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[Cites 13, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

Surendranath Ghosh vs State Of Orissa on 2 July, 2010

Author: B.P.Das

Bench: B.P.Das

                             HIGH COURT OF ORISSA: CUTTACK

                                   W.P.(C). No. 2990 of 2008


         In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
         Constitution of India.
                                     --------

         Surendranath Ghosh, Trust Estate, Kolkata                ...       Petitioner.

                                         -Versus-

         State of Orissa
         & others                                                 ...       Opp.Parties.


                       For Petitioners    :      M/s. Ramakanta Mohanty,
                                                 D.Mohanty, A.P.Bose, S.N.Biswal,
                                                 P.Jena, D.P.Patnaik & D.Varadwaja

                       For Opp. Parties :        Mr.M.S.Sahoo,
                                                 Addl. Standing Counsel

                                              ----------
         P R E S E N T:
                      THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE B.P.DAS
                               AND
                   THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE B.N.MAHAPATRA

               Date of hearing: 10.05.2010 : Date of judgment :       02.07.2010

B.N.MAHAPATRA, J       The petitioner, which is a Trust called "Surendranath Ghosh,

         Trust Estate, Calcutta", being represented through its trustees has filed

         this writ petition with a prayer for quashing the condition Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8,

         9 and 10 imposed under order dated 25.09.2007 (Annexure-2) passed by

         opp. party No.2-Collector, Puri while approving the lease of permanent

         Pattadar status as settled by O.P. No.3-Tahasildar in favour of the

         petitioner.

         2.            Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts and circumstances

         giving rise to the present writ petition are that, according to the petitioner,
                                       2

the land measuring an area Ac 0.193 decimals under Khata No.79, Sabik

Plot No.87 in Sabik Mouza: Balukhand Khasmahal corresponding to Hal

Khata No.67, Hal Plot No.126 measuring an area Ac.0.193 decimals under

Puri Municipality, Ward No.12, Holding No.754 in Hal Mouza Nolia Sahi,

Unit No.12, Puri Town, P.S. Sea Beach, Puri was originally leased out on

07.11.1924 in favour of one Surendranath Ghosh, son of Late Bhola Nath

Ghosh of Sheorapalli, P.S. Srirampur, Dist: Hoogly for sixteen years. On

08.11.1940, the said lease was renewed in favour of said Surendranath

Ghosh for thirty years extending the lease period up to 07.11.1970. Opp.

Party No.2-Collector, Puri on the basis of recommendation of O.P. No.3-

Tahasildar, vide his order dated 10.09.2004 passed in Balu Lease Renewal

Case   No.4/2004,    renewed    the   lease   granted   on    08.11.1940    to

Surendranath Ghosh in favour of Surendranath Ghosh Trust Estate,

Calcutta for two consecutive terms of 30 years each with retrospective effect

from 08.11.1970. Pursuant to said order dated 10.09.2004 of O.P. No.2, the

Renewal Lease Agreement (Annexure-1) was executed on 3rd October, 2005

and the same was registered on 25.10.2005. After the Renewal Lease

Agreement   was   registered on    25.10.2005,   the    petitioner   made   an

application to O.P. No.3-Tahasildar, Puri for grant of permanent lease of the

said land which was registered as BPL Case No.20/2005. The Tahasildar

settled the land in question in favour of the petitioner-Trust on permanent

Pattadar status and sent the BPL case record to O.P. No.2-Collector, Puri

for approval. The O.P. No.2 while approving the lease of permanent

Pattadar status under the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962

(for short 'the OGLS Act') imposed certain terms and conditions
                                       3

as per Annexure-2 and directed the Tahasildar to incorporate the said

terms and conditions in the lease deed. Being dissatisfied with the said

terms and conditions, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for

quashing those conditions. This Court vide ex parte order dated 25.06.2009

dismissed the writ petition on merit with the following observation.

                    "In view of the above mentioned facts and
            circumstances as well as the facts that the period of lease
            has already expired on 08.11.1970 and the lessee is not
            utilizing the lease hold land for homestead purpose for not
            less than five years on the appointed dated i.e. 9.1.1991
            and no rent having been collected from the lessee since
            1975 and also that the land had been recorded as Sarakari
            Khata since 1988, no case in favour of the petitioners is
            made out."

            Misc. Case No.8396 of 2009 was filed by the petitioner with a

prayer to recall the above order dated 25.06.2009 and to restore the case to

original file and to rehear the matter on merit. Vide order dated

02.12.2009, this Court recalled its earlier order dated 25.06.2009.

Thereafter, the matter was heard at length on 06.05.2010 and 10.05.2010.

3.          Mr. R. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,

submitted that originally the land in question was leased out in favour of

late Surendranath Ghosh on 07.11.1924 for sixteen years. On 08.11.1940,

it was renewed for another thirty years. Surendranath Ghosh died on

19.01.1973. Before his death, an unregistered private Trust was created by

said Surendranath Ghosh consisting of his family members on 30.06.1971.

