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"The test that is required to be applied is : does the processing of the original commodity bring into existence a commercially different and distinct commodity. On an application of this test, it is clear that the blending of different qualities of ore possessing different chemical and physical compositions so as to produce ore of the contractual specifications cannot be said to involve the process of manufacture, since the ore that is produced cannot be regarded as a commercially new and distinct commodity from the ore or different specifications blended together. What is produced as a result of blending is commercially the same article, namely, ore though with different specifications than the ore which is blended and hence it cannot be said that any process of manufacture is involved in blending of ore."

32. The assessee relied on the later part of the judgment of Chowgule & Co.'s case (supra), wherein the Court equated the blending process of iron ore with the blending of different grades of tea. However, the Court clarified that process in either case does not amount to manufacture, in other words, it does not bring into existence a new commodity, commercially different from one which has gone into blending. Thus, blending though not manufacturing of goods but amounts to processing of goods in the sense that it brings some change in the goods, hence it was entitled to lower rate of tax under the Central Sales-tax Act. However, we are not concerned with the expression "process" in juxtaposition with expression "manufacture". The legislature as clearly used "manufacture" and "produce" in juxtaposition of each other.

The Court further observed that :

"On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to think that the view taken in the Empire Industries' case that 'grey fabric' after they undergo the various processes of bleaching, dyeing, sizing, printing, finishing, etc. emerge a commercially different commodity with its own price structure, customs and other commercial incidents and that there was in that sense a 'manufacture' within the meaning of Section 2(f), even as unamended, is an eminently plausible view and is not shown to suffer from any fallacy. Indeed on this point, the referring Bench did not disagree or have any reservations either. It is to be noticed that if the amending law is valid, this aspect becomes academic."