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5. As regards the second contention it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that a valid sanction under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act has been given by the Collector of Customs for prosecuting the petitioner under Section 135 of the Customs Act, that only one sanction was required to be granted by the Collector of Customs to prosecute the petitioner and consequently the sanction that has been granted under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act must be held to be a valid sanction for the learned Magistrate to take the cognizance against the petitioner and the principle laid down in above Supreme Court decision is not attracted because the Supreme Court in that decision held that if for prosecuting a member of Armed Force and sanction under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code and a sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code were to be issued only one sanction under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code would not be sufficient and sanctions both under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code and 197, Criminal Procedure Code are required to be given and in the absence of both the sanctions the proceeding initiated against the members of Armed Force had to be quashed.

14. However, it is for decision as to whether there is any such illegality in the sanction order issued by the Collector of Customs to hold that the Learned Magistrate was not justified in taking cognizance of the offence under Section 135 of the Customs Act on the basis of the said sanction.
15. Mr. Ghosh has drawn our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court as referred to above namely (Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana) in which Two Division Bench of Supreme Court consisting of M.P. Thakkar and B.C. Roy, JJ. has held that a sanction under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code for prosecution of a member of Armed Force is not a substitute for sanction for taking cognizance under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. In the above reported decision for prosecution of the member of the Armed Force both the sanction under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code for prosecution of a member of Armed Force and a sanction under Section 197(2), Criminal Procedure Code were necessary. Admittedly, there was only one sanction under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code issued. The High Court, however, took the view that inasmuch as State Government itself had accorded sanction to prosecute the appellant in exercise of the powers under Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code there was no need for sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code. The Division Bench of Supreme Court set aside the above judgment of High Court and has clearly held that for prosecuting a member of Armed Force if sanction under Section 132 and that under Section 197 are required to be issued then regard being had to the purpose for which the two sanctions are contemplated in two different provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code sanction under Section 132 cannot be a substitute for sanction for taking cognizance under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, the Division Bench of Supreme court is of the view that if the sanctions under both Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code and under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code are required then in the absence of a sanction under Section 197, Criminal Procedure Code taking of cognizance by the Magistrate would be illegal. Mr. Ghose has also drawn our attention to a Single Bench decision of this Court reported in [1989] 19 ECC 173 (Cal) : (1988) 2 Cal HN 455 (S.N. Bhowmick v. State) where the learned Single Judge relying on the above Supreme Court decision quashed a proceeding on the ground that the sanction purported to be under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act was not a valid sanction under that section by such sanction, sanction was given for prosecution and not for taking cognizance.

20. In this case only one sanction under Section 137(i) of the Customs Act is required for the Magistrate to take cognizance.

21. Regard being had to the principle laid down in the Supreme Court decision of we are of the view that what is necessary for the Court to decide as to whether a proper sanction is given or not as required under the law, is to see as to whether either from the order of sanction or from any other materials produced the facts in respect of which it is given have been set out or not. It is not necessary that the sanction will be in a particular form. It is only necessary that there should be a sanction stating the facts in respect of which it is given and the Court on the basis of the said sanction has to take cognizance. The particular language used in the order of sanction is not material. The only material thing to show is as to whether there is a previous sanction for the Court to take cognizance. It is not necessary that a sanction order under Section 137(1) shall have to be issued by the Collector to accord sanction for the Court to take cognizance, Under the Code of Criminal Procedure ordinarily the Criminal Courts on the basis of petition of complaint or police report or otherwise may take cognizance and initiate a criminal proceeding. No sanction of the executive authority is necessary for a Criminal Court to take cognizance. What 197, Criminal Procedure Code or 137(1) of the Customs Act provides is that for the offences contemplated under the said provisions there must be a previous sanction of the concerned authority for the Court to take cognizance. The language in which such sanction is worded is not in the least material when the Supreme Court has clearly held that there is no particular form of sanction. When the Customs Act has not specified the particular form of sanction under Section 137(1) of the Customs Act, then we are of the view that even if the Collector of Customs accords sanction for filing complaint for offences punishable under Section 132 and 135 of the Customs Act, 1962 before a competent Court of Law and when that sanction has been accorded in exercise of the powers under Section 137(i) of the Customs Act and when the sanction order clearly set out the facts in respect of which the said sanction has been accorded, then only because the expression used in the sanction order that the sanction is accorded for filing complaint, we are unable to hold that such sanction which has been issued under Section 137(1) is invalid. We are unable to hold that the Collector of Customs has to accord a sanction to the competent Magistrate to take cognizance. We have already indicated that it is not the contemplation of the law that the Collector shall accord sanction to take cognizance. It is the contemplation of the law that there must be a previous sanction of the competent Authority for the Court to take cognizance.

22. We have unable to approve the decision of the Learned Single Judge reported in (1988) 2 Cal HN 455 in which the learned Single Judge even though he found that only the sanction under Section 137(i) of the Customs Act was necessary he quashed the proceeding on the ground that the sanction was accorded for prosecution of the accused and that it was not a sanction for taking cognizance. In the result we are unable to hold that the sanction order issued by the Collector of Customs in this case under Section 137(1) Criminal Procedure Code [Customs Act] is in any way invalid. Therefore, the taking cognizance by the Learned Magistrate on the basis of such sanction order is not in our opinion invalid.