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Showing contexts for: 113a in Ahshan Khan vs State Of Madhya Pradesh on 4 April, 2001Matching Fragments
8. The record of the Trial Court indicates that this incident had taken place about 25 days before the date of death of Seema. It is clear from the perusal of the statement of P.W. 2, Smt. Shahjehan, the mother of the deceased.
9. The Trial Court further came to the conclusion that the dead body of Seema was recovered after breaking open the door of the room which was bolted from inside. In the room it is not disputed that Seema was all alone. The defence witness Nos. 1 and 2 had disclosed that the dead body of Seema was hanging from the roof. Holding that Seema had committed suicide and she had been harassed by her husband with the object to pressurise her to bring either a scooter from her parents or bring Rs. 20,000/- in lieu thereof, the Trial Court with the aid of the presumption available under Section 113A of the Evidence Act found the accused-appellant to be guilty of having committed the offence envisaged under Section 306, IPC.
10. The Trial Court drew support for its conclusion from the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Girijashanker and Ors v. State of M.P., reported in 1989 C,Cr. J. 72 as well as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, reported in 1991 Cr.LJ 1897.
11. The accused, however, was not found guilty under Section 304B, IPC and was acquitted so far as that charge was concerned.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the conviction of the appellant under Section 306, IPC with the aid of Section 113A of the Evidence Act is not sustainable in law. What has been urged in this connection is that on the own showing of the prosecution the matter had been amicably settled and whatever harassment etc. may have been there prior to Seema's coming to her husband's place alongwith her husband and maternal uncle Shakoor 25 days before the date of death the same stood condoned and in the absence of any evidence whatsoever that any such demand was raised or there was any activity on the part of the accused-appellant which could fall in the category of 'harassment', the presumption envisaged under Section 113A of the Evidence Act could not be deemed to have been available on the basis whereof the conviction under Section 306, IPC could be sustained. It was also contended that the presumption envisaged under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act is a rebuttable presumption and it was incumbent on the part of the prosecution to lead positive evidence of harassment during the period of 25 days after the couple, forgetting the past, had decided to live together and acting upon the settlement Seema came with her husband to live with him. There is absolutely no evidence which may in any manner indicate that after coming back from her parent's house 25 days prior to the date of incident she was meted out with any such harassment which could in any manner create a situation which could fall within the ambit of the expression 'abetment' envisaged under Section 107, IPC. In support of the aforesaid submission learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Mahendm Singh and Anr. Gayatribai v. State of M.P., reported in 1995 SCC (Cr.) 1157. In the aforesaid decision the Apex Court had observed as follows :--
14. The learned Government Advocate, however, has urged that taking into consideration the preceding attitude of the accused-appellant and the finding returned by the Trial Court that he had been throughout torturing and harassing the wife and compelled her to bring the amount of Rs. 20,000/- or a scooter in lieu thereof, the presumption envisaged under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act was clearly available to the prosecution and the Trial Court was justified in convicting the accused under Section 306, IPC with the aid of the aforesaid presumption. It was further been urged that the amicable settlement where under the deceased wife had agreed to come back to her husband's place 25 days before the date of incident was of no material consequence and could not be taken to have the effect of condoning the past harassment etc. so as to wipe out the effect of Section 107A, IPC and the presumption remained effective and available as claimed. In support of the aforesaid submission reliance has been placed on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Gutubachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, reported in AIR 1990 SC 209. In the aforesaid decision it had been observed that there is ample and sufficient evidence that she had complained that she was taunted for bringing meagre dowry and that (it was) even insinuated that she was carrying 'an illegitimate child'. The aforesaid facts stand established by cogent and reliable evidence. These are grave and serious provocations enough for an ordinary woman in the Indian set up, to do what the deceased is alleged to have done. In the absence of any burn injury on the hands of the people around was taken to have indicated and established that there was no attempt to save the deceased though she was seen burnt. The attitude and conduct of the in-laws, the father-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband, after Ravinder Kaur, the deceased got burns in not informing the parents and not taking prompt steps to take her to hospital for giving medical assistance corroborated the inference that these accused connived and abetted the crime."
16. So far as the presumption available under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act was concerned the contention on behalf of the accused that the aforesaid provision was brought into effect subsequent to the commission of the offence i.e.,on June 23rd, 1983, and could not be taken recourse to while coming to a finding regarding the presumption as to abetment of suicide committed by a married woman against the accused persons was rejected holding that the presumption arising under Section 113A of the Evidence Act had been rightly taken into consideration by the Trial Court. It had to be construed as retrospective in operation.