On 26.11.1971 this Trust applied for renewal of the lease before the

Collector, Puri. Accordingly, Khasmahal lease was renewed in favour of the

petitioner-Trust in Balu Lease Renewal Case No. 4 of 2004 for two

consecutive terms of 30 years each with retrospective effect from

08.11.1970 and the lease deed was executed on 03.10.2005. The OGLS Act
                                       4

prescribes the modalities for settlement of the Government land. Under

Section 2(b), Explanation (i) of the OGLS Act Khasmahal land has been

included as Government land. Section 3 of the OGLS Act prescribes the

modalities for settlement of such Government land. Sub-section 4(a) of

Section 3 of the OGLS Act prescribes that renewal of such Khasmahal land

shall be deemed to have been leased out under the OGLS Act. Section 3(4)

(c) of the OGLS Act mandates such settlement on permanent basis with

heritable and transferable rights. In view of the aforesaid position of law,

the petitioner-Trust applied for permanent settlement of the land in

question leased out to it under Annexure-1. The same was registered as

Balu Permanent Lease Case No.20/2005 under the provisions of the OGLS

Act and Rule 5 B of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Rules, 1983

(for short 'the OGLS Rules'). The manner of settlement of such Khasmahal

land has been prescribed under Schedule-V appended to the Rules in

Paragraph 3 thereof. In fact, considering all this, O.P.No.2-Collector, Puri

by the impugned order dated 25.09.2007 (Annexure-2) approved the

settlement of leasehold property in favour of the petitioner on permanent

basis. While so ordering, the Collector has imposed certain conditions

particularly condition Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10, which are contrary to law

and without any authority. Nowhere under the provisions of the OGLS Act

and OGLS Rules and Schedule-V appended thereto, the authority is

empowered to impose such conditions while recognizing the permanent

right of a lessee. The O.P.No.2 has basically failed to understand the

provisions prescribed for grant of permanent lease where the right accrues

in favour of the lessee is heritable and transferable. In support of his
                                       5

contention, Mr. Mohanty placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in

Republic of India Vs. Prafulla Ku. Samal & Ors., ILR 1976 CUTTACK

1392, Sunil Kumar Dass(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. Vs. The Revenue

Divisional Commissioner, Central Division, Cuttack & Ors., 2008 (I)

OLR 530, Sourindra Narayan Bhanja Deo Vs. Member, Board of

Revenue, Orissa & Ors., 2004 (II) OLR            332 and OJC No.3417/96

disposed of on 11th December, 2007.

            Relying on the decision of this Court in Sourindra Narayan

Bhanja Deo's case (supra), Mr. Mohanty vehemently argued that in the

matter of renewal of Khasmahal lease option is left to the lessee and the

Khashmahal authorities cannot refuse renewal of lease if the lessee opts for

the same. The opposite parties for the first time are taking the stand that the

impugned conditions have been imposed keeping in view the provisions

contained in the Trust Deed. Such a stand is wholly misconceived and has

no legal sanction. So far as the petitioner-Trust is concerned, it has no

bearing on the rights conferred on the petitioner-Trust under law. The Trust

is a Juristic person and is entitled to be conferred with all the permanent

right that law has prescribed in respect of the leasehold property. If there is

any violation of the terms of the Trust, the provisions of the Indian Trust Act

will take care of the situation. But in no event, after conferring valid

permanent title on the petitioner, the State Government has further power to

limit such a permanent right. The right accrues in respect of Khasmahal

land is in no way different from that which one reserves in his own private

land. Therefore, O.P. No.2 has no right to impose any terms and conditions
                                       6

while approving the lease of permanent Pattadar status as settled by

O.P.No.3-Tahasildar in favour of the petitioner-Trust.

4.          On being noticed, the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 have filed

counter affidavit. Mr. M. Sahoo, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the

State repudiating the stand taken by the petitioner contended that the land

in question is Khasmahal property of the Government and the Collector,

Puri is the administrator of the property under the provisions of the Estate

Manual, 1990. The petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order

passed by the Khasmahal authority. Since the petitioner has filed this writ

petition by suppressing the material facts, the same is not maintainable.

Due to non-renewal of lease after expiry of the lease period on 07.11.1970,

the leasehold land had been recorded in the Sarakari Khata No.67 in Hal

ROR finally published in the year 1988. The petitioner-Trust through its

Trustees applied for lease of the land in question in Balu Lease Renewal

Case No.4 of 2004. Considering the charitable activities of the Trust,

Collector, Puri was pleased to renew the lease for two consecutive terms of

thirty years each with retrospective effect from 08.11.1970 with certain

conditions. Otherwise, it would have been resumed due to gross violation of

lease conditions and non-use of the leasehold land for which the same had

been sanctioned. In pursuance of the orders of the Commissioner of

Consolidation, Orissa, Bhubaneswar passed in RP No.69 of 2005, the

record was corrected in the name of Sri Surendranath Ghosh Trust Estate,

represented through its Trustee, namely, Nimai Kumar Ghosh vide new

Khata No.61/18. When the lease was in force till 2030, the Trust applied

for permanent lease by filing BPL Case No.20/2005. After expiry of the term
                                        7

of lease on 07.11.1970, no family member of the lessee was using the land

in question for residential purpose. There was no scope for permanent lease

under the provisions of the OGLS (Amendment) Rules, 1993 due to the fact

that such lease was renewed up to 07.11.2030. The Trust Estate with an

intention to transfer the leasehold land applied for permanent lease in BPL

Case No.20/2005. So, the Collector has rightly imposed the conditions to

prevent the Trust Estate from utilizing the property for personal benefits.

