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6. Mr. Pallod, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, while supporting the decision given by the trial Court submitted that the admissibility of the claim to exemption of the society from the Act must be determined by the language of the provisions made by the Act itself in that behalf. It has been contended that a question whether a particular object is of general public utility like the question whether the plaintiff society trust is a charitable trust is a question of law though doubtless it is for the Charity Commissioner to find out and state any facts bearing thereon. Referring to the certificates of registration of the plaintiff society as a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, produced at Exh. 45 and the Memorandum and the rules framed for the proper management of the public trust produced at Exhibit 40 it has been submitted that no further evidence was necessitated in proof of the fact that the plaintiff carries the very object of charitable purpose by running an educational institution. The learned Counsel for the respondent also referred to the auditor's reports at Exhibits 102 to 108 to show the activities of the plaintiff society running the educational institution are for charitable purposes. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the learned trial Judge was correct in taking the view that the buildings meant for canteen or hostel for boys and girl students have no distinct characteristic than the properties of the Trust. The buildings are constructed as per the requirements or directions of the University for the benefit of the students and in carrying out the charitable purposes of education. Therefore, the learned Counsel submitted that there is no ground to interfere with the decision of the trial Court in this appeal.

7. The first question is whether the plaintiff society which is a public trust is a charitable trust. For the question whether a particular object is of general public utility like the question whether the trust is a charitable is a question of law and useful reference may be made to the decision in the case of Trustees of Tribune Press, Lahore v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Punjab . Exhibit 44 is a certificate of registration of the plaintiff society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Exhibit 45 is the certificate of registration of the plaintiff under the Bombay Public Trusts, Act, 1950. The Trust is registered as on 29-7-1969. Exhibit 40 is the Memorandum of Association and the regulations for the proper management of the plaintiff society which contain inter alia the object for which the society was established. The main object is to promote education and culture in its Christian institutions which while primarily for those professing the Christian faith and also admit others irrespective of caste, class, creed or sex, to provide, establish endow, maintain, control and manage the Ahmednagar College and other educational institutions, schools and study or training centres and to do all acts and things necessary for or conducive to the promotion of secular and religious education in the said college at undergraduate and post-graduate level and in pre-primary, primary, secondary, Higher, Commercial, Technical and Industrial institutions at Ahmednagar or elsewhere, and for this purpose to start, establish, acquire, organize, conduct, maintain and manage branch colleges, Reading rooms, Laboratories, Gymnasiums, Workshops, Extension Projects, Publishing Houses, Hostels, Residential Quarters and the like, in order to train ideal citizens, and to take over the assets, properties, liabilities and managements of the existing institution known as Ahmednagar college from the Marathi Mission society registered under the Societies Registration Act at Bombay, Maharashtra State, and the United Church Board for World Ministries, a foreign corporation of the United States of America registered under the Indian Companies Act.

(3) "Open land" means land which is not built upon or enclosed."

9. The expression "charitable purposes" as used in Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Cess Act assumes importance. The learned Counsel for the appellant is right in his submission that the admissibility of a claim to exemption from education cess must be determined by the language of the special provisions made by the Act in that behalf. The object both of the Trust and the Society undoubtedly is to promote educational activities and the properties referred to in the suit are prima facie held under the trust wholly for advancement of an object of general public utility. The question whether an object is of general public utility like the question whether a particular object is charitable is a question of law as held by the Privy Council in the case of Trustees of Tribune Press, Lahore (cited supra). In the present case, the competent authority has granted the certificate of registration of the plaintiff trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The certificate of registration is itself is a best piece of evidence to show that the Trust can be deemed to be a charitable trust. It is true that by the terms of `trust it is clear that it is not to be carried for profit to any individual. There is, however, absolutely no material to show that any of the buildings owned by the plaintiff trust was used for profit to any individual. It is to be observed that under the Act, the test of general public utility is applicable not only to the trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 or a Wakf Board under the Wakf Act but is also to be applied to the property held under the trust or other legal obligations. Even if the object of the plaintiff society is taken into account there could not be any doubt that the plaintiff society can be called `charitable trust' for a charitable purpose. In the case of Shanti Sarup v. Radhaswami Satsang Sabha Dayalbagh Agra and others , it was observed that :

"Societies Registration Act permits registration of societies for charitable purposes. A religious society can also be called a charitable society, for a religious purpose may also be a charitable purpose and the religious society might legally be registered under the provisions of the Act."

In the present case also the plaintiff society has been registered under the Societies Registration Act and also under the Bombay Public Trusts Act and its dominant object is charitable purpose to advance education. The meaning of the word "institution" as observed by the Supreme Court in Kamaraju Venkata Krishna Rao v. Sub-Collector, Ongole and another , will cover every use of it depends on the context in which it is found. It may by emphasised that it is well settled by now that an object beneficial to a section of the people is an object of general public utility to serve a charitable purpose. It is not necessary that the object should be an object to the whole of mankind or all persons in particular country or State. It is sufficient if the intention was to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from a specified individual is present. A reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Rana Caste, Caste Association v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat . Moreover, section 2(13) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act provides that unless there is anything repugnant to the context of the public trust, `public trust means an express or constructive trust for either public religious or charitable purpose or both. The very fact that the plaintiff society is also registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, its object is for a charitable purpose. There is absolutely no merit in the contention that because certain documents which were called from the plaintiff by the defendant were not produced, an adverse inference should have been drawn in regard to the purpose for which the trust was registered. The documents to which I have made a reference earlier are sufficient to come to the definite conclusion that the plaintiff society is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act with the main object of charitable purpose to run educational institution. Thus, applying the test of general public utility in the facts and circumstances of the case there is no doubt that the plaintiff trust or the property held by it clearly comes within the purview of Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act. If the plaintiff's case falls under the category as described in section 7 of the Act, undoubtedly the lands or buildings possessed by the plaintiff are exempted from payment of tax under the express provisions contained in section 7 of the Act.