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The decision of the Full Bench was, in our opinion, and we say so with all respect, a correct decision, and is binding upon us.

(7) A contrary view was brought to out notice, expressed by a Full bench of the Mysore High Court in Rachagouda v. Kamabai, AIR 1963 Mys 21 (FB). The case arose under the same Act and, no doubt, the Full Bench held that the Mamlatdar is not competent to give a negative declaration that a person is not a tenant. Since, however, the Mysore Full Bench has expressly referred to the above decision of the Full bench of this Court, and dissented from it, and since, in our view, the decision of this Court was with all respect, a correct decision, we turn to examine the reasons which impelled the decision of the Mysore High Court.

(8) In coming to their decision that a negative declaration that a person is not a tenant cannot be granted by the Mamlatdar under Section 70 (b) of the Act the Mysore High Court referred to the opening clause of section 70 (b) and particularly the words used therein "For the purposes of this Act." One argument which was advanced before them was that nothing which is not for the purposes of the Act can be the duty of the Mamlatdar. The Mysore High Court accepted that contention and construed clause (b) of section 70 in the light of the opening clause of section 70. It was also argued before us that it could surely not be the purpose of the Act to decide, whether at the instance of the landlord or the tenant or any other person, that a person is not a tenant and, therefore, clause (b) of section 70 should be construed in conformity with the opening clause of section 70 and confined only to cases of declaration that a person is a tenant. It seems to us that the argument merely begs the real question to be determined. Every decision which affirmatively states that a fact exists necessarily implies that the negative does not exist. If a Mamlatdar decides that a person is a tenant he necessarily negatives the issue that he is not a tenant, yet it is said that he can decide the former but not the latter issue. Vice versa if the Mamlatdar decides that a person is not a tenant he necessarily negatives the issue that he is a tenant. Yet in this case it argued that he cannot decide the former issue but only the latter one. Why the Mamlatdar cannot do so it is difficult to see. Similarly every decision which the Mamlatdar may make that a person is a tenant in a litigation between two parties both claiming to be tenants must necessarily imply a decision that the other party is not a tenant. We are unable to appreciate the contention, therefore, that the latter issue cannot be decided by the Mamlatdar for the purposes of the Act.