The provisions of the OGLS (Amendment) Act, 1993 are not applicable to

the case of the petitioner as the term of the lease had already expired since

08.11.1970. The lessee was not using the leasehold land for homestead

purpose for a period of not less than five years as on the appointed date,

i.e., 09.01.1991. The land in question was under the Government Khata

and no rent was being collected from anybody since 1975, as such lease

was not in force on the appointed date, i.e., 09.01.1991 as prescribed in the

OGLS (Amendment) Rules. Referring to Clauses-5(Kha) and 5(Cha) of the

Trust deed it is contended that the lease sanctioning authority has every

right to impose any conditions to safeguard the leasehold property from any

alienation or misuse. The Government of Orissa in Revenue & Disaster

Management Department have cancelled the lease sanctioned in favour of

Raibahadur Hazarimal Trust Fund and resumed the land due to transfer of

the same for personal benefit by the trust members. Therefore, the writ

petition is not at all maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.

5.          The rival contentions raised at the Bar drive us to go to the

genesis of the case to appreciate the respective contentions and for effectual

adjudication of the relevant issues involved.
                                        8

6.          It would be appropriate to decide first the issue relating to the

relief sought for by the petitioner-Trust in the present writ petition. The

petitioner's grievance is that opposite party no.2-Collector is not justified in

imposing the terms and conditions while approving the lease-hold land in

question in favour of the petitioner-Trust on permanent Pattadar status in

his order dated 25.9.2007 (Annexure-2) passed in BPL Case No.20/2005.

In order to deal with the said issue, it is necessary to decide whether the

petitioner-Trust was entitled to be settled with the land in question on

permanent Pattadar status under the OGLS Act and Rules. In other words,

as to whether O.P. No.3-Tahasildar and O.P.No.2-Collector are respectively

justified in settling and approving the land in question on permanent

Pattadar status in favour of the petitioner-Trust in BPL Case No.20/2005.

The order of the Collector dated 25.09.2007 (Annexure-2) reveals that the

Tahasildar, Puri has settled the land in question in favour of Sunrendranath

Ghosh Trust Estate, Calcutta and Marfatdars Gautam Kumar Ghosh, Nimain

Kumar Ghosh, Partha Ghosh of 19/1 Rahasbehari Ghosh, Calcutta on

permanent Pattadar status as per sub-Rule 3(a) of Rule 5-B of the OGLS

(Amendment) Rules, 1993. Relying on the said Rules the Collector, Puri

approved the Settlement of the land in question in favour of the petitioner-

Trust on permanent Pattadar status as made by the Tahasildar. The letter

No.294 dated 28.09.2007 of the Deputy Collector, Puri reveals that the land

in question as settled by the Tahasildar, Puri has been approved by the

Collector, Puri in favour of the petitioner-Trust as per Sub-Rule 3(a) of Rule

5-B of the OGLS (Amendment) Rules, 1993. The petitioner also relied upon

the provisions of Rule 5-B of the OGLS Rules and schedule-V appended to
                                         9

Rule 5-B in terms of paragraph-3 thereof in support of its claim. The

petitioner-Trust through its power of Attorney Holder also made an

application to Tahasildar, Puri on 03.11.2005 in Form No.1 for permanent

settlement of the leasehold land relying on the OGLS (Amendment) Rules,

1993. Now, it is necessary to examine what is contemplated in Rule 5-B and

Sub-Rule 3(a) of the said Rule of the OGLS (Amendment) Rules, 1993 on

which both the parties have placed reliance. The relevant provisions of Rule

5-B and Sub-Rule 3(a) of Rule 5-B are reproduced below.

          "5-B. Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 3, 5, 5-A,
          8,11,12, 13, Settlement of Khasmahal and Nazul land,
          Gramakantha Parmbok and Abadi land leased out prior to the
          9th day of January 1991 shall be made in the manner
          prescribed in in Schedule-V."
              xx         xx           xx          xx         xx
          3(a) Tahasildar on being satisfied after enquiry that any
          Nazul/Khasmahal land is used and in occupation by any
          person as homestead for a period of not less than five years as
          on the appointed day shall settle the said land in favour of the
          person holding such land, on execution of lease deed in Form
          IV. In case of a sub-lessee and subsequent sub-lessee such
          settlement shall take effect on production of the stamped
          receipt in Form I from the date of payment of such
          compensation to the person (s) immediately under whom they
          held the land;
                   Provided that on each such settlement, approval of
          the Collector shall be obtained."
                                 (underlined for emphasis)

            Perusal of the above provisions makes it amply clear that

settlement of Khasmahal and Nazul land leased out prior to 9th day of

January, 1991 shall be made in the manner prescribed in Schedule-V. Rule

3(a) of Schedule-V provides that the Tahasildar on being satisfied after

enquiry that any Khasmahal land is used and in occupation of any person as

homestead for a period of not less than five years as on the appointed

day i.e. 09.01.1991 shall settle the said land in favour of the person holding

such land on execution of lease deed in Form No.IV. Thus Rule 5-B is
                                       10

applicable only in respect of those Khasmahal lands leased out prior to the

9th day of January, 1991. In the present case, Khasmahal land in question

was not leased out to the petitioner-Trust prior to the 9th day of January,

1991. It is only for the first time the land in question was leased out in Balu

Lease Renewal Case No.04/2004 vide order dated 10.09.2004 passed by O.P.

