Vs. Assistant Director of Enforcement, Trivandrum & Ors. [1995 Cr.L.J. 2825 (Kerala)], the learned counsel has contended that even investigation by the police would be covered under Section 188 Cr.P.C. Therefore, even the police cannot investigate the case until and unless there is a sanction given by the Central Government. Furthermore, relying on the case of Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. [AIR 2008 SC 2392], the learned counsel has contended that even cognizance cannot be taken by the court when the offences are patently committed outside India. Hence, he has contended that due to the bar contained in Section 188 Cr.P.C., the present case squarely falls within condition No.6 enumerated by the Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

Thirdly, the learned counsel has contended that no reliance can be placed on the case of Samarudeen (supra) as in the case of Ajay Aggarwal Vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC 609], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt extensively with the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the case of Samarudeen (supra) decided by the Hon'ble Kerala High Court cannot be relied upon in the light of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Aggarwal (supra). One of the offences alleged against the present petitioner is of criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Aggarwal (supra), criminal conspiracy is a continuous offence. If part of the conspiracy had taken place outside India, and part of the conspiracy had occurred within India, then proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. would not come into force. Since the cruelties against the complainant, since the criminal breach of trust against the complainant were committed in Jaipur and since part of the conspiracy had taken place in Jaipur, therefore, the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C. requiring the sanction of the Central Government, ipso facto, is inapplicable to the present case. Hence, the case does not fall within circumstance No.6, mentioned in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) as there is no legal bar against investigation, or inquiry, or trial in the present case by a court in Jaipur.

In the case of Ajay Aggarwal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that the word used is offence. The word offence cannot be understood as part of the offence. Therefore, in order to attract the proviso to Section 188 Cr.P.C., all the ingredients of the offence would have to be committed outside India. Moreover, a criminal conspiracy being a continuous offence, if any part of the offence takes place in India, then the requirement of having a sanction from the Central Government does not come into force. Since a part of the offence had occurred in India, Section 188 Cr.P.C. is inapplicable in such a case.
As far as the case of Samarudeen (supra) is concerned, suffice it to say that once there is pronouncement by the Apex Court elaborately deal with Section 188 Cr.P.C. and its proviso, the judgment of a High Court cannot take precedent over the judgment of the Supreme Court. Since the bar contained in Section 188 Cr.P.C. does not cover the present case, obviously, the present case does not fall within the circumstance No.6 enumerated in the base of Bhajanlal (supra). Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the present FIR is hit by the bar contained in Section 188 Cr.P.C., is unsustainable.