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Showing contexts for: second injunction in Lala Baijnath Prosad And Ors. vs Nursingdas Guzrati on 1 March, 1957Matching Fragments
1. On 16th of August, 1930, the Respondent Narsingdas Guzrati obtained from Lort-Williams J., sitting on the Original Side of this Court, a decree for money against 38 defendants. That decree was signed by S. R. Das, J. on 10th September, 1943 and a certified copy of it was obtained by the decree-holder on the following day. On 4th of August, 1953, the decree-holder applied for the execution of his decree. Not unnaturally, an objection was at once raised on behalf of some of the judgment-debtors that execution of the decree could no longer be had, because the twelve years' time allowed by Article 183 of the Limitation Act had long expired. The decree-holder's reply was that he had still the right to execute his decree because, according to him, in computing the period of limitation, he was entitled to exclude three periods of time which would bring his application within twelve years. He also contended that there had been acknowledgments of liability which had given a fresh start to limitation. The exclusions claimed by the decree-holder were of the period between the date of the decree and the date on which a certified copy of it had been obtained, a period during which execution of the decree was said to have remained stayed under an injunction and a further period during which execution was Said to have remained further stayed under a second injunction. There can be no question that if any of those periods could be excluded, the application for execution would be within time. P. B. Mukherji, J., before whom the matter came up for hearing, allowed the exclusions claimed with some slight modifications, but he did not decide finally the question of the acknowledgments, though the inclination of his opinion was clearly in the decree-holder's favour. In the result, he over-ruled the objection of the judgment-debtors and directed the execution to proceed. Against that decision, twelve of the judgment-debtors have appealed.
22. I may now proceed to a consideration of the decree-holder's claim that he was entitled to exclude in the computation of limitation two periods during which execution of the decree remained stayed under injunctions. The date of his application was beyond twelve years by 12 days less than two years. According to the finding of the learned Judge, the period of the first injunction commenced at least on the 4th March. 1940 and extended up to the 18th January, 1944; and that of the second injunction extended from the 13th February, 1947 up to the 17th February, 1950. If even one of those periods be available to the decree-holder, his application for execution was within time.
33. The period of the Second injunction cannot be excluded at all. Though the injunction was in favour of judgment-debtors Nos. 34 to 38, Appellants Nos. 8 to 12, it only restrained execution against such of their properties as were situated in the United Provinces. There was nothing in the injunction to prevent the present decree-holder from proceeding against the interest of the judgment-debtors Nos. 34 to 38, if any, in the Calcutta property against which the present execution is directed. The decree-holder is thus not entitled to the benefit of period of the second injunction as against. Appellants Nos. 8 to 12 or as against any of the other Appellants. Though he gets the benefit of the period of the first injunction as against Moonoo, Appellant No. 12, it appears to be a benefit without any substance so far as the present execution is concerned, because Moonoo has no interest in the property Sought to be attached and sold.