No.2-Collector, Puri in favour of the petitioner-Trust. That apart, as per sub-

rule 3(a), the land in question must be in use and in occupation by any

person as homestead. The term 'person' has not been defined in the OGLS

Rules. But the term 'person' has been defined in the OGLS Act. Sub-rule (2)

of Rule 2 to the OGLS Rules provides that "words and expressions used but

not defined in these rules shall have the same meaning as are respectively

assigned to them in the Act".     The term 'Person' as has been defined in

Section 2 (b-2) in the OGLS Act runs as follows:

            "(b-2) 'Person' means any person, the total extent of whole
            land excluding homestead, together with lands held by all
            the members of his family who are living with him in
            common mess is less than one standard acre and whose
            total annual income together with the total annual income of
            all the members of his family living with him in common
            mess, does not exceed rupees three thousand and six
            hundred or an amount which the State Government may, by
            notification from time to time, specify in that behalf;"
                                         (underlined for emphasis)

            The petitioner is a Trust and not a person as defined in Section

2(b-2) of the OGLS Act, 1962. This position is clear from the fact that the

relevant expressions are 'homestead' and 'held by all the members of the

family', 'living in common mess' 'annual income of all the members of the

family'. Therefore, no Khasmahal land can be settled in favour of the

present petitioner-Trust in terms of sub-rule 3 (a) of Rule 5-B read with

Rule-5B of the OGLS (Amendment) Rules, 1993. Moreover, sub-Rule 3(a) of
                                       11

Rule-5B further requires that the Khasmahal land should be used by a

person as homestead for a period of not less than five years on the

appointed date.    But the order of the Collector dated 10.09.2004 reveals

that a building constructed on the Khasmahal land is used for commercial

purpose without permission of Khasmahal authority and no resumption

proceeding has been initiated. Thus, in the present case, the competent

authorities failed to exercise their mind to the above pre-conditions

stipulated in the statute before settling/approving lease of Khasmahal land

on permanent Pattadar status in favour of the petitioner-Trust. As it

appears, O.P.No.3-Tahasildar, Puri vide his order dated 30.03.2007 passed

in BPL Case No.20/2005 has settled the land in question in favour of the

petitioner-Trust   on   permanent     Pattadar   status   with   heritable   and

transferable right closing his eyes towards the statutory requirement of the

OGLS Act and the Rules. The Collector, Puri also without examining the

validity/legality of the Tahasildar's recommendation accepted the settlement

made by the Tahasildar ignoring the relevant provisions of the statute

though of course has imposed certain terms and conditions.

7.          It is the settled law that when any action of the State or its

instrumentalities is not in accordance with the rules or regulations and

supported by the statute, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction to declare

such an act as illegal and invalid.

            In Sirsi Municipality by its President, Sirsi Vs. Cecelia

Kom Francis Tellis, AIR 1973 S.C. 855, the Supreme Court observed that

the rules or the regulations are binding on the authorities.
                                       12

            Whenever any action of the authority is in violation of the

provisions of the statute or the action is constitutionally illegal, it cannot

claim any sanctity in law, and there is no obligation on the part of the

Court to sanctify such an illegal act. Wherever the statutory provision is

ignored, the Court cannot become a silent spectator to such an illegality

and it becomes the solemn duty of the Court to deal with the person(s)

violating the law with heavy hands. (See R.N. Nanjundappa Vs. T.

Thimmaiah & Anr., AIR 1972 SC 1767, Sultan Sadik Vs. Sanjay Raj

Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 S.C. 1377)

            Thus, the legal position remains, every statutory provision

requires strict adherence; for the reason, the statute creates rights in

favour of the citizens, and, if any order is passed de hors the same, it

cannot be held to be a valid order and cannot be enforced. [See Swastik

Agency & 2 Ors., -v- State Bank of India, Main Branch, Bhubaneswar

& 3 Ors., 107 (2009) CLT 250]

            Non-compliance     of   mandatory    requirements    vitiates   the

proceedings.

            The Collector and the Tahasildar are responsible Government

officers working in the Revenue Department. They are supposed to know

the law relating to leasing out of Government properties. Ignorance of the

same cannot be considered as bliss.

            Apart from the above, in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit, it

is stated that the OGLS (Amendment) Act is not applicable to the case of the

petitioner due to the fact that the term of lease had expired since 8.11.1970.

The lessee was not using the leasehold land for homestead purposes for a
                                        13

period of not less than five years as on the appointed date i.e. 9.1.1991. The

Khasmahal land in question was recorded in Sarakari Khata since 1988.

These averments have not been denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder.

However, the petitioner in paragraph 11 of the writ petition has averred that

as per Section 3(4)(c)(i) of the OGLS Act, right accrued under the provisions of

the permanent lease is heritable and transferable.

            For the reasons stated above, since the petitioner is not a person

as defined in Section 2 (b-2) of the OGLS Act, Section 3(4)(a) and Section 3(4)

(c)(i), relied upon by the petitioner which speak of a person have no

application to the case of the petitioner. Besides, the petitioner also does not

fulfill the other conditions provided under those sections.

