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1. The petitioner has challenged in this writ petition an order of the third respondent dated December 14, 1990 disqualifying him from membership of the Legislative Assembly of the stale of Goa. The petitioner was elected as a Member of the Goa Legislative Assembly on November 26, 1989 on the Congress (I) party ticket. He was elected as speaker of the Assembly on January 22, 1990. On March 24, 1990 the petitioner, while holding the office of speaker, resigned from the Congress (I) along with six other members of the said party. These persons formed a new political party which they designated as the Goan People's Party. The resignation of the petitioner was accepted by the Congress (I) party on March 25, 1990.

4. The petitioner thereafter resigned as the speaker of the Assembly on April 14, 1990. He filed his reply on April 30, 1990. A hearing was given to the petitioner by the respondent No. 3. Thereafter by his order dated December 14, 1990 which is an elaborate speaking order, the 3rd respondent has disqualified the petitioner from the membership of the Assembly.

5. The first contention which has been raised before us relates to the provisions of the Members of Goa, Daman and Diu Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on grounds of Defection) Rules, 1986. Under Rule 6(6) of these Rules every petition is required to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the verification of pleadings. In the present case the petition is so signed and verified. Rule 6(7) requires every annexure to the petition also to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. According to the petitioner this has not been done in the present case. Under Rule 7(2) of these Rules, if the petition docs not comply with the requirements of Rule 6 the speaker shall dismiss the petition. According to the petitioner, in view of the fact that the annexures to the petition have not been signed by the petitioner and verified as per Sub-rule (7) of Rule 6, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. The second submission made before us relates to the jurisdiction of respondent No. 3 to decide the petition. It is submitted that at the time when the petition was decided, the petitioner was no longer the speaker of the assembly. Hence the respondent No. 3 had no jurisdiction to decide the petition. Under paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution, the question of disqualification of a member of the Assembly has to be decided by the speaker. The proviso to paragraph 6 states that when it is a question of the disqualification of the speaker of the House, it has to be decided by a member of the House elected in this behalf by the House. Whether the proviso applies or not will depend upon whether the speaker is sought to be disqualified or not. The relevant date for this purpose is the date when the action complained of occurs. If it is the action of the speaker, the proviso is attracted. In the present case the conduct of the petitioner which gave rise to the petition for disqualification was his conduct as the speaker. The disqualification petition was also filed at a time when the petitioner was the speaker. On the date when respondent No. 3 was elected by the House to decide the disqualification petition, the petitioner was the speaker. On such election, respondent No. 3 became invested with the jurisdiction to decide the petition. It was only thereafter that the petitioner resigned as speaker. We do not sec anything in paragraph 6 which will divest a duly elected member, invested with the jurisdiction to hear such a dispute of his jurisdiction at a later date if the speaker ceases to be the speaker. Both on the date of the impugned conduct and on the date of respondent No. 3's election to decide the question of disqualification the petitioner was the speaker. His subsequent resignation as speaker docs not divest respondent No. 3 of jurisdiction validly conferred on him.

10. Mr. Usgaoncar, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted with some force before us that under paragraph 5 a speaker, by reason of his election to the office of speaker, may voluntarily give up the membership of the political party to which he belongs without incuring any disqualification under paragraph 2, so long as he does not rejoin that political party during his term as speaker or becomes a member of another political party during his term as speaker. He has contended that in the present case, since the petitioner did not resign from membership of his political party on the ground that he had become the speaker, the provisions of paragraph 5 do not come into operation. Respondent No. 3, however, has interpreted paragraph 5 to mean that during the time that a person holds the office of a speaker he cannot become a member of another political party. The provisions of paragraph 3 of Tenth Schedule which deal with the case of a split in the party, do not apply to provisions of paragraph 5. We are not sitting in appeal over the decision of respondent No. 3. We, therefore, do not propose to go into the question whether the interpretation put on paragraph 5 by respondent No. 3 is correct or incorrect. What we have to consider is whether the view taken by respondent No. 3 is a possible view or whether it is wholly unreasonable or perverse. If it is latter, we can intervene. Otherwise the authority to decide this question is conferred on the respondent No. 3 under paragraph 6. In our view, it cannot be said in the present case that the interpretation put on paragraph 5 is unreasonable or perverse.