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Showing contexts for: section 53a in M/S Prestige Estates Projects Limited , ... vs Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax ... on 2 March, 2021Matching Fragments
44. It is important to bear in mind that section 2(47)(v) refers to "possession to be taken or retained in part performance of the contract of the nature referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act" and in the case before Hon'ble Bombay High Court, there was no dispute that the conditions of section 53A were satisfied. In other words, the proposition laid down by their Lordships can M/s.Prestige Estates Projects Limited.
at best be inferred as that when conditions under section 53A are satisfied, and when the assessee enters into a contract which is a development agreement, in the garb of agreement of sale, it is the date of this development agreement which is material date to decide the date of transfer. However, by no stretch of logic, this legal precedent can support the proposition that all development agreements, in all situations, satisfy the conditions of section 53A which is a sine qua non for invoking section 2(47)(v).
In judging the willingness to perform, the Court must consider the obligations of the parties and the sequence in which these are to be performed........"
48. We are in considered agreement with the views so expressed in this commentary on the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is thus clear that 'willingness to perform' for the purposes of section 53A is something more than a statement of intent; it is the unqualified and unconditional willingness on the part of the vendee to perform its obligations. Unless the party has performed or is willing to perform its obligations under the contract, and in the same sequence in which these are to be performed, it cannot be said that the provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act will come into play on the facts of that case. It is only elementary that, unless provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are satisfied on the facts of a case, the transaction in question cannot fall within the scope of deemed transfer under section 2(47)(v) of the IT Act. Let us therefore consider whether the transferee, on the facts of the present case, can be said to have 'performed or is willing to perform' its obligations under the agreement.
M/s.Prestige Estates Projects Limited.
Without sanction of the building plan, the very genesis of the agreement fails. To enable the execution of the agreement, firstly, plan is to be approved by the competent authority. In fact, the building plan was not got approved by the builder in the assessment year under consideration. Until permission is granted, a developer cannot undertake construction. As a result of this lapse by the transferee, the construction was not taken place in the assessment year under consideration. There is a breach and break down of development agreement in the assessment year under consideration. Nothing is brought on record by authorities to show that there was development activity in the project during the assessment year under consideration and cost of construction was incurred by the builder/developer. Hence it is to be inferred that no amount of investment by the developer in the construction activity during the assessment year in this project and it would amount to non-incurring of required cost of acquisition by the developer. In the assessment year under consideration, it is not possible to say whether the developer prepared to carry out those parts of the agreement to their logical end. The developer in this assessment year had not shown its readiness or having made preparation for the compliance of the agreement. The developer has not taken steps to make it eligible to undertake the performance of the agreement which are the primary ingredient that make a person eligible and entitled to make the construction. The act and conduct of the developer in this assessment year shows that it had violated essential terms of the agreement which tend to subvert the relationship established by the development agreement. Being so, it was clear that in the year under consideration, there was no transfer of not only the flats as superstructure but also the proportionate land by the assessee under the joint development agreement. As per clause Nos. 12.11 and 19.1 of Development Agreement-cum Power of Attorney, time is the essence of the contract and as per clause No. 12.11 the said property is to be developed and hand over the possession of the owners' allocation to the owners' and or their nominees within 24 months from the date of receiving the sanction of the plan from HUDA and Municipality/Gram Panchayat with a further grace period of 3 months. But the fact remains that the transferee was not only failed to perform its obligations under the agreement, but also unwilling to perform its obligations in the assessment year under consideration. Even otherwise, the assessing authorities has not brought on record the actual position of the project even as on the date of assessment or he has not recorded the findings whether the developer started the construction work at any time during the assessment year under consideration or any development has taken place in the project in the relevant period. He went on to proceed on the sole issue with regard to handing over the possession of the property to the developer in part performance of the Development Agreement-cum-General power of Attorney. In our opinion, the handing over of the possession of the property is only one of the condition under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act but it is not the sole and isolated condition. It is necessary to go into whether or not the transferee was 'willing to perform' its obligation under these consent terms. When transferee, by its conduct and by its deeds, demonstrates that it is unwilling to perform its obligations under the agreement in this assessment year, the date of agreement ceases to be relevant. In such a situation, it is only the actual performance of transferee's obligations which can give rise to the situation envisaged in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. On these facts, it is not possible to hold that the transferee was willing to perform its obligations in the financial year in which the capital gains are sought to be taxed by the Revenue. We hold that this condition laid down under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was not satisfied in this assessment year. Once we come to the conclusion that the transferee was not 'willing to perform', as stipulated by and within meanings assigned to this expression under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, its contractual obligations in this previous year relevant to the present assessment year, it is only a corollary to this finding that the M/s.Prestige Estates Projects Limited.
50. That is clearly an erroneous assumption, and the provisions of deemed transfer under section 2(47)(v) could not have been invoked on the facts of the present case and for the assessment year in dispute before us. In the present case, the situation is that the assessee has received only a 'meagre amount' out of total consideration, the transferee is avoiding adhering to the agreement and there is no evidence brought on record by the revenue authorities to show that there was actual construction has been taken place at the impugned property in the assessment year under consideration and also there is no evidence to show that the right to receive the sale consideration was actually accrued to the assessee. Without accrual of the consideration to the assessee, the assessee is not expected to pay capital gains on the entire agreed sales consideration. When time is essence of the contract, and the time schedule is not adhered to, it cannot be said that such a contract confers any rights on the vendor/landlord to seek redressal under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This agreement cannot, therefore, be said to be in the nature of a contract referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that the provisions of section 2(47)(v) will apply in the situation before us. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case as discussed above, we are of the considered view that the assessee deserves to succeed on reason that the capital gains could not have been taxed in this assessment year in appeal before us. The other grounds raised by the assessees in their appeals have become irrelevant at this point of time as we have held that provisions of section 2(47)(v) will not apply to the assessees in the assessment year under consideration. Consequently, the appeal filed by the revenue in ITA Nos. 328 to 331/Hyd./2011 have become infructuous and dismissed accordingly.