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on September 24, 1951, and after weighing it in the light of incontrovertible or admitted fact it found the allegation untrue. In the first place, it observed that the written statement filed by Narsinghdas did not describe her specifically as being "cyanosed '. It found that the evidence of Dr. Choubey, who deposed that Premwati was unable to respond, could not be believed, nor was it possible to rely on the nurse Rachel, whose name was not mentioned in the original list of fifty-six witnesses filed by Narsinghdas, and who stated that she had been told by Dr. Choubey that Premwati was in an unconscious state. The entire case set up in evidence was completely demolished by the undisputed fact that Premwati had indeed signed the adoption deed on September 24, 1951. Much capital was made by the contesting respondents of the fact that the appellant had not examined Gopmath Vaidya to establish the condition of Premwati's health and the fact of adoption on September 24, 1951, but the trial court, in the course of its judgment, has referred in some detail to the appellants efforts to have the evidence of that witness recorded. At the appellant's instance a commission had been issued at Hathras for the examination of Ramsarandas and Gopinath Vaidya. On June 22, 1960 both witnesses were present before the Commissioner at Hathras, but the Commissioner took an unexpectedly long time in examining Ramsarandas on that day, and on the next day, to which he had deferred the examination of Gopinath Vaidya, he left town suddenly to see his sick son. The appellant, the trial Court pointed out, sought to examine the witness on a subsequent date in court at Jabalpur, but the witness did not appear.

The trial court then considered the matter of the execution of an adoption deed by Jagannathdas and Premwati as evidence of the adoption. It took into account the circumstances in which the document was considered necessary, its execution and attestation, and how it was at first entrusted to Seth Govinddas and then returned to Jagannathdas. It was not disputed that such a document was in fact signed by Jagannathdas and Premwati on September 24, 1951, and the trial court repelled the case of the respondents that Jagannathdas was compelled to sign it without and knowledge of its contents and that Premwati also did so in ignorance of what it set forth. The fact that Jagannathdas was aware of the nature of the document is fully established by his reference to it as an adoption deed when he wrote out the receipt given to Seth Govinddas in envidence of its return. The trial court also noted that Jagannathdas disowned the adoption and the document later only when the circumstance around him changed as his wife approached her end and the over-powering influence of Narsinghdas began to take hold over his will.

The High Court has declined to accept the adoption also on the ground that the adoption deed mentioned the performance of a "havan" and other ceremonies when in fact there is no evidence whatever that those ceremonies were performed. It does appear that there is an inconsistency between the case of the appellant and some of the recitals in the adoption deed. The inconsistency has a been explained satisfactorily by the trial court. It is apparent that the document was prepared by the lawyer, Jamna Prasad Dubey, containing recitals usual in such a document, and Manmohandas who had entrusted him with the task could have given him only the briefest instructions in regard to its contents. Time was running out fast as Premwati's condition grew progressively worse, and when it was brought before her and read out it was too late to effect a change in some of the recitals, and consequently it was signed as it was by Jagannathdas and Premwati. The complaints made by Jagannathdas to the Deputy Commissioner and the District Superintendent of Police as well as the public notices published in the newspapers disclaiming execution of the adoption deed and the adoption are explicable only in the context of the overpowering influence of Narsinghdas. So also is the creation of the Trust in which Narsinghdas secured for himself the office of working trustee in respect of most of the properties. It is significant that the power of revocation reserved to himself by Jagannathdas was relinquished by him within a mere four months of the creation of the Trust. The entire conduct of Jagannathdas persisting thereafter can be ascribed to the position to which he had been persuaded, namely, one of active opposition to the appellant's claim of adoption. The attitude was tempered only later, when a a few weeks before his death he wrote to his mother that he had "owned" the appellant as his adopted son.

It is urged by the contesting respondents that in the event of the Court holding that the appellant is the adopted son of the Jagannathdas and Premwati he can be found entitled to a half share only in the properties. The submission is based on a recital in the trust deed executed by Jagannathdas that if the adoption deed "is declared valid by the highest court then, today, I express, by this writing, a strong and unequivocal intention to separate at once from the heir by the aforesaid alleged adoption deed and direct the trustees that in that event they shall get the property immediately partitioned and apply at least my half share in the property for fulfillment of the objects of the trust:" It is contended that the declaration contained in the trust deed must be regarded as effecting a partition whereby the share of Jagannathdas in the property stood separated from the share of the appellant and the former share must be treated as the subject of the trust. Both the trial court and the High Court rejected the contention. They held that a valid partition required notice to the co-sharer of the intention to separate, and no such notice was given nor could be inferred from Jagannathdas to the appellant. We are in agreement with the courts below. It was held by the Privy Council in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj(1) and Bal Krishan and Ors. v. Bal Krishan and Ors.(2) that a separation is effected by a clear and unequivocal intimation on the part of one member of a Joint Hindu Family to his co- sharers of his desire to sever himself from the Joint Family. In A. Raghavamma and Anr. v. Chenchamma and Anr. (Supra), Puttrangamma and others v. M.S. Ranganna and Ors.(3) and Kalyani (dead) by L. Rs. v. Narayanan and Ors.(4) this Court held that there should be an intimation, indication or representation of such intention, and that this manifestation or declaration of intention should be to the knowledge of the persons affected because a mere uncommunicated declaration amounts to no more than merely harbouring an intention to separate. In the present case, there is no evidence whatever to show that the intention to separate was communicated by Jagannathdas to the appellant at any time when creating the trust. There are other grounds on which the appellant contends that the declaration of separation in the trust deed is wholly in effective, but we consider it unnecessary to consider them here.