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28. We may quote paragraphs 6 and 7 from the judgment in Mathew 's case (supra) :

" 6. O. 33 R. 5 deals with rejection of an application for permission to sue as an indigent person. Clause (a) thereof says that the application shall be rejected where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rr. 2 and 3. Sub-r. (b) calls for rejection where the applicant is not an indigent person. O. 33 R. 2 clearly provides that every application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits: a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof shall be annexed thereto and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. In other words, what R. 2 contemplates is a scheduling of any movable or immovable property (emphasis supplied) belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof. When an applicant does not disclose an asset held by him in his application, whatever be the reason, on the wording of R. 2 of O. 33 of the Code it is clear that the application is liable to be rejected in terms of 0.33 R. 5(a) of the Code. In Vazhunnavar's case, His Lordship Justice Raghavan (as then was) made an exception only in cases where a bonafide omission to include an asset was made by an applicant. May be occasionally cases may arise where either due to inadvertence or for reasons beyond his control, an applicant might omit to include an item of property in his application for permission to sue as an indigent person. If before the final disposal of the application, the applicant takes steps to include the said item also in the schedule to the application and satisfies the Court that the original omission was bonafide, it may be possible to take the view that at the time the application is taken up for disposal the same had been framed in the manner prescribed by R. 2 of O. 33 of the Code. With respect, we are inclined to think that the proposition as stated in Kunji Raman's case (1976 KLT 620) cannot be accepted in the broad form in which it is stated. The postulate that the rejection could only be under O. 33 R. 5(b) of the Code in a case where there is a non-disclosure in the application made by an applicant with respect, cannot be accepted. When R. 2 of O.33 calls for setting out the entire assets of an applicant for permission to sue as an indigent person, there is no jurisdiction for watering down the said requirement except probably in the exceptional circumstance of a bonafide omission as referred to by His Lordship Justice Raghavan (as he then was) in Vazhunnavar's case. The Supreme Court has clarified in the decision in M.L. Sethy v. R.P. Kapoor (AIR 1972 SC 2379) that an immunity from a litigation unless the requisite court fee is paid by the plaintiff is a valuable right for the defendant. When the plaintiff seeks the taking away of that immunity on the scheme provided by O.33 of the Code, is there any jurisdiction for whittling down the requirement set out in O.33 R. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure? We think not. Under the scheme of O. 33 of the Code, a plaintiff is exempted from paying the Court fee that is payable by any other litigant who comes to court for relief at the time of institution of the suit on the ground that he is not in a position to pay the court fee. If a plaintiff seeks such a special privilege to pursue his litigation, is there any reason not to insist on his strictly complying with the requirement of O.33 of the Code and coming to court with clean hands? According to us, there is no jurisdiction for removing the immunity available to the defendant in a suit and to grant a right to the plaintiff to prosecute the suit without payment of the Court fee unless the plaintiff comes to court with clean hands, making a disclosure of all his assets. The word 'any movable or immovable property' used in O. 33 R. 2 according to us ought to be given its natural meaning and on the scheme of the Code, it is clear that failure to comply with any of the requirements of O. 33 R. 2 or R. 3, should entail the rejection of the permission sought for by a plaintiff. In fact, Mr. T.K. Joseph, J, in Abdul Khader Rowther v. Appu (1963 KLT 13) adopted the view that any deliberate omission to include all the assets in the schedule should entail the dismissal of the application. We are therefore satisfied that in so far as Kunju Ramam's case (1976 KLT 620) postulated that even in the case of an omission to include an asset by an applicant and its discovery later, the rejection of the application could only be under O. 33 R. 5(b) of the Code, cannot be taken as correct. With respect, we are of the view that the rejection could be under O.33 R, 5(a) of the Code in such a situation and a rejection under O.33 R. 5(a) of the Code can be warded off by an applicant for permission to sue as an indigent person, only by establishing that it was a bonafide omission on his part to include the asset and only after getting the application for permission amended to accord with the requirement of O. 33 R. 2 of the Code.