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4. Thus far I have assumed that the effect of the order in ejectment and the proceedings in execution of that order would be to entitle the plaintiff to Sobhandhari's one-fourth share. But I am strongly inclined to hold that they had no such effect. The holding was a joint one in the occupation of Sobhandhari and the other members of his family. The patta ought to have been tendered to all the occupants. If the plaintiff had done so, he would not, according to the present finding of the Courts, have been entitled to the decree which he obtained against Sobhandhari alone. It was in consequence of Sobhandhari's admission of the kammatham right of the Estate apparently that he was directed to accept the patta then tendered. His admission in the muchilika could, of course, not have affected the other members of the family if they had been made parties to the patta suit. The plaintiff could not, by adopting what has been found to be illegal procedure, obtain an advantage which he would not otherwise be entitled to. I find it difficult to see on what ground the ejectment proceedings could possibly affect the rights of the present defendants, either as to their shares in the property or as to their right of survivorship to the share of Sobhandhari on his death which took place subsequent to the ejectment proceedings. In Freeman on Co-Tenancy, Section 168, the learned author refers to a case in the Supreme Court of, California very similar to the present one. A judgment had been rendered against some of a number of co-tenants which in effect for ever precluded them from asserting their title. Then the remaining co-tenants instituted an action in ejectment against the plaintiff in the former suit to recover possession of the entire land. His title was found. The question was argued whether, having regard to the previous judgment against his co-tenants, he was entitled to recover anything more than his own share. The Court held that he was. Dealing with the argument that the defendant in this second suit became entitled, by his judgment, to the rights of the co tenants against, whom he obtained his decree, the Court observed as follows:

5. Ram Narain v. Bisheshar Prasad 10 A. 411 : A.W.N. (1888) 149 was cited for the respondent but in that case the only question argued was one of res judicata. It is, therefore, not in point. I am of opinion that the plaintiff's suit must fail also on the ground that he did not obtain any right to the share of Sobhandhari by the proceedings taken against him in ejectment. The result is that the second appeal is dismissed with costs.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

6. I agree in holding that the plaintiff could not, in any event, claim more than one-fourth share which belonged to the deceased Sobhandhrai. I am, however, of opinion that, when a tenant is ejected, he loses his rights in the holding, whether his interests cover only a part of the holding or the entirety of the holding, especially when the order of ejectment has been carried out by a process in execution in which the Court officer has necessarily to take the property into his custody and put it in the possession of the decree-holder. If a mere attachment of the interests of a joint tenant could sever the joint tenancy, I think the act of a Court officer in taking possession of a joint tenant's interests and handing over such possession to the decree-holder must also sever the joint tenancy. T am of opinion that the Courts should lean against the continuance of joint tenances and against claims of survivorship. The ancient Hindu Law knew, according to the learned writer, Mr. J.C. Ghose, no such principle as joint tenancy and no principle of survivorship, which principles were introduced by the Mitakshara, the writer of which commentary gave an anomalous right by birth to sons in the ancestral properties of their father. Equity also does not favour joint tenancies and rights of survivorship. If a joint tenant can, by alienating his share, put an end to the tenancy, I do not see any adequate reason why he should not, by allowing the landlord to eject him so far as his interest is concerned, also put an end to the joint tenancy. As regards the case in para. 168 of Freeman on Co-Tenancy, with due respect to the Court which decided it, I do not feel myself inpressed by the ingenious argument advanced therein. If a joint tenancy and the right of survivorship could be destroyed by proceedings in "fine and recovery" as stated in paragraph 33 of the same book, I do not see why a consent decree by which the co-tenant allows his landlord to get an order for ejectment against him should not also put an end to the co-tenancy. Even a judgment declaring the title of a third person in the holding as against a co-tenant has, in my opinion, the same effect as the transfer of any title which might have existed in the latter in favour of the decree-holder and mast, therefore, sever the tenancy. I think the case of Sunder Lal v. Chitter Mal 29 A. 215 : 4 A.L.J. 17 : A.W.N.(1907) 25 clearly lays down that if the right of the one co-tenant is extinguished in favour of a third person and cannot be set up by reason of a decision of a Court of Justice as against that third person, that event severs the joint tenancy and the other co tenants cannot claim to recover the share of the co-tenant, whose right has been destroyed either by setting up a right of survivorship or by alleging that the co-tenancy itself has not been destroyed, or by alleging that the judgment, which extinguished the rights of their co-tenant, did not make the person in whose favour such right was extinguished a tenant-in-common along with them. However, on the other grounds mentioned by my learned brother in his judgment, I hold that this is not a fit case for giving a decree for joint possession to the plaintiff along with defendants Nos. 1 and 2. I, therefore, agree in dismissing the second appeal with costs.