Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

46. Several contentions were raised to the effect (i) that a Public Charitable Trust cannot be dissolved by way of resolutions and (ii) that the dissolution of the Trust is contrary to the scheme decree. But these contentions cannot be raised by the applicants, who have an interest only in their sub-lease rights in the Trust property, without even a semblance of any interest in the Trust itself. The applicants have also not shown that the subservience of their private interests would also subserve the interests of the Trust. It must be pointed out that the applicants and the companies in which they are the shareholders and Directors, are in possession of the land of the extent of about 13 grounds and 1720 sq. ft., in Poonamallee High Road, near Central Railway Station, on a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/- per month. According to them, the period of lease extends upto 30.9.2028. Therefore, the continuance of such a lease upto 30.9.2028, on a monthly rent of Rs.250/- from 1-10-1973 to 30-9-1986 and Rs.500/- from 1-10-1986 to 30-9-2008 and Rs.2,500/- from 1-10-2008 to 30-9-1028, in respect of such a vast extent of land in the heart of the City, would not certainly serve the interest of the Trust. Therefore, the applications A.Nos.1930 and 1931 of 2009 are dismissed. Consequently, the interim application O.A.No.421 of 2009 is also dismissed.

(iii) that under the Lease Deed dated 12.10.1973, the plaintiffs have a valid sub-lease upto 30.9.2028 and that therefore, they cannot be dispossessed by an indirect method.

VALIDITY OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE TRUST AND THE SURRENDER OF THE PROPERTY:

49. The first contention of the plaintiffs is that a Public Charitable Trust created under a Deed of Trust and which is administered under a scheme framed by this Court under Section 92 CPC, cannot be dissolved.

50. It is true that there is no provision of law under which a public trust can be dissolved. If circumstances so warrant, the properties of the trust, with the prior permission of the court can be transferred to any other trust having similar objects, applying if necessary, the cy pres doctrine.

(iii) that the then Additional Advocate General was requested to file necessary petition under Section 92 CPC before this Court.

62. Therefore, the contention of the applicants/plaintiffs that the Trust had been dissolved and that such dissolution is unknown to law, is factually wrong. Resolution No.2 uses only the expression "may be dissolved" and not the expression "hereby dissolved". This is why, the same Resolution talks about the formation of a new Trust and Resolution No.9 talks about necessary application to be moved under section 92.

105. But I do not think that I need to go into the said question. My conclusions in the preceding portions of this order are not based upon the question whether the Public Hall is a heritage monument or not. All the conclusions that I have drawn, are on a scrutiny of the pleadings of the plaintiffs, the documents relied upon by them and the contentions raised on their behalf.

106. Once it is found (i) that there was no actual dissolution of the Trust, but only a proposal to dissolve the existing Trust, after creating a new one with the same objects, subject to the approval of this Court (ii) that the Memorandum of Compromise and the surrender of the leasehold land to the Corporation, was actually for the benefit and not to the detriment of the Trust and (iii) that the very Deed of Sub-lease dated 12.10.1973 executed by the Trust in favour of N.D.Gupta for a period upto 30.9.2028, was vitiated, there is no escape from the conclusion that the plaintiffs have no prima facie case for the grant of an order of injunction. Therefore, the applications for injunction are liable to be dismissed.