8.          The apex Court in New India Assurance Co., Shimla Vs.

Kamla & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1419 held as follows :-

                   "As a point of law we have no manner of doubt that a
            fake licence cannot get its forgery outfit stripped off merely
            on account of some officer renewing the same with or
            without knowing it to be forged. Section 15 of the Act only
            empowers any licensing authority to "renew a driving
            licence issued under the provisions of this Act with effect
            from the date of its expiry." No licensing authority has the
            power to renew a fake licence and, therefore, a renewal if at
            all made cannot transform a fake licence as genuine. Any
            counterfeit document showing that it contains a purported
            order of statutory authority would ever remain counterfeit
            albeit the fact that other persons including some statutory
            authorities would have acted on the document unwittingly
            on the assumption that it is genuine."

Thus, merely because some Revenue Officers have settled and approved the

lease in favour of petitioner-Trust on permanent Pattadar status that cannot

confer any right on the petitioner-Trust over the land in question as the

same has been granted illegally without adhering to the statutory

provisions. Therefore, settlement of the land in question in favour of the
                                          14

petitioner-Trust on permanent Pattadar status as made by the Tahasildar

and approved by the Collector in BPL Case No.20/2005 being not in

consonance with law is ab initio void and unsustainable.

9.          In view of our findings that grant of lease of permanent Pattadar

status in BPL Case No.20/2005 in favour of the petitioner-Trust is void ab

initio because of the illegalities, irregularities committed by the Revenue

authorities, the relief sought for by the petitioner-Trust in the present writ

petition does not merit consideration.

              Consequently, even though there is no quarrel over the legal

propositions settled by this Court in the cases relied upon by the petitioner,

they are of no help to the petitioner.

            The apex Court in Badrinath -v- Government of Tamil Nadu

& Ors., AIR 2000 S.C. 3243, observed that once the basis of a proceeding is

gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground

automatically.

10.         Law is well settled that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary in

nature and must be exercised in furtherance of justice. The Court has to

keep in mind that its order should not defeat the interest of justice nor it

should permit an order to secure dishonest advantage or perpetuate an

unjust gain or approve an order which has been passed in contravention of

the statutory provisions. (See Champalal Binani Vs. CIT, West Bengal, AIR

1970 SC 645; K.D.Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors., 2008

AIR SCW 6654).

            In view of the above settled legal position, it is felt necessary to

examine the other relevant issues involved in the present context.
                                      15

            One of such relevant issues that needs determination by this

Court is whether any lease could have been granted in favour of the

petitioner-Trust at the first instance vide order dated 10.09.2004 in Balu

Lease Renewal Case No.4/2004 pursuant to which the renewal lease

agreement (Annexure-1) was executed on 3rd October, 2005.

            Admittedly in the present case, the land in question had been

leased out for the first time in favour of the petitioner-Trust by O.P. No.2-

Collector, Puri vide order dated 10.09.2004 in Balu Lease Renewal Case

No.4/2004. The said order of the Collector dated 10.09.2004 reveals that the

Collector had renewed the leasehold land in favour of the petitioner-Trust for

30 years from 08.11.1970 to 07.11.2000 and another spell of 30 years from

08.11.2000 to 07.11.2030 on the basis of the recommendation of the

Tahasildar, Puri made as per report No.6556 dated 31.07.2004 and letter

No.7757 dated 09.09.2004. The said order further reveals that the

Tahasildar, Puri reported that as per Hal R.O.R. published on 27.08.1988 the

land in question was recorded under Sarakari Khata with a note of illegal

possession of Surendranath Ghosh, son of Bholanath. The report No.6556

dated 31.07.2004 of the Tahasildar is not available on record. The letter of

the Tahasildar dated 09.09.2004 reveals that the land in question was

recorded in Sarakari Khata as the lease had expired in the year 1970 during

pendency of settlement operation. In spite of the above factual observations,

the O.P. No.3-Tahasildar, Puri, without any rhyme or reason and without

referring to any provision of law prevalent during the relevant period

recommended for renewal of lease in favour of the petitioner-Trust. The

opposite   party   No.2-Collector   has   also   mechanically   accepted   the
                                        16

recommendation of the Tahasildar and accorded approval just on the next

day, vide order dated 10.09.2004 by giving colour of legitimacy to the

apparently illegal act of the Tahasildar.

               It is not understood how in absence of any lease in favour of the

petitioner-Trust in respect of the land in question the Tahasildar could

recommend for renewal of a non-existent lease in favour of the petitioner-

Trust and the same got approval of the Collector on 10.9.2004. Admittedly,

in the instant case, S.N.Ghosh died on 19.01.1973 and no lease was

granted in favour of the Petitioner-Trust prior to 10.09.2004.

               Neither the letter of the Tahasildar dated 09.09.2004 nor the

order of the Collector dated 10.09.2004 reveals any provisions of law under

which    the     Tahasildar    and    the   Collector   assumed     powers    to

recommend/approve such renewal of lease in respect of the land in question

for sixty years with retrospective effect from 08.11.1970.

               Admittedly the lessee Surendranath Ghosh had never applied

for renewal of lease in respect of the land in question after expiry of the

lease period on 7.11.1970 during his life time. The lease granted to him in

respect of the land in question expired on 7.11.1970 in terms of the lease

deed as well as by operation of Section 111 of the T.P. Act, 1981 by efflux of

time limited by the lease. Therefore, the question of renewal of lease does

not arise. On the other hand, any application of the petitioner Trust can

only be an application for consideration of fresh lease.

