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The question then is: whether the retracted
confessional statement requires corroboration from any other
independent evidence? It is seen that the evidence in this
case consists of the confessional statement, the recovery
panchnama and the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 5. It is true
that in a trial and proprio vigore in a criminal trial,
courts are required to marshal the evidence. It is the duty
of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. The evidence may consist of direct evidence,
confession or circumstantial evidence. In a criminal trial
punishable under the provisions of the IPC it is now well
settled legal position that confession can form the sole
basis for conviction. If it is retracted, it must first be
tested whether confession is voluntary and truthful
inculpating the accused in the commission of the crime.
Confession is one of the species of admission dealt with
under Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 164
of the Code. It is an admission against the maker of it,
unless its admissibility is excluded by some of those
provisions. If a confession is proved by unimpeachable
evidence and if it is of voluntary nature, it when
retracted, is entitled to high degree of value as its maker
is likely to face the consequences of confession by a
statement affecting his life, liberty or property. Burden is
on the accused to prove that the statement was obtained by
threat, duress or promise like any other person as was held
in Bhagwan Singh V/s. State of Punjab [AIR 1952 SC 214, para
30]. If it is established from the record or circumstances
that the confession is shrouded with suspicious features,
then it falls in the realm of doubt. The burden of proof on
the accused is not as high as on the prosecution. If the
accused is able to prove the facts creating reasonable doubt
that the confession was not voluntary or it was obtained by
threat, coercion or inducement etc., the burden would be on
the prosecution to prove that the confession was made by the
accused voluntarily. If the Court believes that the
confession was voluntary and believes it to be true, then
there is no legal bar on the Court for ordering conviction.
However, rule of prudence and practice does require that the
Court seeks corroboration of the retracted confession from
other evidence. The confession must be one implicating the
accused in the crime. It is not necessary that each fact or
circumstance contained in the confession is separately or
independently corroborated. It is enough if it receives
general corroboration. The burden is not as high as in the
case of an approver or an accomplice in which case
corroboration is required on material particulars of the
prosecution case. Each case would, therefore, require to be
examined in the light of the facts and circumstances in
which the confession came to be made and whether or not it
was voluntary and true. These require to be tested in the
light of given set of facts. The high degree of proof and
probative value is insisted in capital offences.
In Kashmira Singh's case the co-accused, Gurcharan
singh made a confession, The question arose whether the
confession could be relied upon to prove the prosecution
case against the appellant kashmira Singh. In that context,
Bose, J. speaking for bench of three Judges laid down the
law that the Court requires to marshall the evidence against
the accused excluding the confession altogether from
consideration. If the evidence do hors the confession proves
the guilt of the appellant, the confession of the co-accused
could be used to corroborate the prosecution case to lend
assurance to the Court to convict the appellant. The Court
considered the evidence led by the prosecution, de hors the
confession of co-accused and held that the evidence was not
sufficient to bring home the guilt of appellant Kashmira
Singh of the charge of murder. The appellant was acquitted
of an offence under Section 302 IPC but was convicted for
the offence under Section 201 IPC for destroying the
evidence of murder and sentenced him to seven years rigorous
imprisonment. This decision was considered by a four-judge
Bench in Balbir Singh V/s. State of Punjab [AIR 1957 SC 216]
where in it was held that if there is independent evidence,
besides the confession, the rule that the confession could
be used only to corroborate the other evidences loses its
efficacy. Therefore, it was held that if the retracted
confession is believed to be voluntary and true, it may form
the basis of a conviction but the rule of practice and
prudence requires that it should be corroborated by
independent evidence. Therein also, for the charges of
capital offence, the trial court did not accept the
confessional statement of co-accused containing inculpatory
and self-exculpatory statement. The High Court reversed the
acquittal and convicted the accused, accepting that part of
the confessional statement of the accused which was
corroborated from other evidence. This Court upheld the
conviction and held that it is not necessary that each item
of fact or circumstance mentioned in the confessional
statement requires to be corroborated separately and
independently. It would be sufficient if there is general
corroboration. The ratio in Kashmira Singh's case was
referred to.
It would thus be seen that there is no prohibition
under the Evidence Act to rely upon the retracted confession
to prove the prosecution case or to make the same basis for
conviction of the accused. The practice and prudence require
that the Court could examine the evidence adduced by the
prosecution to find out whether there are any other facts
and circumstances to corroborate the retracted confession.
It is not necessary that there should be corroboration from
independent evidence adduced by the prosecution to
corroborate each detail contained in the confessional
statement. The Court is required to examine whether the
confessional statement is voluntary; in other words, whether
it was not obtained by threat, duress or promise. If the
Court is satisfied from the evidence that it was voluntary,
then it is required to examine whether the statement is
true. If the Court on examination of the evidence finds that
the retracted confession is true, that part of the
inculpatory portion could be relied upon to base conviction.
However, the prudence and practice require that Court would
seek assurance getting corroboration from other evidence
adduced by the prosecution.
It is seen that the contraband of 200 gold biscuits of
foreign marking concealed in a wooden box and kept in the
pit in the compound of the appellant was recovered at 9.00
a.m. on December 6, 1980 in the presence of Panch (mediator)
Witnesses including P.W.3. This is proved from the evidence
of PWs 2, 3 and 5. There was nothing for PW-3 to speak
falsehood against the appellant who is a friend of him. PW-2
and 5 also withstood the grueling cross-examination. There
is nothing to disbelieve their evidence. The appellant
herein made statement under Section 108 at 1 P.M. on
December 6, 1980, i.e., after four hours. It is unlikely
that during that short period PW-2 and 5 would have obtained
the retracted confession under Ex. P-4 in his own
handwriting running into 5 typed pages under threat or
duress or promise. No doubt the wealth of details by itself
is not an assurance of its voluntary character. The totality
of the facts and circumstances would be taken into account.
On a consideration of the evidence, the High Court accepted
that Ex. P-4 is a voluntary and true confessional statement
and accordingly it convicted the appellant of the offences.
It is seen that Ex. P-4 was given in furtherance of the
statutory compulsion and the appellant made statement in
unequivocal terms admitting the guilt. It is seen that in
barkat Ram's case, this Court accepted the retracted
confessional statement and upheld, on that basis, the
conviction. In vallabhdas Liladhar's case and also in Rustom
Das's case the retracted confessional statement found basis
for conviction and in the latter the recoveries were relied
as corroborative evidence. In Haroom Abdulla's case, this
Court used the evidence of co-accused as corroborative
evidence.