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8. In the Act of 1903 another change in favour of rateable distribution was introduced by omitting the words "realized by sale or otherwise" and substituting for them the words "are held by the Court." But the essential condition was retained, namely, that persons applying for distribution paripassu must have made applications to the Court for the execution of decrees before the receipt of assets. It is thus clear from an examination of these provisions that there is a progressive tendency in favour of rateable distribution. I may even say that there is a tendency to restrict the rights of the first applicant. But certain conditions have still to be complied with if the benefit of such a provision is to be availed of. Bakewell, J.'s judgment would lead one to suppose that wherever there are a number of decrees against a common judgment debtor the principle of rateable distribution should be enforced, whether there have been applications for execution prior to the realization of the assets or not. If that were the object of the Legislature, it could have then easily declared that no person having a decree against a judgment-debtor shall be entitled to priority by virtue of the fact that he had applied for execution before others. The Indian law has provided for rateable distribution to all creditors in administrative actions and in insolvency matters. Under Order XX, Rule 13, if there is an administrative action and the assets are in the hands of the Court, its distribution is governed by the same principles as obtain with regard to distribution of assets of an insolvent judgment debtor. No question of applying priority to the reailization of assess and no question of execution application arise under this rule. Section 73, Civil Procedure Code, is, therefore, restricted in its operation to other than administrative actions. If we turn to Order XXI, Rule 52, it seems clear that priority is within the contemplation of the Legislature because it says: "Any question of title or priority arising between the deqree-holder and any other person shall be determined by the Court." In my opinion the general principle is this, that a person who is diligent enough to invoke the aid of the Court in satisfaction of his decree should not be kept out of his rights because others have not been equally diligent in seeking their redress. The only restriction upon his right is that, if before he sets the process of the Court is motion to realize the assets, others have applied for execution, he should share the realised assets with these other applicants. There is no warrant for holding that a person who had applied for payment should be put off on the chance of some others having claims on the property coming in at some time to have the property distributed rateably. It is not easy to see how long this process, of waiting should be enforced. Is it to be only, as in the present case, in favour of persons who have filed suits or is the Court to embark on an enquiry whether there are other creditors who may at some future time file suits to obtain decrees? In my opinion, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh 40 Ind. Cas. 242 : 44 C. 662 (P.C) : 1 P.L.W. 425 : 5 L.W. 711 : 32 M.L.J. 425 : 21 C.W.N. 585 : 21 M.L.T. 344 : 15 A.L.J. 382 : 25 C.L.J. 508 : 19 Bom. L.R. 421 : (1917) M.W.N. 473 : 44 I.A. 72, Section 73 should be construed as applying only to persons who come within the strict letter of the law. I am unable to agree with Bakewell, J., that there is an underlying principle in our jurisprudence and in our Procedure Code that every creditor should have equal chance of payment from out of the assets of the judgment debtor, whether he is diligent or not and whether he takes prompt steps to enforce his rights or not. I agree with the conclusion come to by the present Chief Justice in Thiruvangadial v. Thiruvangadih 24 Ind. Cas. 617 : 26 M.L.J. 364. As regards Thakur Das Moti Lal v. Joseph Iskender 41 Ind. Cas. 516 : 21 C.W.N. 887 : 25 C.L.J. 595 : 44 C. 1072, on the facets of that case the present question did not arise for decision. There are some observation by way of obiter in the judgment of Mookerjee, J., who invokes the aid of justice, equity and good conscience in favour of equal apportionment to all decree-holders. It has been laid down by the Judicial Committee that under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act if one creditor is preferred by a debtor honestly, that would not be a preference which would avoid the transaction. I am referring to this for the purpose of showing that a person who is diligent enough to get from his debtor his rights is not to be asked to give them up because there are others who have similar rights but who have not taken steps to enforce them. If there is any one principle which guides our Courts, it is the principle of enabling persons who ace diligent enough to secure their rights to get full satisfaction of their claims without compelling them to share the property of the judgment-debtor along with others who did not move promptly in the matter.