               As it appears the Tahasildar vide his letter No.7757 dated

09.09.2004 and the Collector vide his order dated 10.9.2004 respectively

have recommended and granted renewal of lease of Khasmahal land in
                                      17

Mouza - Balukhanda Khasmahal-108 in favour of the petitioner-Trust. Thus

the only enabling provision that was governing the field for grant of

Khasmahal land in urban area during the relevant period, i.e. in the year

2004 is Rule 5-B and Sub-rule 3(a) to Rule 5-B of the OGLS (Amendment)

Rules, 1993. In the foregoing paragraphs we have already dealt in detail

how the petitioner-Trust is not entitled to be settled with the Khasmahal

land under the OGLS Act and Rules.

            Law is also well settled that when the statute provides for a

particular procedure, the authority has to follow the same and is not

permitted to act in contravention of the prescribed provisions. It has been

hither to uncontroverted legal position that where a statute requires to do a

certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at

all. Other methods or mode of performance are impliedly and necessarily

forbidden. The aforesaid settled legal proposition is based on a legal maxim

"Expressio unius est exclusion alteris", meaning thereby that if a statute

provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be

done in that manner and in no other manner and following other course is

not permissible. (See Taylor v. Taylor, (1876) 1 Ch.D.426; Nazir Ahmed v.

King Emperor, AIR 1036 PC 253; Ram Phal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma;

and Indian Bank's Association v. Devkala Consultancy Service, AIR

2004 SC 2615).

            In view of the above, renewal of the lease in favour of the

petitioner-Trust in BPL case No.4 of 2004 is abinitio void.

11.         The other glaring illegality that comes to our notice is renewal of

the lease in the year 2004 with retrospective effect from 08.11.1970 for sixty
                                      18

years in the name of the petitioner-Trust without any basis and sanction of

law. To justify retrospective renewal of lease, the petitioner-Trust claimed in

course of hearing and in the written note of submission dated 11.05.2010

that it had applied for renewal of the lease before the Collector, Puri on

26.11.1971 and the same was renewed for 60 years with retrospective effect

commencing from 08.11.1970. The submission of the petitioner that it had

made an application on 26.11.1971 for renewal of lease before the Collector,

Puri is not borne by record. There is no pleading in the writ petition to the

effect   that on 26.11.1971 an application was made to the Collector for

renewal of lease granted in the name of Surendranath Ghosh in favour of

the petitioner-Trust much less any evidence was either enclosed to the writ

petition or rejoinder supporting such contention. In course of hearing, no

evidence has also been adduced before us in support of such contention.

             Law is well settled that a party has to plead its case and

produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its stand taken in the

petition and, in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no

obligation to entertain such plea. (See Bharat Singh & Ors.Vs.State of

Haryana & Ors, AIR 1988 S.C. 2181).

             Neither the order of the Collector dated 10.9.2004 passed in BPL

Case No.4 of 2004 nor the renewal deed executed on 3rd Day of October, 2005

shows that any such application had been filed on 26.11.1971 by the

petitioner-Trustee either before the Collector or before the Tahasildar for

renewal of lease.    Surprisingly, even though in the renewal lease deed

agreement dated 03.10.2005 it is recited that the lessee had applied for

renewal of lease granted on 18.6.1941, it remained silent as to when any
                                        19

such renewal application was filed. In the case record of Renewal Lease Case

No.4 of 2004, application dated 26.11.1971 claimed to have been filed does

not find place.

             Therefore, the petitioner's claim that it had applied for renewal

of lease on 26.11.1971 is nothing but a misleading approach, which is not

sustainable in the eye of law. It is a clear case of misrepresentation.

             In view of the above, grant of lease in the name of Surendranath

Ghosh Trust Estate in Balu Lease Renewal Case No.4 of 2004 for sixty years

with retrospective effect from 8.11.1970 is not only unsustainable but also

goes to   show how undue favouritism has been shown by the Revenue

authorities to the petitioner-Trust.

12.          The petitioner Trust is otherwise also not entitled to be granted

lease under the OGLS Act and the Rules as it is an unregistered Trust. In

paragraph 8 of the writ petition it is averred that one unregistered private

Trust was created on 30.06.1971 by Surendranath Ghosh keeping his family

members as trustees. The photocopy of the Deed of Trust, which has been

filed before us, shows that late Surendranath Ghosh formed Surendranath

Ghosh Trust Estate on 30.6.1971 in respect of immovable properties situated

in different parts of West Bengal and the property in question situated in

Puri. Section 5 of the Indian Trust Act, 1982 says - "no trust in relation to

immovable property is valid unless declared by non-testamentary instrument

in writing signed by the author of the trust or the trustees and registered or

by the will of the author of the trust or the trustees".(underlined for emphasis)

In the instant case the trust being an unregistered trust, it is not valid.
                                       20

            Moreover,    Clause   5(kha)   of   the   Trust   deed   categorically

authorizes the trustees to utilize the income and usufructs of the immovable

properties described in the schedule for charitable purpose after meeting

various expenses relating to the said immovable properties, salary of the

employees etc. Since the author of the Trust purports to create, declare,

assign right and interest on several immovable properties worth more than

Rs.100/- in favour of the Trust, the same is also required to be registered as

per Section 17(b) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Unless the Trust is

registered the said Trust deed does not become operative. (See Gostha

Behari Ghose Vs. University of Calcutta, AIR 1972 Calcutta 61). The

petitioner-Trust being an unregistered Trust, the claim that the petitioner-

Trust is a juristic person does not merit consideration.

