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29. Per contra, Sh.Atul Nanda learned senior counsel, who argued with equal aplomb for the respondents urged that as against civil jurisprudence, military jurisprudence had grown differently and historically Courts in common law and non common law jurisdictions had not issued prerogative writs to military courts or tribunals. Conceding that power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution was recognized to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, counsel urged that the legislative intent to create an Armed Force Tribunal which resulted in the legislative mandate under the Armed Forces Tribunal Act 2007 is to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution of India and for which submission learned senior counsel urged that vis-à-vis civil service, requirement of highest standard of discipline in an armed service was essential to a democratic society requiring speedy adjudication of disputes relating to members of an Armed Force and therefrom learned senior counsel urged that keeping in view said distinction between a civil service and a military service, on the principle of comity, speedy justice and the requirement of reducing multiplicity of litigation, it has to be held that a High Court either does not have or if having, would refrain from exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. With respect to the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, with reference to clause 4 thereof, learned senior counsel urged that the complete power of superintendence created under Article 227 was non-applicable to Tribunals or Courts constituted by a law relating to the Armed Forces and thus counsel urged that even judicial superintendence was taken away with respect to the Armed Forces Tribunal. Learned counsel urged that the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to correct decisions passed by authorities and persons subordinate to the High Court did not extend to issue directions to exercise discretion in a particular manner, which power was a part of the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, and thus learned senior counsel urged that de hors Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court would be powerless to issue any direction to the Tribunal to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner.

66. The Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported as 1973 (4) SCC 225 Keshwananda Bharti Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. laid down the principle of the basic structure of the Constitution being inviolable and we may hasten to add that though the Bench did not specifically hold that judicial review is a part of basic structure of the Constitution but expressly held that Rule of Law is essentially a part of the basic structure. Judicial review was however held to be an integral part of the Constitution. We may also note that Justice Y.V.Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was), in the decision reported as 1975 Supp. SCC 1 Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Raj Narain & Anr. held in the context of elections to elect representatives to the Lok Sabha, that judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. However, a meaningful reading of the opinion of Y.V.Chandrachud (CJ) in the decision reported as 1980 (3) SCC 625 Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors. would reveal that His Lordship held judicial review with respect to legislative actions as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The separate opinion of P.N.Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was), also upheld judicial review with respect to legislative actions as a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, but His Lordship hedged the opinion with a caveat in the following words:-
―Para 87........I am of the view that if there is one feature of our Constitution which, more than any other, is basic and fundamental to the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law, it is the power of judicial review and it is unquestionably, to my mind, part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Of course, when I say this I should not be taken to suggest that effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review cannot be made by Parliament. (Underlined emphasized).‖
68. The aforesaid line of reasoning adopted by Bhagwati, J.

was applied in full vigour in the decision reported as 1987 (1) SCC 124 S.P.Sampath Kumar Vs. UOI & Ors. in para 3 whereof it was observed that although power of judicial review is an integral part of our Constitutional system and without it there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of unreality and thus judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament, it can certainly, without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine, set up alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review. But, to our mind, His Lordship made a very broad and a sweeping statement in said para 3 by observing that this view was the majority view of the Judges who decided Minerva Mills' case (supra). The observations in para 3: It is undoubtedly true that my judgment in Minerva Mills Ltd. case was a minority judgment but so far as this aspect is concerned, the majority Judges also took the same view and held that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution and it is equally clear from the same decision that though judicial review cannot be altogether abrogated by Parliament it can certainly, without in any way violating the basic structure doctrine set up effective alternative institutional mechanisms or arrangements for judicial review.