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12. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting respondents would submit that since Ex.B4 is an ancient document of 30 years old, it attracts the presumption contemplated under Section 90 of the Evidence Act and that burden of rebutting such presumption is on the appellants/plaintiffs and that the appellants/plaintiffs on whom such rebuttal burden lies ought to have led evidence by producing authenticated documents having the thumb impression of the deceased first plaintiff to prove that the thumb impressions found therein and the thumb impression found in Ex.B4 are not that of one and the same persons. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the contesting respondents that they have proved by documentary evidence that the plaintiff was earlier known as Arumuga Naicker and only after the execution of Ex.B4, he could have changed his name as Kannaiyan; that when the appellants themselves have admitted that the deceased first plaintiff Kannaiyan had got an alias name Arumugam and on the other hand contend that Ex.B4 was not the one executed by him, they ought to have taken steps to refer the disputed documents with admitted documents to the finger print experts to show that Ex.B4 was not the one executed by the deceased first plaintiff and that since they failed to do so, the burden to prove cast on them remains undischarged.

17. Admittedly Ex.B4 is an ancient document aged more than 30 years. It is dated 07.10.1950. It has also been proved that the document has come from proper custody, namely Natesan, the first defendant/first respondent (died during the pendency of the second appeal). When a document is proved or admitted to be of 30 years old and it has come from proper custody, then it has to be presumed that the document was executed by the person who is purported to have executed the same. Though, the term "may" has been used in the section, unless there is a doubt regarding the age of the document or a doubt regarding the custody from which it has come, the Court shall draw a presumption as contemplated under the said section. Of course when a presumption is drawn under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, it does not mean that the same shall be the conclusive proof and such presumption is irrebuttable. Unless the law prescribes that on establishment of certain facts shall be the conclusive proof, the presumption contemplated shall be rebuttable. The contesting defendants/contesting respondents have made out a case for drawing a presumption in respect of Ex.B4 that the same was executed by the deceased first defendant. Such a presumption is only rebuttable. But the appellants/plaintiffs have not adduced reliable and sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, since the first plaintiff Kannaiyan was alive when the written statement was filed and he also chose to file a reply statement denying the execution of the sale deed dated 07.10.1950, he could have very well volunteered to give his left thumb impression and his specimen writings writing the name "Arumuga Naicker" to be compared with the left thumb impression and the signature "Arumuga Naicker" found in Ex.B4. The deceased first plaintiff did not take any steps even though he knew that the document relied on by the contesting defendants even on the date of filing of the suit was an ancient document of 30 years old. After the death of the first plaintiff, the other plaintiffs, namely the appellants also failed to produce any document containing the left thumb impression of the deceased first plaintiff for being compared with the thumb impression found in Ex.B4. The appellants/plaintiffs have also failed to produce any other document containing the left thumb impression of the deceased first plaintiff. They have also not produced any document containing the signature of the first plaintiff which was contemporary to Ex.B4. Moreover, they have not produced any document to show how his signature as Arumuga Naicker differed from the signature found in Ex.B4. Therefore, we have to come to a necessary conclusion that the appellants/plaintiffs have not adduced reliable and sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption indicated above.

19. Simply because one of the reasons assigned by the court below for arriving at the conclusion does not get the approval of this Court, it cannot be concluded that the finding regarding Ex.B4 is erroneous. As pointed out supra, since Ex.B4 is an ancient document and it attracts the presumption contemplated under Section 90 of the Evidence Act regarding its due execution as it has come from proper custody. The burden of rebutting the presumption lies on the appellants/plaintiffs. They have failed to rebut the presumption by producing reliable and sufficient evidence. Therefore, but for the erroneous attempt made by the lower appellate Court to make a comparison of the signature found in Ex.B4 and Ex.A8, the finding of the lower appellate Court that Ex.B4 sale deed was genuine and it was proved to be executed by the deceased first plaintiff in his other name, namely Arumuga Naicker deserves countenance Hence, the question framed as the second substantial question of law is to be answered in favour of the respondents and against the appellants holding that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the sale deed produced as Ex.B4 was genuine and it was binding on the plaintiffs cannot be termed either infirm or defective, much less perverse, warranting interference by this Court in this second appeal.