            The Trust in question being not a legal entity it can neither make

any application for grant of lease in respect of any land in its favour nor any

lease can be granted in favour of an unregistered Trust.

13.         We are shocked to note that the Revenue authorities have

renewed Khasmahal lease in favour of the petitioner-Trust in Balu Lease

Renewal Case No.4 of 2004 for 60 years with retrospective effect from

08.11.1970, executed Renewal Lease Agreement (Annexure-1) and granted

permanent Pattadar status in BPL Case No. 20 of 2005 without any authority

of law. We have no hesitation to hold that it is a clear case of collusion and

fraud.

14.         The other irregularities/illegalities that cast suspicion in the

minds of the Court are that by virtue of Power of Attorney dated 26.02.2005

the Trust has given power to one Mr. Madhusudhan Khuntia, the Power of
                                       21

Attorney holder, to sell away the land in question in favour of one Govinda

Chandra Khuntia and his brothers and one Smt. Sandhyarani Mohanty to

whom the Trustees had agreed to sell the said land and received the

consideration money of Rupees Thirteen Lakhs although, as per the trust

deed, the trustees are not competent to transfer the Trust properties by

effecting gift, sale and mortgage etc. Clause-5(Kha) of the Trust deed

categorically provides that the Trust has been formed for charitable

purpose and Clause-5(Cha) clearly debars the trustees from selling away

the Trust properties, but the activities of the Trustees to sell away the

property unveils their hidden mala fide intention and connivance with the

proposed buyers. The relevant portion of Clause-5(Cha) is reproduced

below.

            "(cha) The trustees shall not be competent to raise
            claim to the effect that the scheduled properties are
            their personal properties at any point of time and the
            property described in the schedule shall not be sold
            or put to auction for the personal debts of the
            trustees. The trustees shall not be competent to
            transfer or charge the properties described in the
            schedule by effecting gift, sale, mortgage etc.
            whatsoever and if that is so done the same shall be
            void and inadmissible everywhere and in all courts of
            law."
                                       (underlined for emphasis)
            The Trustees being the creatures of the Trust cannot act

contrary to the purpose for which the Trust has been created.

            In the instant case the power of attorney had been executed on

26.02.2005 in favour of Mr. Khuntia inter alia authorizing him to sell the

property at Puri for which the trustees received consideration money and

thereafter the renewal lease deed agreement has been executed by the said

Power of Attorney holder Mr. Khuntia on 3rd day of October, 2005. Thus, all
                                       22

these documents appear to have been created in the year 2005 only with an

intention to grab the government land.

            Moreover, in the Trust deed dated 30.06.1971, the author of

the Trust late Surendranath Ghosh declared that he had decided to execute

a deed of trust for performing the works as stated in the Trust deed

properly from out of the income of the properties received by him by way of

inheritance from paternal side and being purchased by him having his right

and possession over the properties. The property at Puri does not come

within the purview of these two categories. The author of the Trust who

included the land in question at Puri in the schedule to the trust deed

dated 30.6.1971 was by that time no more a lease holder of the said land,

as the term of lease had expired on 7.11.1970. As stated above, after expiry

of the lease on 7.11.1970, renewal of lease was never asked for by the said

Surendranath Ghosh during his life time till he expired on 19.1.1973. In

any event, on the date of execution of the Trust Deed the author of the

Trust was not the leaseholder/owner of the land in question at Puri.

            The Commissioner of Consolidation, Orissa, Bhubaneswar in

his order dated July 14, 2006 passed in R.P. No.69/2005 while dealing

with the matter regarding mutation of the land in question in favour of the

petitioner-Trust remanded the matter to the Tahasildar, Puri for disposal

according to law with the following observation :-

                   "A perusal of material evidence on record shows that
            1988 Settlement Plot No.126 Ac.0.218 under Gharbari EK
            Classification stands recorded in Govt. Khata No.67 with a
            note of illegal possession of Surendranath Ghose S/o-
            Bholanath. The petitioner prays for mutation of case land
            on the strength of the Renewal lease deed agreement
            bearing Regd No.5327 dt .25.10.2005 executed by the
            Hon'ble Governor of Orissa in favour of Surendranath
            Ghosh Trust Estate, Kolkata. In this deed, lease has been
                                       23

            granted for two consecutive terms of 60 years from
            8.11.1970 to 7.11.2030. In the meantime the record of right
            for the case land has been finally published on 27.8.1988.
            The Renewal lease deed has been executed in 2005.
                   As such, the R.P. is remanded to the Tahasildar,
                   Puri for disposal according to law."
                                        (Underlined for emphasis)

            In spite of the above observation of the Commissioner of

Consolidation, the Tahasildar, Puri recorded the land in question in the

name of the petitioner-Trust without assigning any cogent reason and with

utter disregard to the statutory provisions.

