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2. Since the parties are same and common question of law is involved, all the writ petitions have been clubbed together for disposal by the following common order.

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3. In above the cases, the leases were granted under the provisions of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962 (here-in-after referred to as 'the OGLS Act') vide W.L. Case Nos.562, 577, 578, 587, 588, 589, 590 and 591 of 1975. The Petitioner appears to have purchased the leasehold lands either from the lessees or from their vendees and claimed to be in possession of the same ever since the respective purchases made and also mutated her name in the revenue records. In the meantime, suo motu revision proceedings were initiated under Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act and the leases in question were cancelled by order dated 30th June 1998. As revealed from the record, the Petitioner, thereafter, challenged the orders of cancellation by approaching this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.2895, 3291, 3293, 3297, 2893, 3292, 3296 and 3295 of 2003 which were disposed of orders under Annexure-2. In the aforesaid cases, this Court set aside the cancellation of leases and directed OP No.2 to provide hearing to the Petitioner in compliance of 1st proviso to Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act. Accordingly, the revision proceedings were restored to file and the Petitioner was provided an opportunity by OP No.2. Finally, by a common order under Annexure-3, OP No.2 cancelled the leases granted in favour of the lessees on the ground of fraud and material irregularities in the procedure followed by the concerned authority. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner approached this Court by contending that the leases could not have been cancelled in view of 2nd proviso to Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act.

8. Mr. Mohanty contends that irrespective of the irregularities as has been pointed out by OP No.2 in the impugned order under Annexure-3, the leases could not have been cancelled in view of the 2nd proviso to Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act which is to the effect that no such proceeding can be initiated after expiry of 14 years from the date of order. Admittedly, the leases are of the year 1975 and subsequently, cancelled in 1998 under Annexure-1 and thereafter, once again confirmed vide Annexure-3 holding that the then Tahasildar, Bhubaneswar failed to conduct enquiries following the procedure under the OGLS Act, while settling the lands in favour of the lessees, besides the fraud which was elicited on examination of the lower court records. Now, the question is, whether with such delay of 23 years, OP No.2 ought to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act, while cancelling the leases?

10. The citations so relied upon by Mr. Das are, in fact, on distinguishable facts and law. In Laxmipriya Tripathy case, the lease was cancelled for having been granted without following due procedure under the OGLS Act. In other words, on fraud and material irregularities being detected while allowing the lease, the Court in the aforesaid case was of the view that the cancellation order should not be set aside. In that case, the lease was cancelled after about 10 years which was within the period // 7 // of limitation as prescribed in Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act. So it can be said that in the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case, this Court in Laxmipriya Tripathy declined to set aside the order of cancellation of lease which was again an exercise carried within the period of limitation. The decision in Brudaban Sharma (supra), wherein, the Supreme Court held that validity of a nonest order may be questioned or invalidity be set up in any proceeding or at any stage was in relation to the revisional jurisdiction exercisable under Section 38-B of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (in short 'the OEA Act') where no period of limitation has been prescribed. In the above case, the Supreme Court held that even though the impugned order was passed after 27 years since the time the patta was granted by the Tahasildar, the revisional power could still be exercised to invalidate an otherwise nonest order which was passed without obtaining prior confirmation of the Board of Revenue. The above decision as relied upon by Mr. Das is under the OEA Act and as such, no period of limitation is prescribed in Section 38-B of the said Act. But, in the instant case, a period is stipulated in Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act which is 14 years from the date of passing of the order on lease by the authority concerned. So, the Court is to examine, whether, despite such a provision carrying limitation, OP No.2 was justified to cancel the leases after 23 years.

11. Of course in Smt. Elley Pattnaik, this Court had concluded that the revisional power under Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act may be exercised but within 14 years as per 2nd proviso thereof. In Laxmidhar Tarai, the Court referred to the above case but // 8 // was inclined to set aside the cancellation of lease rather on the ground that by such belated action, the poor lessees would suffer. Such a decision was against the backdrop of a finding by the authority concerned regarding violation of provisions OGLS Act and fraud, while settling the leases. In fact, the decision in Laxmidhar Tarai is not an authority on exercise of revisional jurisdiction vis-à-vis 2nd proviso to Section 7-A(3) of the OGLS Act. Rather, the Court, in that case, was conscious of the fact that the leases had been cancelled after 14 years but was inclined to set aside the orders of cancellation on a different ground. In the case of Mr. Purna Ch. Pradhan, this Court even after taking cognizance of Section 7-A(3) 2nd proviso of OGLS Act had to observe that in case of fraud committed for obtaining a lease, the starting point for computation of period of limitation as prescribed would be from the date of its detection.