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6. The trial court further held that the testimonies of PW9 (Vikash Kumar) and PW11 (GS Bhinder) could not be accepted, as there were some inconsistencies in their testimonies. The Trial court observed that neither PW9 nor PW11 mentioned that the Superintendent Y.R. Yadav had also followed the NCB officials to the airport. Both in the complaint and in the examination in chief of PW9 and PW11, the only statement which has been made about the NCB officials who had gone to the airport, is that a team constituting of G.S. Bhinder, Vikash Kumar and two Sepoys had left the NCB office for the airport and had conducted the proceedings at the airport and there is no mention in the entire complaint that the Superintendent Y.R. Yadav had followed the NCB team to the airport. But in his cross examination, the Superintendent had deposed that he had reached the airport at about 05.15 AM and that in his presence, only the baggage of the accused was identified and he was served a notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Further, PW11 in his cross-examination had deposed that Sh. Y.R. Yadav had reached the spot only after the trolley bag of the accused had already been opened and further that the samples were not put into pullandas but into envelopes and the same were not hot sealed. However, the trial court noted that PW9, Sh Vikash Kumar, neither took a stand regarding the presence of YR Yadav at the airport during the proceedings nor regarding the procedure of sampling done at the airport. He had deposed that he does not remember whether the samples were taken from one, two or more places and how were they packed.

7. In view of the contradictory statements made by the aforesaid witnesses, the trial court held that the same could not relied upon to reach the conclusion that the sampling procedure was done at the airport in the manner as described in the panchnama. The trial court further held the said inconsistencies/contradictions in the depositions of the aforesaid witnesses could not be termed as minor, as "the testing of the contraband, drawing out of sample therefrom, weighing the contraband, preparing pullandas are all very essential steps in the proceedings conducted in a case registered under the provisions of the NDPS Act and the members of the raiding team are expected to remember the details thereof."

19. It is also relevant to note that PW-5 was not a hostile witness; he had supported the case of the prosecution in other aspects. He is also an independent witness and has no other involvement in the matter. Thus, his testimony must be accepted.

20. The trial court evaluated the evidence obtaining in this case and had concluded that the sampling procedure had not taken place at the spot. This Court finds no reason to differ with the said conclusion.

23. As stated earlier, the conclusion that the sampling procedure was not carried out at the airport, warrants no interference. It is not disputed that not following the procedure at the spot is fatal to the prosecution's case.

24. It is a well settled that in cases of acquittal, the threshold to justify interference by the Appellate Court is much higher. The Apex Court in Chandrappa and Ors v. State of Karnataka: (2007) 4 SCC 415 held that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. The Apex Court in Ghurey Law v. State of U.P.: (2008) 10 SCC 450 held that though the Appellate Court can review the Trial Court's conclusion with respect to facts and law, it is not enough for the High Court to take a different view on evidence. There must be 'substantial' and 'compelling' reasons for holding that the Trial Court was wrong. A Division Bench of this Court in State v. Kaishar Ali: CRL.LP. 188/2018, while reiterating the principles enunciated in Ghurey Lal's case (supra) and Chandrappa's case (supra), held that though the Appellate Court has wide powers to review and come to its own conclusion, any acquittal order cannot be lightly interfered with since the presumption of innocence is bolstered in the favour of the accused by the order of acquittal. (Also see: Niraj vs. Ramesh Pratap Singh: (2012) SCC OnLine Del 3813; Arulvelu & Anr. vs. State Represented by the Public Prosecutor & Anr.: (2009) 10 SCC 206; Dilwar Singh & Ors v. State of Haryana: 2015 (1) SCC 737; Jayaswamy v. State of Karnataka: Crl Appeal No. 1022 of 2011)