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6. Counter has been filed on behalf of the respondent contending that the construction was not commenced within one year as provided under Section 440 of "The Act" from the date of the alleged deemed permission for the construction of 1 + 23 floors and that the construction did not commence even within one year from the date of the decree in O.S. No. 2804 of 1982 i.e., 28-12-1987. Construction actually commenced in the year 1991 without issuing any notice of commencement of construction and, therefore, the Corporation was compelled to issue a notice under Section 452 of "The Act" to the petitioner on 7-6-1991 as also on 17-8-1991. Petitioner commenced the construction hi the year 1991 not only without issuing the requisite notice but also in violation of building bye-laws, zoning regulations and multistoreyed building regulations. It is also alleged in the counter that under the shelter of the order of ex parte injunction obtained by the petitioner in E.A. No. 22 of 1991 in E.P. No. 23 of 1991 dated 21-8-1991, the petitioner raised un-authorised construction in gross and capricious violation of the law with impunity for full two years. It is also stated that since the construction was commenced by the petitioner in the year 1991, zoning regulations and multi-storyed building regulations, which are in force as on the date of commencement of construction, will apply and if so applied, the construction is contrary to the zoning regulations and multi-storyed building regulations.

"Assuming again that the petitioner was deemed to have permission in terms of Section 437 of the Act and it should have commenced construction 30 days after receipt of valid application by the 2nd respondent on 17-8-198I and within one year thereafter he could have done so only subject to the Zoning Regulations, 1981 and the Muitistoreyed Building Regulations, 1981 which had come into force in the meantime. It could have commenced construction at the earliest only on I6-9-I981 and that too, subject to the provisions of the above Regulations. Those Regulations contain restrictions regarding construction of multistoreyed buildings with more than 1 + 3 floors in the Zone in question. It is difficult to accept the submission that the petitioner is entitled to avoid and escape the provisions of the relevant Rules and Regulations which were in force as on the earliest date on which it could have commenced construction on the basis of the permission which was deemed to have been granted in accordance with the provisions of Section 437 of the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act. Clause 17 (viii) of the Building Bye-laws, 1981 which were in force with effect from 5-9-1981 contained an absolute prohibition that "no proposed construction shall contravene the Zoning Regulations". Petitioner could not therefore, have commenced construction on 16-9-1981 or within one year thereafter in violation of the above provision. It is also necessary to refer to the Building Bye-laws of 1972. Clause 70 of those Bye-laws also contained a similar provision as follows:

"70. Violation of Zoning Regulations:

No proposed construction shall contravene any of the Zoning Regulation of the sanctioned development plan."

Assuming that the petitioner is right in its submission, that its application should have been dealt with only under the Bye-laws of 1972, Clause 70 of the 1972 bye-laws disabled it from undertaking any construction contrary to the Zoning Regulations. "Zoning Regulations" mentioned in the above provision shall necessarily mean -- the Zoning Regulations which were in force at the relevant time. Admittedly, on 16-9-1981 and thereafter, the Zoning Regulations, 1981 had come into force. So also had the provisions in the Multistoreyed Building Regulations, 1981, Appendix A of which, contains restrictions on buildings in specified Zones become operative. We, therefore, hold that even assuming that petitioner is right in its submission that its application ought to have been considered in terms of 1972 Building Bye-laws, it will not be entitled to commence construction in contravention of the Zoning Regulations introduced on 5-9-1981 and other restrictions which were brought into force by the Multistoreyed Building Regulations."

19. In the present case also, the petitioner submitted plans seeking sanction on 28-6-1980. It must start construction within a period of one year from the date of deemed sanction i.e. 27-7-1980. There is absolutely no evidence on record to establish that the petitioner started construction as required under the provisions of the Act within a period of one year from the date of deemed sanction. In fact there is no evidence whatsoever adduced in that regard even in the suit. muchless in these proceedings. Therefore, it is not correct to contend that Zoning Regulations, 1981 and Multistoreyed Building Regulations, 1981 will not be applicable to such a case, having regard to the law declared by the Division Bench of this Court in the Judgment referred to supra . We are of the opinion that the decision in the civil proceedings, that Zoning Regulations, 1981 are not applicable to the construction raised by the petitioner, will not operate as res judicata in these proceedings. We are in entire agreement with the decision of the Division Bench (supra) regarding the applicability of the Zoning Regulations, 1981 and Multistoreyed Building Regulations, 1981. It is also clear from the material placed before us and also the decision in the civil proceedings that the petitioner nowhere stated, muchless established, that it started construction pursuant to the "deemed sanction" within a period of one year. The Division Bench in the above case (sup,a) held that if the construction is not commenced within a period of one year from the date of "deemed sanction", the deemed sanction itself lapses. The petitioner, in order to avail of the 'deemed' permission has to establish the fact that it commenced the construction within one year of service of notice and if it had not commenced the construction within one year, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the deeming provision. Further as the learned Judges of the Division Bench observed in the above case that the petitioner, even if it has deemed permission, could not have commenced con-