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dispossessed by the Government in May, 1947. The suit was resisted by the defendant State on the ground, inter alia, that the Ruler's firman "did not confer absolute title on late Liaqat Ali", but only a life-interest in the house.

The Additional District Judge who tried the suit, found on a construction of the firman (Ex-P-1), that the suit house had been gifted by the Ruler to late Sir Liaqat Ali, absolutely, and, in consequence, decreed the suit. On appeal, a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed that finding and held that "on a true construction of the Firman (Ex.P-1), the grantee, the late Sir Syed Liaqat Ali, was given only an estate for life in the suit property, and the plaintiffs as his heirs had no right to inherit it as his property. In the result, the appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.

"In general, Muslim Law draws no distinction between real and personal property, and their Lordships know of no authoritative work......... which affirms that Muslim Law recognizes the splitting up of ownership of land into estates, (1)[1956] SCR 889 as per S. K. Das J. at p. 902, (2) 6 I.A.5.4 (3) 30 I.A. 50.
(4)28 I.A. 65.
(5) ILR 46 Cal. 683 (P.C.).
(6) 75 I.A. 62 at 77.
245

or in point of quality like legal and equitable estates, or in point of duration like estates in fee sample in tail, for life, or in remainder. What Muslim Law does recognize and insist on, is the distinction between the corpus of the property itself (ayn) and the usufruct in the property (manafi). Over the corpus of the property the law recognizes only absolute dominion, heritable and unrestricted in point of time, and where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion the condition is rejected as repugnant, but interest limited in point of time can be created in the usufruct of the property and the dominion over the corpus takes effect subject to any such limited interests." (emphasis added) Mr. Hardy refers to the letter, dated 29-6-1938 (Ex. P-3) of the Chief Engineer and Secretary, P.W.D.,Bhopal whereby two maps of the house, Nawab Manzil were sent to the grantee. The portions shown in light red colour in these maps were referred to in this letter as in the "possession and ownership" of the grantee according to the Gazette Notification No. 7, dated 31st October, 1934. As against the above, Mr. Panjwani, learned Counsel for the Respondent submits that the grant of the house is not to be dissociated from the pensionary grants; that even the last sentence of the Firman, read in the context along with its preamble reasonably bears only one construction viz., that a right of residence for life, to be conveyed by the Ruler to the grantee. Stress has been laid on to be conveyed by the Ruler to the grantee. Stress has been laid or,. the fact that there are no words such as, nasalan-dar-nasalan, pushatdar-pushat etc. in the language of the Firman showing that absolute. heritable rights in the property were conferred on the grantee. Counsel further maintains that the Firman represents a grant made by' an absolute Ruler in favour of his subject on the occasion of the latter's retirement from service and that it was not a mere hiba made by one Muslim under Mohammedan Law to another Muslim. Reference to Mohammedan Law, proceeds the argument, has no relevance. It is urged that the grant being a Sovereign grant, had to be construed strongly against the grantee, and imperfections in the language of the Firman had to be resolved in favour of the Government, by reading it as a whole in the light of the surrounding circumstances and even the subsequent conduct of the then Bhopal Government in ejecting, Syed Mohammad Ali from the house in May, 1947. That ejectment,' according to the Counsel, amounted to resumption of the grant-(by' the grantor) who was then alive and was still the absolute Ruler of Bhopal state. Counsel has referred to several authorities in support, of these contentions.

Another cardinal canon of interpretation to be borne in mind is that in order to ascertain the real intention of the grantor, the Firman has to be read as a whole. It will not be correct as the appellants want us to do to dissect the Firman into three water-tight compartments or to read last sentence of the Firman out of the context. It is also per- missible to consider the surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which this grant was made, as legitimate aids to construction of The Firman (see Gulabdas Jagjivandas v. Collector of Surat (supra).

The occasion for the grant as apparent from the preamble of the Firman, Ex.P-1, (reproduced in the Notification Ex-P-2) was that the grantee, Sir Liaqat Ali, having attained the age of superannuation, was retiring with the permission of the grantor, after putting in "valuable" and "faithful" service for more than thirty years, including two years for which he served without remuneration, in view of the poor economic condition of the State. An analysis of the Firman will show that it confers three-fold benefits on the grantee. Firstly, it rants him such pension as would be admissible under the Service Rules. This he would draw from the State Treasury. Secondly, in addition to the first, it grants him pension at the rate of Rs. 400/- per month which the pensioner would be entitled to draw from the Deodhi Treasure i.e., the Privy Purse of the Ruler. Thirdly, it grants him a beneficial interest in the residential house, in these terms : "Aur aapka sakoonti makan waqya Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa kiya jata hai". As is indicated in the Firman (Ex.P-1) (P-2) Notification in making this tripartite grant the Ruler was actuated by consideration of gratitude for the valuable services rendered by the grantee. The object of conferring these three-fold benefits was the same, namely, to secure to the retiring servant a handsome maintenance and comfortable residence for the rest of his life. In other words, all the three benefits granted under this Firman were cognate benefits, arising out of the same occasion, and made with the same object in view viz., to enable the grantee to live comfortably in retirement. These related benefits could be compendiously described as "retirement benefits". The first two benefits were indisputably pensionary benefits enuring only for the lifetime of the grantee. All the three kindred benefits, including the one in question, were expressly meant for the person of the grantee. This is clear from the word 'apko' which means "to you" in the phrase "apko inayat ataa kiva jata hai" The conjunction "aur" (and) at the commencement of the last sentence of the Firman inextricably links the grant of interest in the residential house, with the pensionarybenefits conferred in the foregoing parts of the Firman. In short, allthe three-fold benefits granted under this Firman are, off spring ofthe same genus. The language of the Firman relating directly to thegrant in question therefore takes its colour from the preceding parts of the Firman relating to the pensionary benefits conferred on the grantee for life. Thus if the crucial words quoted above, are construed in the context of the akin grants, and-according to the general tenor of the Firman as a whole, it becomes clear that the intention of the Ruler was to grant only a right of residence limited to the life time of the grantee-and not an absolute estate in the house. The surrounding circumstances also confirm the interpretation adopted by us. The first such circumstance was. that at the time of the grant, the grantee had no issue, nor any near relation. Indeed, he died widowless and issue-less. In this context, coupled with the omission of any words such as to "grantee and his heirs" or "nasalan-dar-nasalan" indicating the grant to be heritable, it would be reasonable to hold that the grant was intended to be for life only.