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19. I place the second type of investments in the same category, because, in the ultimate analysis, it is the trust-money that the settlor proposes to be pressed into service. Be it the surplus income of any of the investments or the compensation-money as the result of acquisition, it is the trust-money all the same. No doubt, so viewed, in this category, comes also the investment of the sale-proceeds of "116" Sn the event of the sale thereof to Sreelal Chamaria. Because it is trust-money too. But for convenience of treatment of the subject, I keep it separate.

29. Is that even reasonably enough for so many financial obligations cast upon the trustees, of whom the settlor Modhoo Sooden is one, by the trust-deed, and for so many years to come? Let it be remembered too that the settlor is none too solvent then. "116" itself is at the relevant time under an agreement for sale to Sreelal Chamaria for Rs. 45,000, out of which Modhoo Sooden has received Rs. 1,000. More, it has been stipulated that, until completion of the sale to Chamaria, Modhoo Sooden will get from him Rs. 490 a month. See paragraph 12; C ante. With the agreement for sale rescinded, as indeed it was rescinded, that income goes. Placed so, and with so many financial obligations to be discharged over the years in future, will such a one intend to tie up "116" in the manner it is tied up, because of the words "for such purpose"? And how crippled the trustees will be, because of these words, is plain to be seen, I am now looking a little beyond mortgage, to realize the full impact of the limitation, caused by the words "for such purpose". For such purpose, that is, for the purpose of periodic variation in investments of the second type (paragraph 18), if they come into existence ever, because the liabilities the trustees have to wrestle with look much more than the assets they have on their hands, they have the power to sell, mortgage, charge, lease or dispose of "116". Now, let not the milieu of "116" be forgotten for a moment. It is in Cotton Street. Cotton Street is Cotton Street in Burrabazar area of the town of Calcutta, the very hub of trade and commerce, -- a notorious fact I take judicial notice of. Suppose, the trustees have a proposal for a lease with a fat rent and fatter premium within the bounds of law. But no investments of the second type there are. Upon all I see, there appears to be little chance of such investment having been there. Or even if they are there, no variation thereof can be done. In such a contingency, the trustees cannot enter into such a lease. By the "for such purpose" clause, to enter into a lease is subject to taboo upon the trustees: "No variation of investment, (assuming it to exist, its very existence ever being open to the gravest doubt), no lease, no matter how fat the rent and how fatter the premium". Thus, the source of so huge an extra income remains dried up, with no possibility of the augmentation of the capital, even though the financial liabilities go on mounting over the years, -- and all because of the "for such purpose" clause. And this is only illustrative, not exhaustive. It will be, indeed, an exercise in futility trying to demonstrate that a house property in Cotton Street may prove a veritable gold mine, if properly handled, free of shackles. Can a prudent man, therefore, bring himself to believe that such restriction imposed by the "for such purpose" clause is the true intention, at the time of the creation of the trust, of the settlor, a prudent man too and the owner of "116" in a covetable part as this of the town of Calcutta? Or will not a prudent man take it for granted that that is a mistake which does not reflect the true intention of the settlor? The latter view appears to be far more probable. No wonder, the settlor goes for a deed of rectification and says as much, so soon as he discovers such a mistake contrary to his intention and contrary to the tenor of the trust-deed, as noticed in paragraph 14 ante.

31. Upon the whole, therefore, I find as a fact that, at the time the settlor creates the trust, his true intention is --and such is the tenor of the trust-deed too -- that the trustees' power to deal with "116", the main corpus of the trust, are to be free and full, and not to be restricted by the "for such purpose" clause. Only through inadvertence a clause as this is there in the trust-deed. And there is little to be surprised at such inadvertence, once what the trust-deed is like be remembered. Schedules apart, it runs into four pages, closely written--a specimen indeed of fine penmanship. These four pages in turn contain between themselves two hundred twenty-three lines. If, in this background, the settlor cannot see the wood for trees, what is there to cause surprise? I do not see any. A mistake is a mistake. Even with the best care in the world, people do make mistakes from time to time. The settlor Modhoo Sooden does no more.

"And whereas the settlor is desirous of making a provision for the maintenance of his son, the said Moti Lall Sain, about whose success in his profession, the settlor is not certain, and of his family other than his first wife, Srimati Radha Rani Dassi, who is living separately."

It is, therefore, clear, as Mr. Sinha submits, and rightly, in my judgment, that Modhoo Sooden, by the trust-deed, is making provisions for his son Moti Lall, Moti Lall's second wife Nandarani, their children and their children's children. Be it so, From this, the inference by no means follows that his true intention at the time is to tie up "116" by the "for such purpose" clause. A consideration as this cannot outweigh the considerations which lead me to hold that the true intention of the settlor, at the time he creates the trust, is to leave the power of the trustees to deal with "116" unfettered and unrestricted. That apart, solvent or insolvent, discharged bankrupt or undischarged bankrupt, Moti Lall is practically his only son at the relevant time. As he himself says in the trust-deed, of the three sons of his, the eldest Nandalall died unmarried in or about 1909, the second Kanailall has become a sannyasi whom he has, therefore, disinherited, and the third is Moti Lall. And to this practically lone son of his, he gives pride of place, only next to him, in all matters of importance, throughout the trust-deed. Sale-proceeds have to be invested? Investments have to be varied? Well, the approval of the settlor is a precondition, during his lifetime; and after his death, the approval of Moti Lall. The settlor is not discarding Moti Lall, even though he is an undischarged insolvent. And that Moti Lall is made a co-trustee with the settlor himself has been noticed. This manner of confidence in the son Moti Lall continues right up to the death of the settlor Modhoo Sooden, when he leaves behind him a will by which this very son of his, Moti Lall, is appointed executor. The date of Modhoo Sooden's death is April 8, 1939 -- more than seven years after execution of the trust-deed on January 20, 1932. The will has duly been probated too, the date thereof being August 10, 1939 or thereabouts. All this is to be found in Moti Lall's own document, the deed of appointment of a new trustee, exhibit B, by which he retires from the office of trustee, temporarily though, and nominates, just in keeping with the deed of trust, exhibit C, his wife Nandarani as the sole trustee. The date of a deed as this, exhibit B, is December 21, 1939. So, Moti Lall having been an undischarged insolvent can hardly be regarded as a mirror reflecting the settlor's true intention to tie up "116" by the "for such purpose" clause. On top of that, that consideration of all considerations remains (paragraph 29) and may be stated at the risk of repetition. With Rs. 160 as the monthly income from "116", the performance by the trustees of so many duties, involving expenses and expenses over the years, brings the trust-deed on the verge of ridicule and absurdity. Surely, the settlor's intention is not to rush in for a sham trust-deed, with a view to bluffing himself, his son and daughter-in-law, their children and their children's children. With Rs. 1100 or Bs. 1200 as the monthly income from "116", the settlor does not land himself in such an absurdity. Even then, if the income remains stagnant, though "116", because it is "116", is full of possibility for earning more and more, it becomes impossible for the trustees to do what they are called upon to, up to the fourth generation of the settlor, in terms of the trust-deed. So, I reiterate my conclusion that the intention of the settlor, from the very beginning, is to leave unfettered the powers of the trustees to deal with "116", and not fettered by the "for such purpose" clause: just what the settlor himself affirms in the rectification deed.