            The Executive Officer, Puri Municipality vide his letter dated

5277 dated 23.11.2005 filed its objection in Municipal Lease Case No.BPL

20/05 before the Tahasildar, Puri to the effect that the land in question

belonged to Puri Municipality and as such the Tahasildar, Puri was not

competent to grant lease patta in favour of anybody as writ petition bearing

O.J.C. No.17404/97 was pending in the High Court and the matter was

sub-judice. This objection of the Executive Officer, Puri Municipality has not

been considered by opp. parties in its proper perspective.

            The Lease Case Record No. 20 of 2005 further shows that an

application was made to the Collector & District Magistrate, Puri by one

Jagannath Bastia on 07.04.2007 with a prayer not to approve Balu Khanda

Permanent lease settled by Tahasildar, Puri in Lease Case No.20 of 2005 in

favour of the petitioner-Trust and to take necessary immediate steps to stop

illegal transfer of the said Government land and for resumption as it

involves larger interest of the State. Request was also made to enquire into

the matter and to give opportunity to the applicant at the time of enquiry to

substantiate his allegations. As it appears, this objection has not been

considered by the Collector, Puri while approving the settlement made by
                                        24

opposite party No.3, the Tahasildar on permanent Pattadar Status in favour

of the petitioner-Trust vide his order dated 25.09.2007 (Annexure-2).

            In the writ petition and written note of submission though it is

stated that originally the land in question was leased out in favour of late

Surendranath Ghosh on 07.11.1924 for a period of sixteen years, the order

of the Collector dated 10.09.2004 reveals that the land in question was

leased out in favour of one Binod Behari Dey of West Bengal under lease

Agreement Deed No. 1094 of 1928 for a period of sixteen years from

07.11.1924 as per letter No.122 dated 24.07.2004 of R.I., Puri.

15.         The fact situation shows that the renewal of lease with

retrospective effect from 08.11.1970 for sixty years in favour of the

petitioner-Trust in Balu Lease Renewal Case No.4/2004, execution of

Renewal Lease deed dated 03.10.2005 and settlement of lease land on

permanent Pattadar status in BPL Case No. 20 of 2005 are nothing but the

outcome of a massive collusion and fraud.

            The apex Court in Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) vs. Shaw Bros.,

(1992) 1 SCC 534), held as under:-

                    "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn
            proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a
            concept descriptive of human conduct. Michael Levi likens
            a fraudster to Milton's sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his
            ability to, 'wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him
            into snares'. It has been defined as an act of trickery of
            deceit. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary
            fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission to
            act or concealment by which one person obtains an
            advantage against conscience over another or which equity
            or pubic policy forbids as being prejudicial to another. In
            Black's Legal Dictionary, 'fraud' is defined as an intentional
            perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in
            reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging
            to him or surrender a legal right; a false representation of a
            matter of fact whether by words or by conduct, by false or
            misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
            should have been disclosed, which deceives and is intended
                                         25

             to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
             injury. In Concise Oxford Dictionary, it has been defined as
             criminal deception, use of false representation to gain
             unjust advantage; dishonest artifice or trick. According to
             Halsbury's Laws of England, a representation is deemed to
             have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was
             at the material date false in substance and in fact. Section
             17 of the Contract Act defines 'fraud' as an act committed
             by a party to a contract with intent to deceive another.
             From dictionary meaning or even otherwise fraud arises out
             of deliberate active role of representator about a fact which
             he knows to be untrue yet he succeeds in misleading the
             representee by making him believe it to be true. The
             representation to become fraudulent must be of fact with
             knowledge that it was false."

             In a recent decision, the apex Court in State of Orissa and

Others vs. Harapriya Bisoi, (2009) 12 SSC 378 scathingly pulled up

government officials for their involvement in dealing with government

properties in illegal and collusive manner.

             The Court cannot be a party to a case founded on massive

frauds, illegalities and irregularities. The Court has a solemn duty to lift the

veil to arrive at the truth.

16.          Law is well settled that every action of the State and its

instrumentality should be fair, legitimate and above board and without any

affection or aversion. (See Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther Vs. Kerala Finance

Corporation, AIR 1988 SC 157; E.P. Royappa Vs. State of Tamil Nadu,

AIR 1974 SC 555 and State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., -vs- Nalla Raja

Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1458).

             The land in question appears to be a valuable land because of its

locational advantage and commercial use. In case the Government so likes to

lease out/sell such valuable land, the authorities exercising powers for leasing

out/selling away the land must not only be alert and vigilant in such matters

but also show awareness of the ways of the present day world as also the
                                                  26

      ugly realities at their face value or make a less than the closest-and-best-

      attention approach to guard against all pitfalls. [See Chenchu Rami Reddy

      & Anr. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., (1986) 3 SCC 391]

      17.               Considering all the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the

      case, we are of the view that the present case is a clear case of fraud,

      manipulation and collusion. We, therefore, direct the opposite parties to

      take immediate steps to take possession of the land in question. It would be

      appropriate for the State to cause necessary inquiry and fix responsibility

      on the erring officers at whose instance such valuable property of the

      Government has been leased out in illegal and fraudulent manner, in the

      light of the direction of the apex Court in Harapriya Bisoi's case (supra).

      18.               With the above observation, the writ petition is dismissed
                        No order as to costs.



                                                             ...........................
                                                             B.N.Mahapatra, J.
      B.P.Das, J.

I agree.

........................ B.P.Das, J.

Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated 02nd July, 2010/sss/skj/ pcp