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Showing contexts for: equal status post in S.B. Mathur And Others vs Hon'Ble The Chief Justice Of Delhi High ... on 31 August, 1988Matching Fragments
The above provisions make it clear that certain posts were treated as equated posts under Schedule I and certain posts were treated as equal status posts under Schedule I1 to the said Seniority Rules of 1971. It is clear that these provisions were made with a view to provide transferability among persons holding these posts and to provide for channels of promotion to certain categories of employees who did not enjoy a chance for promotion earlier with the result that there was stagnation and frustration in the categories concerned. It may be noticed here that the posts of Judgment PG NO 779 Writers, Personal Assistants to Judges and Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equated posts and the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters and Private Secretaries to Judges have been treated as equal status posts. Rule 5 of the Seniority Rules of 1971 set out by us earlier provides for a joint seniority list of confirmed employees in categories of equal status posts presumably with the same object as aforestated.
The first submission of Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there is a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution in treating the posts of Superintendents, Court Masters or Readers and Private Secretaries to the Judges as equal status posts. It was urged by him that the sources of recruitment to these posts were not identical and so also the qualifications required for appointments to these posts. He also pointed out that the duties of the incumbents of these posts were different. It was submitted by him that in treating these posts as equal status posts unequals were treated equally and hence the rule of equality was violated. In appreciating this submission, it must be borne in mind that it is an accepted principle that where there is an employer who has a large number of employees in his service performing diverse duties, he must enjoy a certain measure of discretion in treating different categories of his employees as holding equal status posts or equated posts, as questions of promotion or transfer of employees inter so will necessarily arise for the purpose of maintaining the efficiency of the organisation. There is, therefore, nothing inherently wrong in an employer treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posts provided that, in doing so, he exercises his reasonably and does not violate the principles of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. it is also clear that for treating certain posts as equated posts or equal status posted, it is not necessary that the holders of these posts must perform completely the same functions or that the sources of recruitment to the posts must be the same nor is it essential that qualifications for appointments to the posts must be identical. All that is reasonable required is that there must not be such difference in the pay-scales or qualifications of the incumbents of the posts concerned or in their duties or responsibilities or regarding any other relevant factor that it would but unjust to treat the posts alike or, in other words, that posts having substantially higher pay-scales or status in service or carrying substantially higher responsibilities and duties or otherwise distinctly superior are not equated with posts carrying much lower pay--scales or substantially lower responsibilities and duties or enjoying much lower status in service.
As far as the case before us is concerned, although Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that aforesaid posts, namely, Superintendents, Private Secretaries and Readers could not be treated as equated PG NO 782 posts or equal status posts, he was unable to point out to us specifically any such difference in respect of the requisite qualifications of the holders of different categories of these posts or regarding the duties and responsibilities carried by these posts as were so marked or significant that it would be unfair or violative of the rule of equality to treat these posts as equal status posts. In fact, it may be mentioned that at one stage in his opening, Mr. Thakur specifically stated that he did not challenge the vires of any of the said Seniority Rules of 1971.If that is so, we fail to see how he can challenge the aforesaid posts being treated as equal status posts as that has been done under the said Seniority Rules of 1971 which have been framed by the Chief Justice in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under Article 224 of the Constitution of India. Even if one is to examine the contention on merits, we are afraid, it must fail. A perusal of items 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule I to the said Salary Rules of 1970 shows that under the said Rules which were framed as early as 1970, the salary scale of Superintendents, Court Masters (Readers) and Private Secretaries is the same, viz., Rs.350-25-575. There is, therefore, no difference in the scales of salary. As far as the qualifications for appointment are concerned, under rule 7 it is provided that these qualifications are as specified in Schedule 11. items 4, 5 and 6 of the said Schedule inter alia provide for the qualifications for appointments to the said posts and it is undoubtedly true that the qualifications required for appointment to these posts are not identical. In the case of Superintendents, it appears, very briefly stated, that appointments to 25 per cent of these posts are to be made on the basis of seniority-cum-suitability from the joint seniority list of categories 9, 10,11, 13, 14 and 15 of Class 111 mentioned in Schedule 1 and 75 per cent of the posts are to be filled by selection on merit from the same categories. The categories of posts from which promotions of selections can be made to the posts of Court Masters are substantially the same. As far as the Private Secretaries are concerned, the mode of appointment is by selection and the qualifications prescribed are that a graduate degree is required for appointment of the said post and a further requirement is a speed of not less than 120 words per minute in shorthand and 45 words per minute in type writing. A perusal of the said provisions shows that the qualifications required for appointment to the post of a Private Secretary are certainly higher than the qualifications required for appointment to the post of a Superintendent or a Court Master although from the latter two categories, probably, more experience would be required. Thus, one fails to see how any grievance can be made by the Superintendents on this score. As far as the duties these posts carry are concerned, undoubtedly they are not the Same. But Rule 8(c) of the Establishment Rules of PG NO 783 1972 provides that any person appointed to the post in one category may be transferred to other category. The validity of this Rule has not been challenged before us. This would show tat even if the duties and responsibilities attached to these posts are not the same, they were not so materially different as to render it inequitable that these posts should be treated on the same footing for the purposes of promotion and transfer. It may be that because of the requirement that a Court Master must be a graduate and having a certain typing speed, Superintendents could not be generally transferred to the posts of Private Secretaries. But one fails to see how any grievance can be made on that score by the Superintendents.
Apart from this, it must be observed that the challenge to the said posts being treated as equal status posts comes much too late to the entertained in the writ petition. These posts were treated as equal status posts under Rule 2 read with the Schedules to the said Seniority Rules of 1971 and certain promotions have also been made under the said Rules. These Rules became effective in 1971 at is much to late to seek to challenge them in 1979, long after Rule have been given effect to. It may be mentioned that, although they did make representations, the petitioners chose to file the Writ Petition only as late as in 1979. In our view, the challenge to the Rules providing for the said posts being posts being treated as equated posts or equal status posts can be negatived on the ground of delay or latches apart from other considerations.