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Relying upon this judgment, Mr. Mohite contended that imposition of the maximum penalty for the offence in question was infraction of the said instructions. In this connection, he particularly pointed out that the offence in this case was not an offence of bigamy; the plaintiff was not being punished for committing bigamy. If said sub-section is applied equally to Hindu & Muslims, then the Muslims will not be deemed to have been punished for committing bigamy, because for a Muslim, bigamy is not an offence at all. A Muslim employee, therefore, if punished under sub-section (2) would be deemed to have been punished for not taking permission of the authorities for contracting a second marriage. Ex hypothes, therefore, if a Hindu employee was punished under said sub-section (2), he would be deemed to have been punished not because of marrying a second wife but because he had failed to take permission of the Government before entering into such second marriage. Offence therefore, is, it is argued, not taking permission of the Government. The offence is not the offence of bigamy. If this is the position, then there is no reason to hold that this is a major offence. If the Government cold, in given circumstances, give permission to the employee to marry a second wife before the marriage, it is conceivable that the Government would be able to condone the second marriage inappropriate circumstances and no case in which the Government has the power to condone the offence can be said to be a case of major offence at all. The penalty for such an offence must be a graduated penalty, not the extreme penalty right from first instance.