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1. This is plaintiffs' appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 challenging concurrent findings of fact, recorded, by both the Courts below holding that the consent decree dated 18-1-1995 (Annexure P-15) suffered by the plaintiff appellant Smt. Manjii Devi wife of Shri Dwarka Parshad did not suffer from any illegality nor it required registration as per the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (for brevity 'the Act.'). The question raised in the appeal is whether the consent decree suffered by the plaintiff-appellant recognised pre-existing rights or it extinguished or created new proprietary rights within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

2. Facts which are necessary for disposal of the controversy raised in the instant appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for joint possession against defendant-respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Her simple case was that the suit land was purchased by her along with defendant-respondent. No. 2 Smt. Laxmi Devi jointly. The plaintiff-appellant and defendant respondent No. 2 are the wives of real brothers namely S/Shri Dwarka Parshad and Bishan Sarup Gupta respectively, She claimed that she had been under the influence of defendant-respondent No. 1, who is the elder brother of her husband and defendant-respondent No. 2, who is her sister-in-law (jethani). On the pretext of getting the land partitioned she was taken by defendant-respondent No. 1 to the Court where her signatures were obtained on the pretext of partition of property between her and defendant-respondent No. 2. However, she later realised that the defendant-respondent No. 1 had obtained a decree in his favour by using those papers on 18-1-1995, in respect of her share in the suit land. In pursuance to the decree, mutation No. 1330 has also been got sanctioned by defendant-respondent No. 1 in his favour on the ground that the aforementioned decree and mutation did not create any interest or title in favour of the defendant-respondents and the decree and mutation were liable to be declared as void. The additional ground taken was that the consent decree dated 18-1-1995 required registration under Section 17 of the Act as it created proprietary right for the first lime in favour of defendant-respondent No. 1. The subsequent sale deeds executed by defendant-respondent No. 1 in favour of defendant-respondent Nos. 3 to 5 have also been challenged because once defendant-respondent No. 1 is not the owner of the land which was the subject-matter of decree dated 18-11-1995 then he could not have passed any valid title to defendant-respondent Nos. 3 to 5.

9. Mr. Harbhagwan Singh, learned Senior counsel has argued that the findings recorded by both the Courts below are vitiated because the Memorandum of Understanding Ex. D1 dated 15-12-1994 cannot be regarded as a document recording any past events. According to the learned Counsel the document Ex. D1 in fact creates proprietary rights for the first time and, therefore, Section 17(1)(ii) of the Act would apply and the document would require registration before it can be accepted as a transfer deed. As a consequence of the non-registration of the document Ex. D1 no consent decree could be suffered unless the same is registered. In support of his submission, learned Counsel has heavily relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, . Learned Counsel has argued that once the consent decree Ex. P-15 is considered to be invalid then no period of limitation would, apply and such a decree is liable to be ignored in the eyes of law.

17. As a natural consequence of the findings in support, of the validity of Memorandum of Understanding Ex. D1, and a consent decree. Ex. P. 15, it is to be held that valid proprietary rights came to vest in defendant-respondent No. 1 in respect of the properly which was subject-matter of consent decree Ex.. P-15 and he could have passed a valid title by execution of transfer deed in favour of defendant-respondent Nos. 3 to 5. Accordingly, the sale deed executed in their favour by defendant-respondent. No. 1 has to be regarded as valid, and legal.