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7. At this stage, we may do worse than examine two puzzling aspects in the impugned order: destruction of confiscated goods and recourse to section 111(f) of Customs Act, 1962. Nowhere does Customs Act, 1962 even refer to willful destruction of 'goods' under any circumstances and, indeed, it would be violation of law and misappropriation of public property to contemplate such extinguishment by an officer of customs of that which the creator statute vests in the Central Government under the authority of section 126 of Customs Act, 1962. The Tribunal, in its order2, in Doc Brown and ors v. Commissioner of Customs (NS-V), Nhava Sheva, disposing off appeal3 challenging order4 of Commissioner of Customs (NS-V), Nhava Sheva, had opportunity to scrutinize the legality of arrogating of such authority and held that '3. ...... The adjudicating authority has directed not only absolute confiscation but also destruction of the goods. [final order no. A/85949-85952/2023 dated 11th May 2023] [no. C/86237/2022] [order-in- original no. 01/2022-23/CC/NS-V/CAC/JNCH dated 6th April 2022] C/85623, 85715-85720/2023 Customs Act, 1962 does not afford, by any of its provisions, authority to destroy goods at any time; indeed, a law for charging tax on goods can hardly bear within it the means of putting goods beyond the reach of the statute. Furthermore, section 125 of Customs Act, 1962 vests confiscated property in the Central Government which, though, as owner is, thereby, free to dispose of such goods as it pleases, may, nonetheless, part with it only under authority either of statutory empowerment or from Presidential delegation to subordinate functionaries and, that too, only in executive capacity which stands excluded, in no uncertain terms, from adjudicatory jurisdiction. The order to destroy is, thus, clearly beyond legal competence of the impugned proceedings and borders on misappropriation of public property.' which, in dismissal of appeal of Revenue, found approval of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay. Therefore, there is no reason to allow such disregard of the law by the adjudicating authority here and, consequently, the 'mark', on impugned goods bereft of offer of redemption for 'destruction', stands extinguished and at par with those on which the offer of redemption had not been taken up. We shall, presently, turn to the legality of absolute confiscation and its consequence. Section 111(f) of Customs Act, 1962 is to be invoked for goods that are not included in declaration prescribed by section 30 of Customs Act, 1962. Possibly, the impugned goods were not but such conclusion can be arrived at, definitively, in adjudication proceedings only by placing those upon whom statutory obligation devolved on notice and after scrutiny of such documents. The absence of such notice C/85623, 85715-85720/2023 as well as the lack of reference to any documentary evidence to that effect in a notice answerable only by those concerned with the next stage in the import procedure puts paid to its validation as recourse to confiscation.

11. As we have pointed out supra, the impugned order has, after recourse to rule 12 of Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, arrogated the authority, under rule 3(4) C/85623, 85715-85720/2023 of the said Rules to proceed with sequential application of the several alternative 'transaction' or other 'value' for assessment. There is no doubt that section 2(41) of Customs Act, 1962 does set out the meaning thereof, including as determined under section 14 of Customs Act, 1962, but we see no justification in the impugned order to conclude that such exercise is prescriptive as a preliminary in all imports or, indeed, that a definition can 'wag' the empowerment to levy duty which is the express intent set out in section 14 of Customs Act, 1962; it could, thus, be safely said that determination of 'value', if resorted to under the aegis of section 14 of Customs Act, 1962, must be proceeded with, and undeviatingly so, in the manner set out therein. The omnibus fastening of value to the four consignments, as a whole, without eliciting the value of each of the articles separately is mere lip service to obligation devolving under section 14 of Customs Act, 1962, as well as the Rules supra, which lay emphasis on 'goods' that can be ignored only at peril to consequences. It is also demonstrative of purposive adjudication which extinguished its credibility in law.

14. Furthermore, the notice, as well as the impugned order, is bereft of any discussion, in relation to the declared and undeclared goods, on C/85623, 85715-85720/2023 the availability of 'identical' or 'similar' goods that was purportedly used as reference by the 'approved valuer' when the adjudicating authority had already recorded the inevitability of by-passing rule 4 and rule 5 of Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007. It is inconceivable that such 'prohibited goods' are available in the market for an acceptable evaluation of price that the 'approved valuer' appears to have resorted to. It would appear that the reliance placed on the report of 'valuer' to the exclusion of the responsibility devolving on the 'proper officer' opting for 'deductive value' has rendered the valuation exercise to be untenable in its entirety and, in the absence of any factual narration in the notice, not amenable to fresh determination. Hence, the confiscation under section 111(m) of Customs Act, 1962 for variation from declared value must be held to lack sanction of law as also the value arrived at by the adjudicating authority.

15. On the imports that were held to be violative of 'intellectual property rights' and, thereby, of being 'counterfeit', Learned Counsel drew our attention to rule 8 of Intellectual Property Rights (Imported Goods) Enforcement Rules, 2007 not having been complied with and, thus, the finding, exclusively on the basis of reports of interested persons who were, in fact, called in and thus circumstanced as 'right holder', who is not bereft of motive of 'self-preservation' implicit in the said Rules. It is no less important that the 'goods' referred to in the Rules are not 'prohibited' by section 11 of Customs Act, 1962 but are C/85623, 85715-85720/2023 'deemed' to be and only upon compliance with the Rules. The procedure is intended to foreclose mischief of 'cats paw' which could, otherwise, convenience any owner, or agent of such owner, of 'intellectual property rights' to 'abuse' government machinery for serving the inevitable desire to reap consequence of 'monopoly commerce' and the manner in which the exercise of ascertainment, as well as the determination of 'counterfeit' has been undertaken, has detracted from the 'commercial neutrality' and 'sanctity of sovereign interest' implicit in empowerment of customs administration. The Hon'ble High Court of Bombay did have occasion, in NBU Bearings Pvt Ltd & Anr v. Union of India & Ors5, to review the responsibility and statutory obligation devolving on customs matters thus '10.2. The IPR Rules do not confer any new intellectual property rights. They prescribe a remedy to prevent importation of goods that infringe intellectual property rights recognized and defned under the parent statutes relating to copyright, patent, trademarks, designs and geographical indications.