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- and on this aspect of the matter they are all unanimous that there was considerable negligence on the part of the management of Shriram in the maintenance and operation of the caustic chlorine plant and there were also defects and drawbacks in its structure and design. The report of Dr. Slater which is the first report in the series clearly pointed out that the safety policies, practices and awareness on the part of the management needed to be addressed urgently and added inter alia that the effectiveness and availability of the design and emergency arrangements was, to say the least, questionable and in the real emergency involving a major spill, the measures would probably prove ineffective in limiting serious consequences inside and outside the plant. He also added that the standard of housekeeping and training among the operational staff was not good and it was symptomatic of inadequate awareness of the importance of safety devices and the scale of potential consequences following "loss of containment". He also reiterated that the manner in which the caustic chlorine plant was being maintained and operated did not "measure up to the responsiblities incumbent upon operators of such plants". So also the report of Manmohan Singh Committee pointed out various drawbacks and deficiencies in the structure and design of the caustic chlorine plant as also in its maintenance and operation and made various detailed recommendations which in the opinion of the Manmohan Singh Committee needed to be strictly and scrupulously carried out, if the risk to the workers and the population in the vicinity was to be minimised. The Nilay Choudhary Committee also made several recommendations in order to minimise the hazard due to a possible leakage of chlorine gas. The management of Shriram claimed that all these recommendations made in the reports of Manmohan singh committee and Nilay Choudhary Committee had been carried out by Shriram and the possible hazard to the workers and the community living in the vicinity was almost reduced to nil and that Shriram should therefore be allowed to reopen the caustic chlorine plant. The management of Shriram made it clear that they did not intended to restart immediately their plants manufacturing Sulphuric Acid, Oleum, Chloro- sulphonic Acid, Super Phosphate and Granulated Fertiliser Ferric Alum and Active Earth. Since these plants were under detailed engineering audit and that out of these plants Double Conversion Double Absorption sulphuric Acid plant and Ferric Alum and Active Earth plants would be started in the second phase "after attending to immediate maintenance needs" and that so far as the other plants were concerned, the schedule restarting would be communicated later. The only plants in respect of which Shriram sought the permission of the Court to restart were the power plant and the plants manufacturing vanaspati and refined oil including its by-products and recovery plants like soap, glycerine and technical hard oil and the caustic chlorine plant including plants manufacturing by-products such as sodium sulphate, hydrochloric acid, stable bleaching powder, superchlor, sodium hypochlorite and container works. Our directions in the present judgment must therefore necessarily be confined only to these plants which Shriram wants to restart immediately and we may make it clear that so far as other plants which Shriram does not propose to restart immediately are concerned, they shall not be restarted by Shriram without obtaining further directions from the Court, particularly since the machinery and equipment in some of these plants is as pointed out in the report of Seturaman Committee old and worn out and the safety instrumentation is not adequate and the Court would therefore have to be satisfied that the machinery and equipment is properly renovated and its design and structure modernised with a view to ensuring maximum safety before the Court can permit these plants to be recommissioned. Now, of course, there could be no objection to the restarting to the vanaspati and refined oil plant and other recovery plants like soap, glycerine and technical hard oil, because they admittedly do not involve any risk or hazard to the community but these plants obviously cannot be restarted by the management of Shriram unless and until the caustic chlorine plant is also allowed to be reopened, because hydrogen is needed for the vanaspati and refined oil plant and hydrogen would not be available unless the caustic chlorine plant is put into operation. The question which therefore requires to be considered is whether all the recommendations made in the reports of Manmohan Singh Committee and Nilay Choudhary Committee in regard to the caustic chlorine plant have been carried out by the management of Shriram and if so, whether Shriram should be allowed to restart the caustic chlorine plant.

We have formulated these conditions with a view to ensuring continuous compliance with the recommendations of Manmohan Singh Committee and Nilay Choudhary Committee and strict observance of safety standards and procedures, so that the possibility of hazard or risk to the workmen and the community is almost reduced to nil. We would like to point out that the caustic chlorine plant of Shriram is not the only plant which is carrying on a hazardous industry. There are many other plants in Delhi which are employing hazardous technology or are engaged in manufacture of hazardous goods and if proper and adequate precautions are not taken, they too are likely to endanger the life and health of the community. We would therefore suggest that a High Powered Authority should be set up by the government of India in consultation with the Central Board for overseeing functioning of hazardous industries with a view to ensuring that there are no defects or deficiencies in the design, structure or quality of their plant and machinery, there is no negligence in maintenance and operation of the plant and equipment and necessary safety devices and instruments are installed and are in operation and proper and adequate safety standards and procedures are strictly followed. This is a question which needs serious attention of the Government of India and we would request the Government of India to take the necessary steps at the earliest, because the problem of danger to the health and well-being of the community on account of chemical and other hazardous industries has become a pressing problem in modern industrial society. It is also necessary to point out that when science and technology are increasingly employed in producing goods and services calculated to improve the quality of life, there is a certain element of hazard or risk inherent in the very use of science and technology and it is not possible to totally eliminate such hazard or risk altogether. We cannot possibly adopt a policy of not having any Chemical or other hazardous industries merely because they pose hazard or risk to the community. If such a policy were adopted, it would mean the end of all progress and development. Such industries, even if hazardous have to be set up since they are essential for economic development and advancement of well-being of the people. We can only hope to reduce the element of hazard or risk to the community by taking all necessary steps for locating such industries in a manner which would pose least risk of danger to the community and maximising safety requirements in such industries. We would therefore like to impress upon the Government of India to evolve a national policy for location of chemical and other hazardous industries in areas where population is scarce and there is little hazard or risk to the community, and when hazardous industries are located in such areas, every care must be taken to see that large human habi tation does not grow around then. There should preferably be a green belt of 1 to 5 k.m. width around such hazardous industries.