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12. Certain individuals claiming to be in temporary service and apprehending termination thereof, filed W.P. Nos. 12043 of 1990 and 13442 of 1990 on the footing that they were entitled to be regularised and continue in service. They prayed for interim injunction restraining L.I.C. from terminating their services. Though interim orders were granted initially, they were vacated on September 20, 1990.

13. Undaunted by the aforesaid orders of this Court, the Associations of Terminated Temporary L.I.C. Employees in various Divisions started filing writ petition after writ petition in this Court praying for directions to the L.I.C. to absorb and appoint their members in Class III and Class IV posts in respective Divisions. Significantly, counsel for the petitioners in all of them was the same. We are now concerned with such writ petitions. In these writ petitions, the L.I.C. represented by the Zonal Manager, South Zone. Madras, is the first respondent and the Union of India is the second respondent. It is stated in the affidavit that these writ petitions are wider in scope and they differ from the earlier writ petitions filed against the Divisional Managers. The basis of the claim is, however, the same. Though the petitioners are not claiming that they are covered by the awards of the National Tribunals referred to earlier, it is their contention that the directions given in the Award to the L.I.C. and the general observations made therein would confer absolute rights on the members of the petitioner association. It is alleged that the L.I.C. is indulging in unfair labour practice as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act and it is not entitled to terminate the services of the members of the petitioners association, though admittedly they were appointed for specific periods temporarily. It is claimed that the members of the petitioners associations are entitled to the benefits of Sec. 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. After the L.I.C. filed its counter-affidavit refuting the claim made by the petitioners, further contentions were raised by filing supplementary affidavits. In the writ petitions filed later, it is contended that the members of the petitioner's association are retrenched employees and as such would be entitled to claim the benefits of Secs. 25F, 25H and 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act. It also became necessary for the petitioners to challenge the validity of sub-clause (bb) of Sec. 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, which excluded from the definition of 'retrenchment', termination of the service of the workmen as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workmen concerned on its expiry or termination of such contract under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein.

(2) No person appointed under sub-Regulation (1) shall only by reason of such appointment be entitled to absorption in the service of the Corporation or claim preference for recruitment to any post."

Learned counsel submitted that right to work is guaranteed by Part IV of the Constitution of India and right to livelihood is guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India According to him, as Regulations 8 prevents a temporary employee from seeking absorption in the service of the L. I.C. or claiming preference for recruitment, it violates the provisions of Arts. 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It was also contended that right to public employment was recognised by the provisions of the Constitution and no person could be deprived of the same by a regulation of this type. It was further argued that Regulation 12 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations recognised the principle of re-employment of retrenched temporary employees in the Explanation appended thereto and thereby the principles underlying Sec. 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act and inasmuch as Regulation 8 sought to curtail the same, it was arbitrary and therefore, unconstitutional. Regulation 12 referred to by learned counsel provides that no person who has been dismissed from the service of the L.I. C. shall be re-employed. It is provided therein that a person who has been compulsorily retired or removed from service or whose services have been terminated, may be re-employed with the prior sanction of the L.I.C. in the case of appointments to posts belonging to Class I and the prior sanction of the Executive Committee in the case of appointments to posts belonging to Classes II, III, and IV. The proviso enables the appointing authority to re-employ, with the approval of the Chairman, persons who have resigned from service. Thus, the Regulation prescribes the authorities who should sanction re-employment of certain categories of persons mentioned therein. The main part of the Regulation does not make any reference whatever to retrenched employees. However, the Explanation refers to them and it is in the following terms :

31. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cawnpore Tannery v. S. Guba, 1961 - II - LLJ - 110 and submitted that the principle of giving an opportunity to a retrenched employee to join service if and when the employer had occasion to employ another hand, is of general application on the ground that it is based on consideration of fair play and justice. It is submitted that Sec. 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act has only recognised the said right of a retrenched workman which already existed and was recognized by industrial adjudication prior to introduction of the said Section. The question whether the petitioners are retrenched employees is itself in dispute and it is being considered by us in a later part of this judgment. Hence, it cannot be assumed that the petitioners are retrenched employees for the purpose of deciding the validity of Regulation 8 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations and holding that the said regulation is arbitrary and unconstitutional inasmuch as it prevents the petitioners from claiming absorption in the service or preference for recruitment.

76. When reliance was placed by the L.I.C. on sub-clause (bb) to refute the contention of the petitioners that they have been retrenched from service, some of the petitioners decided to challenge the constitutionality of the sub-clause and filed writ petitions therefor. Such petitioners are represented by Mr. Singaravelan, Advocate. In his opening argument, he did not advance any contention in this regard. Mr. Chandru, who appeared for the other petitioners, made it clear that he was not challenging the validity of the sub-clause in these proceedings. After Senior Counsel for the L.I.C. concluded his arguments in reply, Mr. Singaravelan sought to contend that the sub-clause is unconstitutional. According to him, it violates the provisions of the Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is contrary to the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the objects and reasons of the Amendment Act 49 of 1984 did not reveal any purpose for the insertion of sub-clause (bb). According to him, the sub-clause defeats substantial right made available to the petitioners by Sec. 25H and the other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. We do not find any substance in the arguments advanced. The competence of the legislature to amend the definition of the expression "retrenchment" is not called in question. When the Industrial Disputes Act was passed in 1947, there was no definition for the said expression in the Act. Nor did the predecessor Act viz., Trade Dispute Act, 1929 contain any definition. Clause (oo) was inserted by Act 43 of 1953 with effect from October 24, 1953. In Hariprasad v. A.D. Divolkar, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 121, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the definition introduced by Clause (oo) had no wider meaning than the ordinary accepted connotation of the word. The relevant passage is as follows :